University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1996

Causal v. positivist theories of scientific explanation : a defense of
the causal theory.
Douglas H. Rice
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Rice, Douglas H., "Causal v. positivist theories of scientific explanation : a defense of the causal theory."
(1996). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2291.
https://doi.org/10.7275/ne26-mg50 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2291

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

CAUSAL

V. POSITIVIST

THEORIES OF

SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION:

A DEFENSE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY

A

Dissertation Presented

by

DOUGLAS

H. RICE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1996

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

© Copyright by Douglas Hans Rice 1996
All Rights

Reserved.

CAUSAL

V. POSITIVIST

THEORIES OF

SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION:

A DEFENSE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY

A

Dissertation Presented

by

DOUGLAS

Approved

Robert

J.

as to style

and content

H. RICE

by:

/u_
yAckermann, Chair

ruce Aune,

Member

0
*

1

Gareth Matthews,

Stan Rachootin,

If)

Member

Member

John Robison, Department Head
Philosophy Department

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation could not have been written without the support of

and

institutions.

Above

Geraldine, Wiley,

me when

all,

I

am

Phil, Steve,

thankful for the love of

my

family and friends

Cindy, Sioux, Regine, George, and Dan

they could, and tolerated

me when my

many people

— especially

— who encouraged

dissertational struggles

were seemingly

endless and insufferable.

I

would

also like to express

my

Nussbaum, Cynthia

gratitude to Professors Martha

Freeland, Bruce Aune, Vere Chappell, Leonard Ehrlich, Gareth Matthews, Fred Feldman,

Bob Wolff, and Bob Ackermann.
them provided me,

in

different

student, with inspiration and

I

learned

ways and

at different

encouragement

The Philosophy Department

me

much from

at

that

I

these excellent teachers, and each of

times

my

in

career as a philosophy

appreciate greatly.

the University of Massachusetts Amherst supported

generously with teaching assistantships during

my

tenure as a doctoral candidate.

In

addition, the Freiburg/Baden-Wuerttemberg Exchange Program at the University of

Massachusetts and the

German Academic Exchange

Germany unencumbered by

of study in

had not been granted

say that

if

Beyond

that, living in

I

this

Germany was

during

my

(DAAD) granted me two

teaching duties or financial obligations.

opportunity, this dissertation

a wonderful experience,

institutions for facilitating the journey.

me

Service

IV

I

am

is

safe to

finished.

grateful to these

Guenther Patzig was generous

Finally, Professor

year at the University of Goettingen, and

and

would not be

It

years

I

thank him

for his hospitality.

to

ABSTRACT

CAUSAL

THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION:
A DEFENSE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY

V. POSITIVIST

SEPTEMBER 1996

DOUGLAS

H. RICE, A.B.,

M.A., UNIVERSITY
Ph.D.,

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Robert

Three fundamental claims are defended

Hume's epistemological program and

is

Ackerman

in this dissertation.

explanation

is

its

Humean

it

by Hume's followers.

Finally,

in

the tradition of

Humean

positivism.

positivism places severe constraints on theories of scientific explanation,

explanation are discussed

is

Second, Hume's

epistemological burden, the causal theory of scientific

influence on extant theories

attention

knowledge have

outdated, and knowledge of causation should be

superior to alternatives lying

Humean
and

this

the influence of

scientific explanation.

relieved of the special epistemological burden placed on

once relieved of

First,

his skepticism with respect to causal

hindered the development of an adequate theory of

conception of causal knowledge

J.

critically,

is

reviewed. Recent positivist theories of scientific

and are shown

to suffer serious difficulties.

Particular

paid to recent pragmatic theories (van Fraassen's and Sintonen's) and to

Kitcher's unificationist theory.

The causal theory

of scientific explanation

theories of causation. Traditional views

and Salmon's (1984) theory

(e.g.,

is

developed through an examination

the regularity view), recent

of causation are rejected

in

of

statistical theories,

favor of Cartwright's thesis that

essential features of scientific
causal laws are best understood as capacity ascriptions. The

of causal capacities and
explanations are then outlined: most prominent are the ascription

v

the description of causal interactions.

The philosophical

benefits of the causal theory are

also summarized.

Common
importance
is

is

objections to causal theories of explanation are treated.

Hume's

skeptical argument.

modernized, however,

his

knowledge

causation: causal

Once Hume's conception

arguments yield no skepticism particular
is

as defensible as are

Of

central

of causal

to the

more respectable types

knowledge

knowledge

of

of empirical

knowledge. Other important objections are also reviewed.
Finally, historical studies of

Lewontin debate concerning the
radiation— are presented.
the origin nor the

of explanation

is

manner

shown

additional evidence

in

two well-known explanatory controversies— the Jensen-

heritability of IQ,

and a dispute about the nature of cosmic

Positivist theories of scientific

explanation can account for neither

of resolution of these controversies.

In contrast,

the causal theory

to illuminate the controversies successfully. This success offers

favor of the causal theory of scientific explanation.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Explanation and Understanding

Science begins with the desire to understand. Understanding,

knowledge, but

it

demands more

than the collection of bare

lot

about the ocean

and recedes roughly twice per day,

knowledge

of tidal patterns

when clams can be

dug, or

is

when and where

knowledge

is

why

when

as well as

to use

it.

to

the tides change.

unnecessary. The

scientist, in

so,

which

we
In

it

is

it,

boat so that

it

he can estimate
will not

philosophical moments, he

be

may wonder,

But for the fisherman's purposes, this

comparison, would be

but

know

to understand the

If

dissatisfied with the

not only that the tides

why and how they

aspires, in other words, to understand the tidal changes.

characteristic cognitive aim,

work: with

his

fisherman's level of knowledge: for the scientist desires to

advance and recede, and when they do

advances

the tide will change tomorrow. This

anchor

In his

An experienced

for instance, that the tide

sufficient for the fisherman's

beached the next time he wishes
or even theorize about,

He knows,

tides.

requires

Contrast the scientist's

facts.

goals with those of other knowledgeable persons, such as fishermen.

fisherman knows a

in turn,

change. The

scientific inquiry has

phenomena

scientist

any

of the natural world in

live.

pursuit of understanding, scientists are not content with gathering vast quantities

of independent facts: they

want

to

know how and why

things

happen the way they do.

Understanding a phenomenon thus demands a cognitive ingredient beyond plain

when does one

knowledge

of

it.

But

knowledge

of

it?

What

understand a

phenomenon

are the markers of understanding?

1

as

opposed

to just

having

science, the understanding of a

In

ways: most prominent are the

some

with precision

phenomenon.
describe

it

1

phenomenon

ability to control

manifests

itself in

a

number

and predict the phenomenon;

of

to calculate

empirical quantities from others; and, finally, to explain the

Those

who

have knowledge of a phenomenon are able

— the fisherman can, after

all,

describe the

tidal patterns

understand the phenomenon are also able to explain or control

and explanation are thus closely

it.

to recognize or

— but those who
Scientific

linked, for the provision of explanations

is

understanding

one

manifestation of scientific understanding. Not surprisingly, understanding and explanation
are linked

in

another way, too: both serve as major objects of

search for understanding

is

synonymous,

in

some

scientific inquiry.

Indeed, the

contexts, with the search for scientific

explanation.

It

reasons.

follows that explanation

First,

explanation

is

is

of interest to the philosophy of science for at least

an important scientific objective and practice

and, accordingly, the philosophy of science should

Second,

in

Some

own

provide some account of

virtue of explanation's close relation to scientific understanding

good account

1.2

try to

in its

and

two

right,

it.

inquiry, a

of explanation promises to illuminate these areas of science as well.

Philosophical Problems of Explanation

The philosophy

of scientific explanation confronts a

which have already been suggested

in this brief

number

of problems,

introduction:

Wherein lies the difference between description and explanation,
between descriptive knowledge and explanatory knowledge?
(a)

or

the precise relation between explanation and understanding?

(b)

What

(c)

Flow can

(d)

The

is

some

we

account

for explanation as

and to explain phenomena both mark
the connection between these two abilities?

ability to control processes

scientific understanding:

what

is

an objective of scientific inquiry?

2

of

(e)

What

the distinction between theoretical prediction and explanation?

is

Attempts to answer these questions have brought further

common

view.

One

philosophical approach, for instance, locates scientific understanding

knowledge

of the network of logical relations

phenomena. Explanation

means

difficulties into

is

among accepted

then said to consist

in

the exhibition of this logical relation by

in

of a valid deduction of the fact-to-be-explained from theories, laws, and additional

relevant facts. There

Aristotle to

is

a difficulty

in this

van Fraassen have pointed

view, however, which commentators from

out.

The

difficulty arises

from the

fact that

while the

instances of theories and laws are often logically symmetrical, the explanatory relation

usually asymmetrical.'

with

which, as

air,

increase

in

it

To

warms, begins

the balloon's

suppose

illustrate,

to

is

expansion. But the ideal gas law

increase

Intuition tells us that the

is

deducing

facts

like

these

seem

change

in

show

to

in

The study

number

gas temperature caused by the match.

latter

fails,

however,

that there

problems

differences

between

in

facts.

In

any event, the examples generate a

in

explanations,

how

can

symmetry

we

of

account

some

instances?

of scientific texts

of

change

must be more to explanation than

of explanatory relations in the face of the logical

in their

to explain the

in

from the former.

problem: assuming that laws and theories play a role

theories and laws

one can derive the

gas temperature from the change

volume

from theories, laws, and other

asymmetry

filled

an equation, and thus logically symmetrical.

temperature, despite our ability to derive the

Examples

in

ideal gas law,

is

not an implausible explanation of the balloon's

Consequently, one can also derive the change

volume.

match under a sealed balloon

light a

I

expand. Using the

volume from the

Fully developed, this derivation

for the

and

scientific theories, laws,

for the

and episodes

in

the history of science also generates a

philosophy of explanation. For instance, there seem to be

fields of

science with respect to the practices and styles of explanation

3

that

predominate within them.

phenomena

In

physics textbooks, for example, explanations of

often include deductions, from theory, of precise empirical
quantities.

social sciences, in contrast, deductively valid

calculation of precise empirical quantities.

arguments are uncommon, as

Can

in different

areas of science?

explanatory styles and practices seem to diverge not only across

What can

nature of explanatory controversy

in

the

the

is

the theory of explanation elucidate

explanatory styles and practices should be distinct

across historical periods.

In

In

why

addition,

scientific fields, but also

the theory of explanation say about this? Finally, the
the history of science also seems to vary.

Some

explanatory controversies rage on for decades without resolution. Other controversies,

comparison, are resolved decisively within a rather short period of time
scientific explanation illuminate

One

causes.

On

Aristotle,

who

this proposal,

In

was put

suggested that to understand a

explanation consists

in citing

phenomenon, though other requirements may
The causal proposal

we

of Explanation: Aristotle

solution to the problems of explanation

philosophy by

is

Can the theory

.

of

historical contrasts?

The Forefathers of Modern Theories

1.3

the

such

3

in

often cite causes to explain events, and scientists

knowledge from explanatory knowledge

of a

Hume

forth early in the history of

phenomenon

is

to

know

its

the factors causally responsible for

also have to be met.

intuitively promising.

addition, the causal proposal provides a basis

and

In

the world of everyday experience,

seem

to follow this practice, as well.

upon which

to distinguish descriptive

phenomenon: on

the causal proposal,

explanatory knowledge contains a description of the explained phenomenon's causes;
explanatory knowledge
proposal also

According

is

thus a special kind of descriptive knowledge.

recommends

The causal

a feasible solution to the problem of explanatory asymmetries.

asymmetries
to the causal proposal, explanatory asymmetries reflect the causal

4

between the

entities, processes, etc. cited in

the use of laws

restrict

Yet despite

its

in

symmetrical laws; the causal asymmetries thus

explanatory contexts.

intuitive force

and potential

for

handling asymmetries and other

problems of explanation, the causal theory of explanation has not met with uniform favor

modern philosophy

of science.

The primary source

knowledge

critical analysis of scientific

4
.

Hume

of this disfavor has

been David Hume's

argued forcefully that so-called

"metaphysical" beliefs, including beliefs about causes and natural laws, cannot be

on grounds acceptable

to science.

The repercussions

philosophy of science cannot be overstated:

it

in

is

of

fair to

Hume's conclusions

say that every

of science, including theory of scientific explanation, has confronted

justified

for the

post-Humean theory

Hume's skepticism

as

a fundamental constraint, and has had to approach causation with caution.

Humean
century

5
.

philosophies have dominated the philosophy of science for over a

This holds true for the philosophy of explanation, as well: the field of extant

theories of scientific explanation consists, for the most part, of

only

in

the degree to which they adhere to

Hume's

Humean

Hume's conclusions. Not

theories that diverge

surprisingly, given

influence, causal theories of explanation have, until recently, been largely

dismissed from consideration, and relegated to the trash bin of unjustifiable metaphysics.

1.4

Two Approaches to

the Theory of Explanation

Recent philosophies of
positivist

and causal

scientific

explanation can be divided into two groups

— according to theoretical approach.

Positivist theories of

—

explanation

are distinguished by the following characteristic: they begin with a stringent epistemological

program

— namely, some version of Humean positivism — and then elaborate a theory of

explanation consistent with

limits

on

its

applicability.

it.

Such theories avoid the notion of causation, or

Positivist theories of

5

set

severe

explanation are themselves divisible into two

groups, according to the stringency with which each group adheres
to the

Humean

program:

(1)

theoretical

Humean and

Paleo-positivists maintain a strong distinction

and the observable, and they follow

observation to the existence of theoretical

metaphysical

Humean and

entities.

requirement of

verifiability,

Humean and

explanation plays no role

in

science

Neo-positivists relax

in

ways

reject

(e.g.,

Duhem);

in specific

Hume's

rigid

or

(ii)

contexts

all

and other

it

inferences from

varieties of

Hume's

strong

as a criterion of

paleo-positivists advocate

observable. Theories, laws, and causes are

conceived

denying

entities, causes,

though paleo-positivists

application of scientific knowledge

in

paleo-positivists thus accept

for scientific explanation,

(2)

Hume

between the

one

explanation

(e.g.,

two conclusions:

of

is

meaning. As

merely a pragmatic

Mach and van

Fraassen).

border between the theoretical and the

all

acceptable to neo-positivists, though they are

that limit their disruption of the

general, laws and causes are conceived either

(i)

as

Humean

epistemological program.

Humean

regularities, or

(ii)

statements satisfying non-empirical criteria such as simplicity, unifying power,

positivists thus refuse to

assume Hume's

anti-inductive, anti-theoretical,

known

strict criterion

as general

etc.

Neo-

of verifiability, as well as his strong

theories or laws.

in

the valid deduction of the phenomena-to-be-

6

Causal theories of scientific explanation, which stand
theories, constitute the

In

and anti-metaphysical stances. Neo-positivists generally

believe scientific explanation to consist

explained from

(i)

second major approach

in

sharp contrast to positivist

to scientific explanation.

In

general, these

theories maintain that explanation requires description of the causes of the phenomenon-to-

be-explained. At the foundation of causal theories

is

fundamental and ineliminable. Because of the

causal theories have

emerged

is

the recognition that causal knowledge

lasting influence of

as serious contenders only recently,

6

Hume, however,

most prominently with

the publication of Wesley Salmon's book, Scientific Explanation

Though

the World.

the

first

the

number

major attempt to shrug

of causal theories

is

and

proliferating,

off the lasting effects of

the Causal Structure of

Salmon's book represents

Hume's skepticism regarding

causal

knowledge.
Against

Hume

and

his followers, this

paper

offers

an extended defense of the causal

theory of scientific explanation. The theory presented here
other causal theories, however, including Salmon's.

my

views

will bring out

My
first,

some

differs in certain respects

Some comments about

from

the origins of

of the differences.

studies of scientific explanation

were launched from two points

of departure:

the conviction that positivist attempts to elucidate scientific understanding and

explanation had failed; and, second, the vague idea that metaphysical (including causal)
beliefs play an important role in scientific reasoning

well as that of

Nancy

Cartwright, had a strong influence on the development of

Salmon (1984) and others have argued convincingly
correspond, more or

and experiment. Salmon's work, as

less, to

what Salmon

my

views.

that positivist theories (which

calls "epistemic" theories) are

doomed

to

fail.

I

remained unpersuaded, however, by Salmon's (1984) causal theory of explanation: though
intuitively plausible, his theory of causation relied

these concepts were analyzed

in

upon

further causal concepts,

non-causal terms, they were clarified by reference to

counterfactual conditionals. Salmon's reference to counterfactuals,

advised, for

I

could find no good reason to accept that

understood as beliefs about what happens
In

and where

in

it

seemed

to

me, was

ill-

should be

scientific beliefs

possible (non-actual) worlds.

an important 1980 paper, Nancy Cartwright also argued that

positivist theories of

explanation (especially Hempel's Covering-Law Model) were inadequate. Her argument

relied

on two plausible premises.

First,

she maintained that there are few true laws

available from which to construct sound covering-law explanations of

7

phenomena, the

great

majority of laws used by scientists, she argued, are true only ceteris
paribus

Second, she
of

insisted that despite the lack of true covering-laws, perfectly

phenomena

little

to

do with

are nonetheless provided

the truth of laws used

Cartwright's argument

Explanation,

it

seemed

and explanation,
regularities.

But

I

I

to

it

was unsure

as describing regularities.

was persuasive, but

I

of

I

how

resisted her conclusions, too.

I

in

I

deny

I

that laws entail true descriptions of

if

they were not to be understood

know how

did not

no theory

to talk

in

my

thinking, Cartwright had already

ideas about the nature of science and scientific laws

now

is

if

Many

fact)

of laws as capacity ascriptions

nature of science. Scientists do not

live, as

scientific

objects and properties that appear before us
scientists live, as laypersons

capacities

whose complex

always have,

comes

the positivists

in

in

a

new

laws are therefore best

regularities.

perspective on the

would have

it,

in

a world of

patterns of regular succession.

a world of objects

interactions are the

phenomena

endowed

with which

Rather,

with causal

we

are familiar.

of
basic aims of science, on this view, are to grasp (and measure) the causal capacities

8

in

connection between

understood as ascriptions of causal capacities, rather than as descriptions of

With the view

Strong

objects have causal capacities,

a contingent but permanent (brute

causal capacities and other (structural) properties.

7
.

argued, to account for what scientists do

the lab and elsewhere. Most important, scientists act as

that there

about

of them.

got this far

metaphysical assumptions are required, she

and they assume

Rather than separate truth

true.

is

that metaphysical beliefs, including causal

science, but

certainly had

that

about laws,

to talk

Fortunately for me, by the time

worked out some new

better to

was thus persuaded

concepts, play an important role

metaphysics or laws, and

the explanation.

in

would be

good explanations

science. She concluded that explanation has

in

me, requires information

thought,

at best.

,

The

know

objects, to

the structural properties with which they are
associated, and to discern the

operation of particular capacities

The causal theory

in specific interactions.

of explanation that

nature and role of causal knowledge

philosophers with a

advantages

way

to talk

in

I

defend applies Cartwright's account of the

science. Cartwright has,

about metaphysics and causation

for the causal theory of explanation.

ascriptions of causal capacity allows

counterfactual conditionals.

connection between

In

one

that has a

number

For example, reading causal laws as

addition, Cartwright's view allows

one

to reassert the

that are untrue as regularity descriptions

can be accepted as true as capacity ascriptions. Other advantages follow, and they
canvassed

Chapter

in

4.

of

to describe causation without reference to

and explanation: laws

truth

believe, provided

I

will

8

This dissertation has goals that

lie

beyond the theory

of explanation.

First

and

foremost,

my

essential,

fundamental, and ineliminable. Put bluntly, one can explain neither what

scientists

do

arguments support the conclusion

in

the lab, nor

concepts. This point

is

that

processes.

two markers

that causal

what phenomena do on

related to a

understanding, especially

above

be

second goal

in its relation to

their

knowledge

own, without reference

— the elucidation

explanation and experimentation.

of explanation

shows us why

this

is

is

to causal

of scientific

of understanding are the abilities to explain,

The causal theory

science

in

so.

and

It

was noted

to control

The

abilities to

explain and to control processes, including those of the laboratory experiment, mark

scientific

understanding because understanding has a causal component: understanding

the ability to

scientific

link

do

things

in

understanding

a world of objects

is

endowed

with causal capacities.

Once

recognized as having an essential causal component, a strong

between explanation (and other

linguistic activities in science)

and process control

(including the activities of experimental and applied sciences) can be affirmed.

9

is

1.5

Summary

of Chapters

A fundamental

claim of

epistemological program and

this dissertation

is

that philosophical allegiances to

skepticism with respect to causal knowledge have hindered

its

the development of an adequate theory of scientific explanation.

conception of causal knowledge

now

is

pursuit of these claims, the historical

is

traced

in

Chapter

it

is

that

Hume’s

by Hume's followers.

development of Humean positivism

Humean

2.

A second

outdated, and that knowledge of causation should

be relieved of the special epistemological burden placed on

of science

Hume's

in

In

the philosophy

positivism places profound constraints on

theories of scientific explanation, and these constraints and their influence are also

discussed

in detail in this

Chapter 3

chapter.

offers a critical discussion of extant positivist theories of scientific

explanation. Particular attention

is

paid to recent pragmatic theories (especially van

Fraassen's and Sintonen's) and to Kitcher's unificationist theory, because these theories

have, as a result of their novelty, received relatively

In

Chapter

4, the causal

treatment

little critical

theory of scientific explanation

is

in

the literature.

developed through an

examination of theories of causation and of the nature of causal laws. Building on

this

examination, features essential to any successful causal theory of explanation are then
outlined.

The philosophical

In

Chapter

is

Hume's

5,

common

benefits of the causal theory of explanation are also laid out.

objections to causal theories are treated.

skeptical argument,

which

conception of causal knowledge

is

is

examined

modernized,

in detail.

his

It

is

Of

central importance here

argued that once Hume's

arguments yield no skeptical

conclusions particular to the knowledge of causation: causal knowledge
defensible as are

more respected kinds

objections, such as the claim that

some

of empirical

is

as clear

and

knowledge. Other important

scientific explanations are non-causal, are also

considered.

10

In

Chapter

6,

a series of historical studies are presented

theory of explanation. The history of explanatory controversies
"data" concerning the nature of scientific explanation, and

episodes

in this

history are unintelligible

theories of explanation.

account

More

for neither the origin

controversies.

It

illuminates those

will

will

science

is

be argued

a rich source of

that certain

the viewpoint of positivist

specifically, positivist theories of scientific explanation

nor the manner of resolution of

historical

explanation. These differences,
causal theory of explanation.

in

when approached from

be shown, moreover,

same

it

defense of the causal

in

many

historical

can

explanatory

that the causal theory of explanation successfully

episodes that are unintelligible under positivist theories of
it

will

be argued, constitute further evidence

in

favor of the

CHAPTER

2

THE HUMEAN POSITIVIST TRADITION

Hume's Influence and the

2.1

Positivist Tradition

has already been noted that despite

It

its

intuitive force

and potential

handling

for

the asymmetries and other problems of explanation, the causal theory of
explanation has

met with

Hume's

little

favor

in

modern philosophy. The source

critical analysis of

causal knowledge.

of this disfavor

is,

above

Hume's influence has been so

David

all,

great that the

current terrain of the philosophy of explanation cannot be understood independently of his

would thus be

doctrines.

It

what

Humean

I

call

development,

I

positivism

will discuss

main points of the Humean heritage

useful to rehearse the

— and to trace

its

development.

historical

work by Hume, Mach, Duhem, and

addition, the consequences of

Humean

In

—

tracing this

the logical positivists.

In

positivism for a theory of explanation will be

discussed with respect to Duhem's and Mach's remarks on scientific explanation. Later
this paper,

I

will also discuss the

views of Carl Hempel (whose work on

in

scientific

explanation remains an important touchstone for current debate), Philip Kitcher, Bas van
Fraassen, and other contemporary standard bearers of the positivist tradition

over

scientific explanation.

influence.

only satisfactory account of
reevaluation of

Hume's

sketching

Chapter

I

terrain

will ultimately

scientific explanation.

Hume's conclusions and

important to be sure that

controversies

9

Understanding the current theoretical

Hume's arguments and

in

we

understand

influence, therefore,

is

not

my

only motive for rehearsing

argue that the causal theory provides the

Because

this

the evidence he offers

his

arguments

in

some

Hume's arguments

5.

12

will

argument requires a
in

support of them,

detail.

In

it

is

addition to

be discussed

in detail in

Hume's

2.2

Critical Philosophy:

Humean
(1)

positivism

may be

The Analysis of Causal Knowledge

characterized by a set of six key doctrines: 10

Duality of knowledge there are two distinct kinds of knowledge

— logical-

mathematical and empirical.
(2) Verifiability, significant

are those

(3)

whose

propositions must be verifiable; verifiable propositions

truth value

can be

settled.

Pro-observation: empirical propositions are best verified by observation (sensory

experience).

Anti-cause: there are no knowable causal connections
the regular associations of objects in experience.
(4)

(5)

nature. There are only

— that the inference
to those that have not been observed — has no epistemic

Anti-induction: ampliative inference

from observed cases

in

empirical matters

in

is,

foundation.

Anti-metaphysics: metaphysical propositions are unverifiable and therefore
meaningless.

(6)

There are other important doctrines
his

in

Hume

— his copy theory of ideas, for example, and

important thesis that causal judgments are ultimately founded on mental propensities

that are tangential to the theory of explanation.

Hume

that

in

discussed below

Chapter

2.3

summarize only those doctrines

in

the

Humean

in

support of these doctrines, especially those underlying

work

of

5.

Our

present aim

is

to track the influence of

(4), will

be

Humean

of later positivists.

Positivism

Hume's philosophy

and the Philosophy of

philosophers of science.

It

Scientific Explanation

— especially his demanding empiricism and distrust of causes

and other "metaphysical" notions

— has had a profound

has also

into the foundation of causal

own

(1)-(6)

have had the most profound influence on subsequent philosophy of science.

Hume's arguments

positivism

11

—

left

them

in

knowledge ends,

solution to skepticism, moreover

influence on subsequent

a quandary.

it

For

would seem,

Hume's

in radical

critical

inquiry

skepticism.

u His

— a theory of mental propensities — places scientific
13

knowledge on the foundation
justice to the explanatory

of a theory of

power and

mechanics or the Darwinian theory

human psychology, which

objectivity of scientific theories such as

of natural selection.

philosophy of science may be understood as an attempt
with an adequate picture of scientific practice and
This

is

hardly seems to

its

Indeed,

much

to reconcile

impressive

true in the philosophy of explanation as well,

that there are

association of objects

no

Newtonian

of subsequent

Humean

positivism

results.

where the

constraints

by Hume's analysis have had a strong impact. The most obvious constraint

Hume's conclusion

do

is

imposed

imposed by

verifiable causes in nature, but only a regular

experience. This conclusion precludes any causal theory of

in

explanation.

Other constraints have been important,
of

phenomena, and

it

is

too.

Science provides theoretical treatments

often remarked that the explanatory

resides in these theoretical treatments.

A

power

of scientific

knowledge

theory of scientific explanation could thus

approach explanation as theoretical treatment, and

try to specify the relation

between

theory and fact wherein such treatment consists. But Hume's analysis presents obstacles to
this

approach, too, for

it

leads to a

downplaying of the importance

of theories.

Hume's

doctrine of verifiability and rejection of ampliative inference entail that empirical theories
are significant only insofar as they describe the facts of past experience. Theories add

nothing,

in

other words, to the empirical facts themselves. Accordingly,

Humean

positivists

tend to conceive of theories as no more than precise and economical summaries of
empirical

facts.

whose aim
13

7).

This

is

them. Both

is

to

Duhem,

for

example, defines a physical theory as "an abstract system

summarize and

classify logically a

group of experimental laws" (1914/1954,

not to say that theories are identical to the empirical facts subsumed under

Mach and Duhem emphasize

that theory construction

is

a process of

abstraction from the empirical facts, and that this process of abstraction

14

is

necessarily

simplifying.

In

theory-building, completeness of description

of simplification

14

As a

.

result,

is

traded for the convenience

no theory represents the empirical

facts in their entirety.

Nevertheless, the significance of theories cannot extend beyond
the empirical

and they

us nothing of the "reality" or "causes" that underlie experience.

tell

Correspondingly, the view of Mach, Duhem, and other

Humean

derive their importance only from their pragmatic virtues: above

positivists

all

is

that theories

else, theories are

simpler and easier to work with than vast collections of disjointed empirical facts
It

becomes puzzling, on

this

conception of theories,

could be enlightening or explanatory,

not the only obstacle his philosophy places

in

Hume's

15
.

theoretical treatments

redundant, adding no
anti-causal stance

thus

is

the path of a theory of scientific explanation:

analysis also discounts the value of theories, and this hinders any theory of

explanation that would

How,

and Pierre

rest

then, can a

consider the remarks

Duhem

16
.

on the theoretical treatment of phenomena.

Humean

made by two
Not

discounting of theories,

Duhem

how

for theories are empirically

significant information to the empirical facts themselves.

Hume's

facts,

positivist

of the

account

most prominent

surprisingly, given their

Mach and Duhem were

rejected scientific explanation outright.

or causes of the

phenomena

for scientific explanation?

Humean

positivists, Ernst

in

science, on

inclined to depreciate explanation as well.

To

as they appear to us.

Duhem's view

17
.

Mach

disparagement of metaphysics and

explain, he said,

But reality

lies

is

Obviously,

this

to reveal the reality

forever

of scientific theory. Theology provides explanations; science does not.

play no role

We'll

beyond the

efforts

Explanations thus

makes quick work

of the

philosophical problems of explanation.

In

that

contrast to

some account

explanation

in

Duhem, Mach recognized

that scientists

of this effort must be provided.

the following way:

15

He

do seek explanations, and

sought to account for the search

for

In the manifold of natural processes,
some things seem familiar, while others
seem unfamiliar, confusing, surprising, indeed, even contradictory
to that
which is familiar. So long as this is the case, one has no stable,

unified

conception of nature. There thus arises the task of searching
out those
elements present in every manifold that are of a similar kind.
In this way,
the shortest and most economical description and statement
can be
obtained. ..If one has

fulfilled this task of recognizing everywhere
the same
few simple elements that are joined together in familiar ways, we then
encounter them as something familiar, we are no longer surprised by them,
their appearance is no longer strange and new, we feel
ourselves at home
with them, they are no longer confusing to us, they are explained

(1883/1976,

Mach

s

5ff.).

view of explanation

is

distinctly psychological: to

have a phenomenon explained

to alleviate the feelings of surprise, confusion,

and discomfort produced by an unfamiliar

phenomenon. These

and the phenomenon explained, when

recognize that the

feelings are diminished,

phenomenon

is

phenomenon can be subsumed under

respects.

theory.

The phenomenon

Subsumption under

and

is

a theory,

it

(or laws):

is

when an

unfamiliar

thereby classified as belonging to a

recognized to be similar to other experiences

is

thus explained for us via

a

known

its

in

some

subsumption under a known

theory promotes the goal of having a unified,

economical, and stable conception of nature. 18 Yet despite the role played by
laws and theories, explanation remains psychological: explanation,

relief

we

similar in certain respects to others already encountered.

This view suggests an explanatory role for theories

certain class of experiences,

is

for

Mach,

scientific

is

literally

the

from feelings of discomfort.
For positivists such as

Mach and Duhem,

explanation has no fundamental role

the proper practice of science. This discounting of explanation

moreover, of Hume's

critical analysis of

causal knowledge: as

in

science

we have

is

seen,

in

a direct legacy,

Hume's

strong

anti-metaphysical and anti-theoretical stance offers a meager foundation for any theory of

explanation.

16

2.4

Logical Positivism

The

tradition of

century by the logical
in

Humean

positivism

The

positivists.

science, for they, like

logical positivists

Hume, were concerned

foundations of knowledge. But the logical
precise and vigorous manner, and therein
efforts

logical

in

was
and

two-fold.

was continued

First,

little

first

half of the twentieth

to say

about explanation

developed

our present

Humean

positivism

The legacy

interest.

in

developed by Frege,

Russell,

England and the United

and develop the Humean position encountered

Second, their

These

significant difficulties.

Humean

difficulties led

positivism, or, at least, to

deemed

too restrictive to develop an adequate notion of scientific theory. As a

of avoiding

Hume's conclusions.

philosophers questioned the doctrine of
logical positivists.

inference of the kind rejected by

These changes had the

one

of

which was

Mach and Duhem
for

explanation

jettison various

in

Hume,

effect of

science.

In particular,

verifiability, at least in the strong

opening up new

The approach

We

many

Humean

philosophy of

have seen

in

work

the

of

positivism preclude any significant role

the failures of logical positivism led philosophers to

doctrines, however, intellectual space for interests

We will

result,

was

form urged by

possibilities in the

explanation was created. This interest was pursued, above

and Carl Hempel.

positivism

including theories of induction and confirmation.

a theory of scientific explanation.

When

Humean

Others openly sought theories of ampliative

that the constraints of

Humean

a

efforts to clarify

new ways

science,

in

of their

seek out

and the early

the

and others, had great influence

States.

philosophers of science to renounce certain aspects of

Hume

viz.,

the methods of the logical positivists, which were the methods of

linguistic analysis

philosophy, especially

had

the

with more fundamental issues,

positivists

lies

in

next consider

some

of the logical positivists

stringently

When we run over our libraries, persuaded of these
we take in our hand any volume;
must we make?
17

the

work

details of this historical

was

If

all, in

in scientific

development.

Humean. Hume

principles,

Popper

of Karl

wrote:

what havoc

of divinity or school

metaphysics, for instance,

let

us ask,

concerning quantity or number
reasoning concerning matter of
the flames: For

This statement, noted
positivism.

Like

it

A.J.

the logical positivists divided significant propositions into
two

and

boundary

Purely formal propositions were tautological, while

factual.

tautological nor verifiable

The

or philosophy.

to

be

verifiable.

were ruled

to

be meaningless and therefore

logical positivists

hoped

distinguishes

it

from that of Hume: the

in

problems of language. Thus, while

the logical positivists

were

to

be

clarified

The

ball

is

Russell,

and

logical positivists'

of verification

Hume,

by drawing a sharp

—

is

work

to

problems

Hume was

in

in turn,

others.

the representation of knowledge,

concerned with what can be known,

The problems

said.

by applying the

new methods

of language

of formal logic

20

famous slogan

— the meaning of a proposition

a stronger, linguisticized version of

significant,

around the

of the logical positivists that

Hume's doctrine

red" represents a comparison of the ideas of "ball" and "red."

is

illegitimate in science

line

a proposition represents a comparison of ideas or impressions

proposition

were neither

science could be eliminated.

in

were concerned with what can be

and resolved,

developed by Frege,

the

that

logical positivists believed that the traditional

problems of knowledge could be reduced
to

that,

Uses of language

of scientific discourse, metaphysical disputes

There was, nevertheless, a focus

i.e.,

contain any abstract reasoning
contain any experimental

it

Ayer, could very well have served as the credo of logical

were required

factual propositions

it

fact and existence? No. Commit it then
to
can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (1
977, 1 1 4).

Hume,

classes: purely formal

Does

No. Does

and can become knowledge, only

if

in

An

is its

method

of verifiability.

thought,

For

e.g., "the

empirical

the ideas contained

in

it

correspond to impressions, which are the discrete components of immediate sensory
experience. The logical positivists had a similar conception of empirical significance, one

which, however, reflected

their linguistic focus.

language was to be constructed out of some

For the logical positivists,

set of simple,

18

all

meaningful

"atomic" statements. These

statements were to correspond to absolutely simple
propositions, the atomic facts

were

to

facts.

In

the case of empirical

correspond to observation reports by which they

could be verified.

There were many disputes about the nature of observation reports
and of
verification.

Ultimately, however, the verifiability criterion had to be abandoned.

logical positivists

argued

at first that all (non-analytic) scientific

reducible to observation reports

only

is

if it

reports/

paper

Hempel

1

in

example,

logically deducible

1

in

is

that the criterion

not up to

supposed task of distinguishing

its

For any statement S that

insignificant propositions:

sentences O, there are an

infinite

In

number

therefore, 5 v N, are insignificant. Yet S v

if

is

deducible from a

for

significant

set of

is

from

observation

of statements of the form 5 v N, such that

N

and

an influential

on a number of grounds. 22 He showed,

this criterion

is

significant

(and logically consistent) set of observation

finite

called this the requirement of complete verifiability.

950, he criticized

according to the

propositions should be

the following sense: a proposition

from some

The

N

and,

deducible from O, and therefore significant

criterion.

Most importantly, Hempel argued

that there are a great

both significant and true, but which are not deducible from any

many

statements that are

finite set of

observation

sentences. These are the universal empirical laws and theories of science. The requirement

thus rules out as insignificant

criticism that

was most damaging

After considering

I

many

think

it

is

integral

of scientific theories.

requirement of complete

to the

and rejecting

components

a

number

23

This

of alternative criteria,

Hempel concluded:

terms of deductive relationships to observation sentences. The

—

of which we have considered the major
past development of this search
seems to warrant the expectation that as long as we try to set up a
stages

—

criterion of testability for individual sentences in a natural language, in terms

of logical relationship to observation sentences, the result will be either too
restrictive or too inclusive, or

both (1959,

19

1

1

6).

the

verifiability.

useless to continue the search for an adequate criterion of

testability in

is

In

place of requirements of complete verifiability or

a requirement of translatability, according to

only

if it is

which

falsifiability,

a sentence has cognitive

translatable into an empiricist language. This criterion also

least as a criterion of

Hempel proposed

meaning. The problem with the

criterion,

fails,

meaning

however,

argued Hempel,

is

and

if

at

that

can give no satisfactory account of the meaning of disposition terms, and he showed

it

that

appeal to counterfactuals or Carnap's "reduction sentences" does not provide sufficient
support here. Hempel concluded:

The content

of a statement with empirical import cannot,

in

general, be

exhaustively expressed by means of any class of observation sentences
(

Hempel

1959 122 ).
,

thus declared the logical positivist criterion of meaning to be dead. At most,

Hempel concluded, we can demand
in

some way

to observables.

This

that cognitively significant scientific propositions refer

demand

says nothing, however, about the

meaning

of

these constituents, and does not imply that their meaning can be exhaustively given by
reference to observable phenomena. Hempel's criticism applies equally to

doctrine of verifiability, which

demanded

content of impressions. This tenet of
to

that significant propositions

Humean

positivism

was

Hume's

be reduced

therefore

to the

condemned

as well,

be replaced by a weaker requirement of empirical import.
Decisive

reduced

to

any

in

Hempel's

criticism

was the recognition

set of possible observations: in

2.5

The Impact

of Logical Positivism's

Laws and theories were thus recognized

set of observational facts

in

the philosophy of science.

of theories

Two

20

as

subsumed under them.

Demise on the Philosophy

Hempel's reassertion of the significance

development

cannot be

an important way, scientific laws (and

theories, therefore) transcend actual experience.

having significance above and beyond the

that scientific laws

of Science

opened the way

for

new

important areas were the studies of

areas of

confirmation and induction.

cannot be reduced
inference

set

is

to

needed

any

If

scientific

laws and theories are accepted as true, and
yet

set of observation statements, then

to justify our belief in such theories.

some

sort of ampliative

Philosophers such as

Hempel

out to develop theories of ampliative inference (confirmation
and induction) to

gap.

Whether the

pursuit of this goal reflected a dismissal of

ampliative inference, or simply a retreat from the

science

is

a normative,

and not merely a

second of Hume's doctrines
has, at least,

The

— the denial

been ignored when

it

is

of ampliative inference

theories.

any

In particular,

Once

it

is

philosophy of

been

— has fallen

that a

into doubt, or

so.

and theories also raised again the questions

of metaphysics that the logical positivists had tried so hard to

philosophy.

that the

descriptive, project, the result has

revival of respect for scientific laws

this

Hume's conclusions about

common view

convenient to do

fill

thus

remove from science and

questions arose concerning the ontological commitments of

accepted that the significance of theories cannot be reduced to that of

set of possible observations,

then one can no longer demand, on grounds of

unverifiability, that the metaphysical entities

mentioned

in

theories be

banned from the

discourse of science. There thus arose an extended discussion, which continues today,

about the ontological (and methodological)
rejection of metaphysics has thus also

One

of

Hume's

status of theoretical entities.

become

is

Hume's

many

positivists

removing causal concepts from science. Yet most continued

knowledge

of causation

is

part of science,

Most

had been,

to accept the

in

Humean view

reducible to that of the regular association of events. This

view has an advantage of economy. Once laws and theories
and irreducible

untouched by the wake

analysis of causal knowledge.

philosophers of science were no longer interested, as

that

positivists'

controversial.

doctrines, however, has remained relatively

of logical positivism's demise. This

The

and

if

are accepted as an essential

laws describing the regular association of events

21

suffice to characterize causal relations, then

it

would seem imprudent

to

add causes

to the

reservoir of concepts or ontological entities necessary
for the philosophy of science.
Finally,

and most important

strong repercussions

in

for

our discussion, the

In

of logical positivism

the philosophy of explanation. Nearly

explanation have acknowledged with FHempel that the

must be abandoned.

fall

all

philosophers of

verifiability criterion of

addition, most have agreed that

Hume's

had

meaning

regularity conception of

causation should be retained. Beyond these two points, however, there has
been sharp

disagreement. The various approaches to explanation that arose out of the demise of
logical
positivism will be discussed

in detail in

the following chapters.
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CHAPTER
POSITIVIST

3

APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION

They are ill discoverers that think there is no land when they can
see
nothing but sea (Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, II, vii,
5).
,

3.1

Neo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation

3.1.1

The Covering-Law Model

of Explanation

Hempel's work played an important
positivism.

Hempel was

also instrumental

role, as

in

we have

in

the

work

of

Hempel,

its

in

emphasizing the new

the philosophy of science. After years of repression under

reassumed,

seen,

Humean

Humean

the turn from

role of explanation in

positivism, explanation

position as a leading objective of scientific inquiry:

To explain

the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the
question "why?" rather than only the question "what?", is one of the
foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research

various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject
matter by providing as explanation of the phenomena it investigates
in its

(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948,

135).

Following Popper and others, 24 Hempel and Oppenheim construed the general
question,

laws,

"Why does

and by

construal

is

virtue of

the

phenomenon happen?"

as

meaning, "According

to

what general

what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon occur?" 25 This

quite broad, and allows

many

possible avenues of approach. One’s approach

depends most importantly on how one understands "general laws" and "occurs

A

causal interpretation of "occurs

in virtue of," for

example,

and Oppenheim pursued another avenue: they aspired
not exclusively)

in

virtue of."

one approach. Hempel

to clarify these ideas largely (though

terms of logical syntax.

The Covering-Law Model
explain a

offers

in

phenomenon

is

of scientific explanation

to derive a statement asserting

23

emphasizes a basic

its

feature: to

occurrence from other

statements, at least

relevance

one

of

which

a universally quantified scientific law.

thus a function of a special kind of logical
dependence.

is

model requires explanations
(I)

is

Explanatory

More

specifically, the

to satisfy four principle conditions:

An explanation is a valid argument,
phenomenon to be explained.

the conclusion of

which

is

a description of

the

The argument must contain

(II)

Some

(III)

at least

one premise

that

premises of the argument must be empirical,

is

a general law.

testable

i.e.,

by observation

or experiment.

The premises

(IV)

A number

of the

argument must be

true.

26

of different kinds of general laws can satisfy requirement

All of

(II).

them share

four basic features:

(i)

they are sentences consisting of one or more quantifiers followed by an

expression containing no quantifiers;

they are not logically equivalent to any singular sentence;

(ii)

(iii)

they contain only "purely qualitative" predicates; 27

(iv)

they are true.

The weakest kind

of general law

— which

Hempel and Oppenheim

— satisfies these features plus the additional requirement that

theory"

set of general

all

of

In

its

it

be derivable from a

Hempel and Oppenheim's

accommodating

contains no individual constants;

original

paper (1948), requirement
Later,

(I)

restricts

with a view towards

certain kinds of statistical explanations, this restriction

was loosened by

to allow statistical inferences that confer a high degree of probability

conclusion.

law—

quantifiers are universal.

explanations to those arguments that are deductively valid.

Hempel

it

laws that contains no individual constants. The strongest kind of

"fundamental law"— has the four basic features plus two:

and

a "derivative

call

28

demonstrated

Both approaches

embody

the idea that a

that a statement describing the

phenomenon

phenomenon must be
24

is

(or

on the

explained

is

if it is

likely to be) true,

given that certain laws and antecedent conditions are
necessity

course,

is

thus bestowed upon the

if its

true.

A

certain kind of epistemic

phenomenon. A demonstration

inferences are truth-preserving.

is

Hence, Hempel requires

an explanatory argument either be deductively

more

forceful, of

that the inferences in

valid, or, in the case of statistical

explanations, bestow a high degree of probability on the conclusion.

Why

would one

general laws?

One

think that scientific explanation consists of logical deduction from

motivation for the view has just been suggested: on Hempel's account,

an explanation of a phenomenon demonstrates that the phenomenon occurs with kind
a
of
necessity, albeit logical (or epistemic) necessity.

theoretical treatments often found

show

a law or set of laws to be a

in

The account

also

fits

science textbooks, especially those of physics, which

consequence

of higher-order laws.

The Covering-Law Model has been thoroughly discussed and
literature.

Hempel and Oppenheim themselves

an incomplete,

if

the deductive

criticized in the

realized that these conditions alone provide

not, in their view, unsatisfactory, characterization of explanation.

The

major problem areas are the following: 29

(1)

The account depends on

a satisfactory account of "lawlikeness,"

and Oppenheim conceded they could not provide. 30 They recognized
be placed on the predicates admissible

in

what

this

that restrictions

must

the construction of general laws. These

predicates, they suggested, must be "purely qualitative," but they

clearly

which Hempel

were unable

to specify

means. There are other problems as well, the most basic of which

is

how

to distinguish laws from accidentally true generalizations.

The problem

of constructing criteria of "lawlikeness"

Covering-Law Model of
that

scientific explanation, but

model. Indeed, one may be tempted

its

is

solution

not

is

endemic

to the

important to the success of

to think that other serious

problems of the

Covering-Law Model, such as the problem of explanatory relevance, could be resolved by

25

a

satisfactory

account of "lawlikeness." 31 The discussion below

problems of explanatory relevance remain even
(2)

The Covering-Law Model

explanations

fail

is

scientific explanations

in

many

Covering-Law Model, because they

(or statistical)

arguments from true premises. Some

— generative or narrative explanations, for example — are simply not

that are, at best, ceteris paribus generalizations,

if

in

science, e.g.,

in

of the latter

is

left

(i.e.,

Coulomb's Law, which

arguments can usually be formulated from laws only
ideal or contrary-to-fact

An example
America came
Strait

from

to

Asia).

if

32

where

employed

never realized) or contrary-totells

us the attractive force

result, valid

deductive

employed

are false as

the laws

assumptions are made.

of a generative or narrative explanation

be populated by human beings

(their

The explanation indicated here

is

is

the explanation of

how

North

ancestors traveled across the Bering

a narrative description of a

sequence of

events, supported by statements of evidence affirming the occurrence of various events

the sequence.

fact that

common

The explanation may

North America
not only

is

refer to general laws, but there

populated by

in social

in

unspecified or are

experienced by two charged bodies that have no mass. 34 As a

if

as true.

physics textbooks, the laws

unspecifiable. Often the conditions required are ideal

written, or

form, rely on laws

which cannot be accepted

these deductions are true only under conditions that are

A good example

in

any, exceptionless generalizations. 33 As a result, even

deductive explanations appear

fact.

that

respectable scientific

form. Other scientific explanations, though deductive

Science contains few,

however,

questions of lawlikeness are settled.

too restrictive:

to satisfy the requirements of the

cannot be reconstructed as deductive

deductive

after

will indicate,

human

beings.

is

no deduction

Narrative explanations

35

are

sciences such as anthropology and sociology, but also

evolutionary biology and astronomy.
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in

in

of the

As a further example, consider Kettlewell's explanation
of melanic species of Lepidoptera
to Kettlewell, the spread of

centuries

due

is

in part to

melanic counterparts.

in industrial

melanic forms

in

of the evolutionary success

England (Kettlewell, 1955

,

1956 ). According

the late nineteenth and early twentieth

the adaptive advantages held by melanic moths over
their non-

In particular,

melanic coloring enhances moths'

ability to

avoid

predatory birds by hiding on tree trunks and boughs darkened by
industrial pollution. An

improved

ability to

avoid predation has resulted,

reproductive success. This

adequate

for

our purposes.

true laws from

inferred.

In

which the

is

It

in turn, in

higher rates of survival and

a simplified sketch of Kettlewell's explanation, but

is

difficult, to

say the

discover

least, to

differential reproductive success of

addition, even though

no such laws are

in this

is

it

explanation any

melanic moths

may be

specified, the explanation

is

convincing.

Of

one could

course,

extract candidate laws from Kettlewell's explanation.

One

such law might be:
(P)

If

species a

is

better able to avoid predation than

is

competitor species

b,

then

species a will outreproduce species b.

Speaking

however,

strictly,

it

cannot be said that

this

law

between predation avoidance and reproductive success
population, there

is

adapted groups. But even

false.

Assuming

if

(P)

a causal connection

exists, there

is

true.

were formulated

First,

will

factors are peculiar to

is

finite

as a stochastic law,

it

would

still

be

between predation avoidance and reproductive

(probability of) reproductive success of species a, or to

that (P)

any

be outreproduced by

remain any number of factors that can intervene

about the consequence

the connection

stochastic: in

always a chance that better adapted groups

lesser

success

is

promote

falsified in particular cases.

each biological case. To specify

27

all

In

to inhibit the

that of species b, bringing

addition, the intervening

possible intervening conditions

would be impossible, and

make

true.

it

it

thus appears that

e.g.,

the

in

any way

that will

36

Another type of explanation
explanations

statistical

cannot be revised

(P)

in

for

which the Covering-Law Model cannot account are

which the probability

quantum mechanical explanation

of the

phenomenon explained

of events with

low

probability.

37

very low,

is

Such cases are

not captured by Hempel's requirement that the explanandum be
granted a high degree of
probability by the explanans. 38

In

response to these

explanations

in

sorts of

counterexamples, Hempel has argued that

science are simply incomplete, and are therefore not easily put into

deductive argument form.

In

some

cases, the additional premises required for a valid

deductive inference are so obvious or so widely known that they are simply
In

other cases, the additional premises needed are not available

can,

in

many

principle, be garnished

be troubled by the

fact that

in

the

actual scientific explanations

fail

unstated.

body

of science, but

We

should thus not

by further experiment and theorizing. 39

many

left

to satisfy the criteria of

the Covering-Law Model, argues Hempel, for the model represents only an ideal that
scientific explanations are intended to meet,

This view, which

I

will

name Hempel's

optimism, according to which there

phenomenon

is

in

the world.

some

if

of

them must

fall

short.

radical normativism, suggests a kind of

a law (or small set of laws) covering every

that occurs. This kind of

most of what happens

even

all

optimism

Hempel's

is

dubious: there are no laws that describe

radical normativism,

however,

entails

such

optimism:

The idea here suggested

is

that the logic of

all

scientific

basically of the covering-law variety, but not that

are scientifically explainable. ..(Hempel,

While

all

scientific explanation

Model, there

is

is

1

all

explanation

empirical

965, 425, note

1

is

phenomena

7).

intended to meet the ideal presented by the Covering-Law

no guarantee, suggests Hempel,

28

that

all

phenomena

are scientifically

explainable.

may

Here Hempel's analogy between the concepts of
"explanation" and

apply. While

proofs

(e.g.,

may be

actual mathematical proofs seek to

all

deductive

validity),

meet the requirements of formal

and, therefore, a metamathematical description
of "proof"

useful in elucidating the logical structure of actual
proofs,

— that

should

we assume

entails

no optimism about the lawlike behavior

explanation

is

all

of "proof"

mathematical

phenomena can be understood and
of the Covering-Law Model. There

does not follow

- nor

can be proven. Similarly, Hempel's theory

facts

thus represents an ideal limit of

it

phenomena. Hempel's theory

of natural

human

of

understanding: insofar as natural

explained, then the explanations will meet the criteria
is

no guarantee, however,

that

all

natural

phenomena

can be understood and explained.

If

Hempel

we

is

take the Covering-Law model to be an ideal model of scientific explanation,

correct to emphasize that

explanation to meet
areas,

and

this

is

its

conditions.

we

should not expect every proffered

scientific

Ideals are often unobtainable, in science as in other

not inconsistent with the notion of being an ideal, nor does

it

detract from

the information that ideal models can provide about the important properties of actual
things.

For example,

some people

carry in their

righteous person, e.g., a Christian ideal of one

trustworthy, etc.

Perhaps no one

minds an

who

is

ideal

model of

pious, humble, benevolent, honest,

satisfies all the criteria of this Christian

description of the ideal can nonetheless

tell

a morally

moral

ideal, but a

us a lot about Christians' moral judgments of

other people's behavior.

Yet Hempel’s radical normativism can be criticized on grounds other than
unjustified optimism.

has

all

Of most

ideal

models

we

the properties of the ideal model, then

someone were

to

come

along

ideal, e.g., a Jesus Christ, then

who happened

expect the following: that
instantiates the ideal

it

to

one would have

29

have

to

all

when something

itself.

For example,

if

the properties of the Christian

conclude

that this

person

is

morally good.

Logical consistency

would

require

one

to reject the ideal

if

he or she could not accept

this

conclusion.
This

is

the situation with the Covering-Law Model.

of scientific explanation,

one cannot accept

is

that

many

One

actual scientific explanations

many arguments meet

all

of

its

fail

is

to

meet

satisfy the

an ideal

that, as

What

standards.

its

standards, yet intuitively

explanatory. Countless arguments without explanatory value

Covering-Law Model. The Covering-Law Model thus

can accept

to

fail

be

requirements of the

not only too restrictive, but

is

too

liberal, as well.

Here

(3)

we

the Covering-Law

will cite a

V can

of

examples so

Model can be appreciated.

demonstrated formally
theory

number

that for

that the full extent of the failure of

Eberle, Kaplan,

and Montague (1961)

any given fundamental theory T and explanandum

be derived from T

that will explain £.

What

follows

is

£,

a

an informal

presentation of one of Eberle eta/.' s arguments (Eberle eta/., 1961, 420f.):

We
T

take as given an

(x)

:

T': (x)(y)[Fx

(Fb v

C:

T',

which

is

For example:

derivable from

(that

T

V and C are true.

is

empirical and both T and £ are true) that T'

Yet, £

is

therefore satisfies the Covering-Law

"explains"

£),

is

and singular conditions C:

nGa) 3 Ha.

empirical and both

T'

T,

v (Gy 3 Hy)]

follows from the hypotheses

It

T.

Fx

There are a theory

alone.

£ and any true empirical theory

Ha.

£:

It

explanandum

although T was chosen

sometimes maintained

Covering-Law Model

suffers

deducible from

Model with

T and

C,

is

though not from

C

respect to £ (and thereby

arbitrarily.

that Eberle et a/.'s

from technical

arguments demonstrate only

difficulties,

30

that the

which can perhaps be remedied.

4"

But

rich

more

intuitive

examples show

that the

Covering-Law Model's deficiencies are deeper.

A

source of problem examples are laws that are symmetrical
with respect to time or

logical form.

Symmetrical laws include those

mathematical equations,

i.e.,

A-

problem of explanatory relevance
already introduced the

first

B or

A =

in

B.

the form of universal biconditionals or

Biconditional laws engender a special

— the problem of explanatory asymmetries, which was

chapter.

The

difficulty arises

because biconditional laws are

logically symmetrical but, in actual explanatory contexts, explanatorily
asymmetrical.

explanation consists

does according

in

to the

the deduction of the

explanandum from

If

testable, true laws, as

it

Covering-Law Model, then explanatory asymmetries cannot be

captured. As a result, the Covering-Law Model counts as explanations

many

intuitively

non-explanatory arguments.

The

Ideal

pressure and

is

at

Gas Law provides

volume

a

good example. The

Ideal

Gas Law says

that the

of a gas are proportional to the gas's temperature (except

when

the gas

very low temperatures):

PV = nRT,
where K
placed
reading

is

in

a constant and n

the

number

is

0 kg/cm

2

until the

the cooker go up to

Suppose water

is

initially.

The cooker

is

placed on a stove, and then heated

pressure gauge levels off

at

2
200 kg/cm

200 kg/cm 2 ? One could argue,

.

Why

at

1

10

did the gas pressure

in

consistent with the Covering-Law

that the correct explanation requires a deduction of the precise value of the pressure

of the gas

in

the cooker from the Ideal

temperature of the gas. This approach
in

of molecules of gas present.

an aluminum pressure cooker outfitted with a pressure gauge. The pressure gauge

degrees C.

Model,

is

contrast, the explanation of

why

Gas Law and information about the volume and
to the explanation

is

not implausible.

the temperature of the gas

in

But consider,

the cooker went up to

degrees C. The Covering-Law Model suggests that to explain the temperature of the

31

1 1

gas,

we

should deduce

its

value from the Ideal Gas Law and the values of the
gas's volume and

pressure.

But

change

temperature of the gas

in

this

gas's pressure

Many
Gas Law

is

not due to changes

does change concurrently with

its

in its

change

such examples can be given. 41 The point

temperature.

in

is

explanations.

Information contained

The

not that deductions from the Ideal

in

laws,

if

symmetrical scientific laws

should not be mislead by everyday intuitions (Hempel, 1965,

where everyday

more

or

less.

is

whatever

But there

is

is

presented

at

is

352ff.).

it

is

a tension, to say the least,

between the proposal

Model

forth as

deduce the

would accept such

may be

earth's position in the past.

some

the explanation of the length of a
43

intuition should

and

is

nothing

to take science at

an explanatory ideal
Ignoring this for the

Newton's laws of

earth,

its

velocity, etc. can

42

Hempel

unnatural consequences of the Covering-Law Model,

pendulum from

its

period and a law for simple

but he cannot accept retrodictive explanations

32

be

Surely no one, scientists included,

a deduction as an explanation of the earth's past position.

willing to swallow

pendulums,

we

clear that the proposed counterexamples clash not only with everyday

mechanics and information about the present position of the
to

that

suggests that

theoretical treatments,

in scientific

intuition, but with the explanatory practices of scientists as well.

employed

He

everyday

often unsatisfied by examples of actual scientific explanations.

moment,

which

face value: scientific explanation

face value, and the attempt to put the Covering-Law

that

us

tell

Hempel warns

intuition conflicts with scientific treatments, then

be suppressed, and science should be taken
(understanding)

often explanatorily

any, are relevant to a given fact-to-be-explained.

discussing an example like that of the Ideal Gas Law,

In

is

in intuitively forceful

because laws and deductive logic alone do not

difficulty arises

of the factors cited

in

gas: intuitively, the

pressure or volume, though the

other equations or biconditional laws) cannot participate

(or

relevant.

deduction would not explain the temperature of the

in

general.

44

e.g.,

The inadequacy
is

exposed nicely

in

of the Covering-Law

cases where

Model

phenomena

as a criterion of explanatory relevance

are covered by

more than one

law; these

cases can be termed instances of nomic overdetermination.
Consider the scenario of Mr.

who

Jones, a heavy smoker,

disease.

When

suffered from both terminal lung cancer

he was diagnosed, the physicians decided

and advanced heart

that both of the following laws

applied to poor Mr. Jones:

(I)

(II)

All

All

persons with stage x lung cancer die within 5 years.
persons with stage y heart disease die within 5 years.

Mr. Jones was diagnosed,
in

stage

y.

Not

question arises,

in

other words, as having lung cancer

surprisingly, Mr. Jones

why

succumbed

did Mr. Jones die?

six

months

in

stage x

and heart disease

after this diagnosis.

The

The Covering-Law Model suggests two

explanations: one consists of a derivation from

(I);

the second of a derivation from

of the explanations, according to the Covering-Law Model,

that Mr. Jones died, in fact, as a result of a heart attack.

is

As a

complete
result,

in itself.

(II).

Each

Suppose

only one of the

deductions suggested by the Covering-Law model represents the correct explanation. The

Covering-Law Model provides no grounds, however, on which

Knowledge

the correct explanation.

settle

of laws

and

logic

is

to judge

not sufficient,

which deduction

in

is

other words, to

explanatory relevance.

Judging from

his

Hempel would respond
unacceptable because

response to a similar objection proposed by Scriven

in

its

962),

the following way: Surely the lung cancer explanation

is

explanans requires the assumption that the patient does not die of

other causes before the lung cancer

clearly false.

(1

kills

him. This assumption,

Hence, the explanation founded on

1965, 420).
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(I)

is

false,

in

the case of Mr. Jones,

is

and can be ruled out (Hempel,

This reply seems inadequate.

In

what way does the explanans require the

assumption that the patient does not die of other causes before
the lung cancer
This

this

is

kills

him?

not a logical requirement of the deduction, for the
deduction goes through without

premise. There

whatever they

may be good grounds

are, are not supplied

for requiring this

by the Covering-Law Model. The Covering-Law Model

thus provides no resources to settle explanatory relevance

One

assumption, but these grounds,

in

the case of Mr. Jones's death.

could also reply to the objection as follows. The problem of explanatory

relevance suggested by the example of Mr. Jones's death

is

a false one, for the conclusions

of the alternative explanatory deductions say nothing about the specific cause
of Mr. Jones's

death, but only that he will die within five years.

Hence, both are consistent with Mr. Jones

having died of a heart attack, and neither should be ruled out as irrelevant by
This reply

Jones die?",

we

is

no more convincing than Hempel's.

explanations are covered,
Indeed,

Hempel

and

(I)

to include causal explanations in

(II),

says,

to provide a causal

which express lawlike

believe that deductions from

(I)

answer

its

"Why
In

did Mr.

addition, the

repertoire: causal

because causal statements describe lawlike
regularities, are causal

view of the Covering-Law Model. Therefore, we both have

Law Model

ask,

are clearly looking for a causal explanation of his death.

Covering-Law Model presumes

regularities.

When we

this fact.

to the question

and from

(II)

laws from the

a right to expect the Covering-

about Jones's death, and reason

are just the sort of causal explanations supplied

under the requirements of the Covering-Law Model. The Covering-Law Model thus
this

(2)

case because either

it

provides too

many

To summarize,

(1

)

it

fails in

does not yield the kinds of causal explanation demanded or

inconsistent causal explanations.

a Covering-Law explanation provides grounds for believing an

empirical claim to be true.

to

Providing grounds for an empirical belief, however, neither
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necessarily nor sufficiently explains

why

the empirical

phenomenon

is

the case. This

is

the

fundamental flaw of the Covering-Law Model.

3.1.2

Kitcher's Unification Theory of Explanation
Unificationist theories of scientific explanation, like the
Covering-Law Model,

attempt to gloss scientific explanation without invoking causation.
view, the overriding goal of scientific theorizing
often understood as the reduction

in

number

the

knowledge. The explanation of phenomena

subsumed under
body

existing

is

the unificationist

the unification of scientific

of basic assumptions of the

achieved

is

On

when

the

knowledge

body

—

of

phenomena can be

the logical network of laws or patterns of derivation that most unifies the

of scientific knowledge.

Unificationist theories have

philosophical.

scientists

First,

virtue of scientific theories.

two points

have

Darwin,

at

of departure,

one

historical

and one

times judged unifying power to be an important

for

example, wrote of

his theory of natural selection:

can hardly be supposed

that a false theory would explain, in so
manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several
large classes of facts above specified.
has recently been objected that this
is an unsafe method of arguing; but it is a method used in judging of the
It

satisfactory a

It

common

events of

philosophers
This passage

Darwin
of

its

is

truth

is

life,

Because

it

greatest of natural

.

often cited as a textbook

example

of inference to the best explanation:

arguing that the explanatory power of the theory of natural selection
46
.

it

examples of appeals
is

is

evidence

Yet part of Darwin's point seems to be that the theory of natural selection

should be accepted because
Historical

and has often been used by the

45

a

provides a unified account of large and diverse sets of
to the unifying

commonly acknowledged

science, unifying

power

is

power

virtue of

of a theory are easily multiplied

many

impressive theories

thus an attractive focus for philosophical theorists.
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in

facts.

47
.

the history of

addition, unificationist theories of explanation
have origins

In

philosophies of science that

reflect a distrust of

acknowledge

neo-positivist

causes and other metaphysical

as they avoid the severe constraints of logical
positivism.
theorists

in

entities,

even

Following Hempel, unification

that scientific theories provide explanations.

Yet while Hempel's

Covering-Law Model emphasizes the epistemic connection between
laws and the

phenomena explained by them,
theories

fall

in

unification theorists locate the explanatory

the ability to systematize logically, and with great economy,
the

under them. Kitcher and other

of neo-positivism

in

phenomena

that

the tradition of Hempel, but with a distinctive emphasis: for them, the

The most important current
is

of

unificationists thus carry forth the philosophical standard

logical relation important to explanation

approach

power

is

not just subsumption, but unification.

unificationist theory

is

that of Philip Kitcher.

Kitcher's

ecumenical, making use of ingredients from many recent theories of

explanation.

Following Hempel (and

central to explanation.

many

others), Kitcher

makes deductive argument

Inspired by Friedman, he believes both that explanatory

function of unifying power, and that

in

unification lies the connection

between

power

is

a

scientific

explanation and understanding. From van Fraassen, he borrows a theory of whyquestions.

48

Finally, Kitcher accepts

concerning the nature of
(including

its

scientific

and incorporates an

knowledge, namely,

insight

from Kuhn's work

that grasping a scientific theory

explanatory power and scope) requires a "cognitive ingredient" beyond

acquaintance with the theory's principles and formulas, and the rules of
Kitcher credits Friedman's

about

1

scientific explanation, but his

describes his intuitive conception

974 paper with fundamentally
concept of unification

this

differs

logic.

redirecting his thinking

from Friedman's.

way:

Understanding.. .is not simply a matter of reducing the "fundamental
incomprehensibilities" but of seeing connections, common patterns,
initially

appear

to

be different

49

situations...

understanding of nature by showing us
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in

what

Science advances our

how

to derive descriptions of

many

He

phenomena, using
demonstrating

this,

same

the

to accept as ultimate (or

A fundamental
number

and again, and in
reduce the number of facts we have
brute) (Kitcher 1989, 432). 50

thesis of Friedman's

how

to

— that understanding

view

of "ultimate" facts that must be accepted

ingredient

set of

patterns of derivation again

teaches us

it

is

—

laws by another, smaller

set,

obtained by reducing the

retained by Kitcher, but a

is

added: reduction (and thus unification)

is

new

achieved not by the reduction of one

is

but through the recurrent use of patterns of derivation.

Unification consists, on Kitcher’s view,

in

the systematization of a great set of facts by a set

of schematic patterns of derivation: an explanation

simply an instantiation of any of the

is

patterns of derivation that belong to the best current systematization.

The most important concept employed
pattern."

To understand

Suppose there

store."

scientific

is,

it

we

at a

must

first

The explanatory

E(K)

others.

The

store, E(K),

is

is

any

set of

K

arguments

that derives

displays certain properties.

set of

is

an explanation

an explanatory pattern?

if

and only

as a set of

some members
Most important,

explanatory patterns.

in their

if

51

may

already

the derivation instantiates a

Next, two obvious questions must be answered:

And what

is it

to instantiate

Kitcher's answers to these questions are laid out, a larger,

surface

K

preliminary statement of Kitcher's account of scientific explanation

pattern in the explanatory store, E(K).

is

that of "explanatory

that set of explanatory patterns that best

best systematization of

be formulated: a derivation

What

is

Kitcher conceives of

this,

must have unifying power greater than any other

A

account

given time, a body of knowledge, K, sanctioned by the

systematizes K, where a systematization

K from

Kitcher's

grasp another basic concept: the "explanatory

community. Although he does not say

sentences.

of

in

place.
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an explanatory pattern?

more important question

Once

will

3. 1.2.1

Explanatory Patterns

On

Kitcher's view, a general

argument pattern

consists

of:

(a) a schematic argument, which is
a sequence of schematic sentences; a
schematic sentence is, in turn, an expression obtained by
replacing

some

the nonlogical expressions with
a set of filling instructions,

(b)

dummy

letters of

dummy

of

letters;

which are

instructions for replacing the

each schematic sentence;

which tells us which sentences of the schematic
be considered premises, and which are to be inferred from

a classification,

(c)

argument are

to

others.

As suggested above, an argument
an argument pattern

an acceptable explanation

An argument

in E(K).

the argument has the

(i)

is

if

instantiates a general

same number

and only

instantiates

if it

argument pattern exactly

of terms as the schematic

if:

argument of

the general argument pattern;
(ii) each sentence or formula in the argument can be
obtained from the
corresponding schematic sentence by applying the appropriate filling

instructions;

(iii)

the sentences of the argument

classification of the general

One

of Kitcher's

many

fulfill

the roles required by the

argument pattern (1989, 432-433).

detailed examples will clarify these abstract conditions.

example, which employs Darwin's theory of natural selection,

implemented

in

response to questions of the form,

have P?" The schematic argument,

"Why do

filling instructions,

and

is

supposed

almost

all

to

The

be

the organisms

classification of the

in

C

Simple

Selection Pattern are as follows:

Schematic argument:

(1

)

G*
(2)

of

The organisms

in

that inhabited an

Among
G* had

the
P,

C

are descendants of the

environment

members

of

G*

members

of an ancestral population

E.

there

was

variation with respect to 7:

some members

others had P#, P##,...

Having P enables an organism in E to obtain a complex of benefits and
disadvantages C, making an expected contribution to its reproductive success w(C);
having P# enables an organism to obtain a complex of benefits and disadvantages
(3)
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C#' making an expected contribution to
> w(C##), etc.

its

reproductive success

w(C#b

w(C#), w(C)

>

w(C)

etc

(4) For any properties P
u P2> if w(P,) > w(P 2) then the average number of offspring
of organisms with P, that survive to maturity is
greater than the average number of
offspring of organisms with P, that survive to maturity.

(5) All

(6)

the properties

No new

P,

P#, PM,... are heritable.

variants of 7 arise

in the lineage leading from C* to C
(i.e., the only
variation with respect to 7 comprises the properties P,
P#, P##,... already present
G*). All the organisms in this lineage live in 7.

each generation of the lineage leading from G*
organisms with P increases.
(7) In

to

G the

relative

The number

in

frequency of

G

of generations in the lineage leading from G* to
is sufficiently
large for the increases in the relative frequency of P to accumulate
to a total relative
frequency of 1
(8)

(9) All

members

of

G

have

P.

be replaced by the name of a determinable

Filling Instructions:

7

"character-type"),

P,

P#, P##,... are to be replaced with the

forms of the

G*

trait,

is

to

with the

name

in

sets

Classification: (1)-(6), (8) are premises;
(7)

and

(8)

though not

all

precise and detailed argumentation

(5), for

is

(7) is

derived from

(1)-(6); (9) is

implicit in the Origin of Species

Darwinian explanations

modern evolutionary arguments, he

of

which members of G* lived, C, C #,... are to
of traits, and w(C), w(C #),... are replaced with

derived from

(444).

This argument pattern, says Kitcher,

texts,

trait (a

of determinate

of an ancestral species, E with a

characterization of the environment

be replaced with specifications of
non-negative numbers.

names

instantiate this pattern.

and other Darwinian

Moreover, many

claims, are extensions of this pattern

is

provided

in

in

which more

support of individual premises;

example, specifications of the genetic basis of the

trait

in

support

under study might be

added.

A couple

of

comments on explanatory

patterns are

in

of a classification appears to admit non-deductive arguments,

statistical

and other kinds of non-deductive explanation
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order.

First,

Kitcher’s notion

which would accommodate

(e.g., narratives),

as well as outdated

forms of explanatory inference that have been
important

The notion

syllogistic logic).

of classification

science

(e.g., Aristotle's

thus a feature that could be

is

range of examples from the history of putative

in

fit

wide

to a

scientific explanations.

Kitcher spurns this advantage, however, to defend a
"deductive chauvinism,"

according to which membership

in E(K)

restricted to

is

deductive arguments. Kitcher

thereby invites the criticism that his account cannot accommodate
non-deductive

explanatory patterns that have been important
Selection Pattern exhibited by Kitcher

Premise

derivation.

(4),

so constructed,

is

greater expected reproductive success than

will

the history of science.

an unpersuasive model of deductive

also false.

Group

B,

Group A

but

have greater actual reproductive success than Group

number

of

A, even

if

chance circumstances,

the

members

Indeed, the Simple

constructed so that the argument will be deductively valid.

(4) is

Unfortunately, premise

is itself

in

of

A

that the

members

it

B.

does not follow

It

is

A

that

Group A

possible, under

of B will outreproduce the

are better adapted to their environment.

replaced with a stochastic premise.

may have

of organisms

stochastic premise, however,

Premise

any

members
(4)

of

should be

would destroy the

deductive validity of the argument.
Kitcher's

power

unifying

worry

is

that

he

will not

be able to construct a comparative

unless he restricts explanations to deductive arguments (448).

merely note that a

classification

need not

restrict

that Kitcher introduces this restriction as an

clarified, for

pattern.

variables

It

is

in

For now,

I

explanations to deductive inferences, and

independent condition.

Returning to Kitcher's general theory, the nature and role of the

must be

criterion of

filling instructions

they determine what counts as an instantiation of an explanatory

clear that the filling instructions

do much more than provide names

the schematic sentences of a pattern.

criticism of Friedman's theory,

Here

it

which was illuminated by

40

is

for

helpful to recall Kitcher's

a discussion of

(1

976)

Newton's laws of

mechanics. Kitcher noted

may be

that in

each of the many domains

in

which Newton's second law

applied, e.g., to explain the motions of planets,
the pressure of gases, the motion of

a simple

pendulum,

employment
instructions.

etc., different auxiliary

Newton's second law

of

52
.

laws must be introduced to

This suggests an important role for

the case of Newton's second law, for example,
the

In

facilitate

provide the various auxiliary equations to be employed

the

filling

filling instructions

to obtain a

value for

F,

would

as well as

the conditions under which each auxiliary equation should
be applied. Each of the

would

auxiliary equations

Consequently, the
nonetheless, that

require, of course,

filling instructions

its

own

set of filling instructions.

could become quite complicated. This suggests,

filling instructions are to

be viewed as rules

schematic sentences of explanatory patterns; these

rules, together

determine the scope of instantiation of an explanatory

What

for the instantiation of

with the classification,

pattern.

sorts of rules constitute filling instructions?

In particular,

does Kitcher view

these rules as explicit and complete instructions for instantiating patterns? Here the
clarification of Kitcher's intentions requires a detour.

account of explanation, Kitcher believes himself

Thomas Kuhn's

He

insights

to

concerning the nature of

By featuring argument patterns

be articulating and developing some of

scientific

knowledge and understanding.

writes:

When we
finitely

as

conceive of

scientific theories as sets of statements (preferably

axiomatized) then

knowing

the statements

we

where there

naturally think of

knowing

a scientific theory

— typically knowing the axioms and,

some important theorems.

But, as

Kuhn

points out, even

in

perhaps,

those instances

are prominent statements that can be identified as the core of

the theory, statements that are displayed

in

the texts and

accompanied with

— as, for example, Maxwell's equations, Newton's laws, or
too common for students to know the
Schrodinger's equation —
names

it

statements and yet

fail

is all

to understand the theory, a failure signaled

by

their

do the exercises at the end of the chapter. Scientific knowledge
involves more than knowing the statements. A good account of scientific
inability to

theories should be able to say what the extra cognitive ingredient
I

claim that to

know

is.

a theory involves the internalization of the

argument patterns associated with

it,

and. ..an adequate philosophical

41

in his

reconstruction of a scientific theory requires
us to identify a set of argument
one component of the theory (Kitcher 1989, 437-438)

patterns as

Kitcher does not say exactly wherein this process
of internalization consists, but one might

reasonably infer that he views

it

to

be a Kuhnian process of learning: one grasps a
theory,

not by memorizing any set of complete and explicit
rules for instantiating the theory's
associated derivation patterns, but by applying the patterns
exercises.

For reasons soon to

become

inconsistent with Kitcher's intentions.

on Kitcher

patterns,

patterns, both the

patterns.
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is

is

order to evaluate the unifying

of sets of

number

of derivation patterns

impossible. As a result, the unifying

filling instructions

and the

sets

total

number

of instantiations of the

is

of a set of patterns cannot

To put

that

another way: The explanatory scope

it

necessarily inexplicit and inexact.

Kitcher's theory can thus hardly

be

be compared. Hence, Kitcher must maintain

are complete and explicit.

on Kuhn's view,

power

assessment of a theory's unifying power demands that
precise.

power

account, one must be able to count, for every candidate set of

measured, nor can that of competing

of a theory,

evident, however, this interpretation

the filling instructions are not explicitly and completely formulated, then
such

If

counting

s

In

a variety of practice

in

its

In

contrast, the

explanatory scope be explicit and

be regarded as a more precise development of

Kuhn's views. 55

Unifying Power

3. 1.2. 2

Kitcher replaces the question,

with the

new

question,

"What

"When

is

some

information a scientific explanation?",

are the conditions under

accepted into the explanatory store?" Kitcher's answer

be accepted

power than

into the explanatory store, E(K),

E(K).

It

is

if

and only

which
is

a derivation pattern

is

to

that a derivation pattern, 5,

is

if

already evident that unifying power

E(K)

is

u S has greater unifying

a property of sets of

explanatory patterns, and not a property of particular derivations or individual patterns
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be
to

themselves;

it

is,

other words, a "global" property.

in

has greater unifying
patterns,

(ii)

more

power than another

stringent patterns, or

The consequence
of

all

instantiations of

pattern's

all

consequence

set of

any

set

(iii)

if,

On

Kitcher's view, a set of patterns

other things being equal,

a larger

consequence

set of patterns, S,

is

set.

it

has

(i)

fewer

56

the set containing the conclusions

patterns of 5. Although Kitcher does not say this,
the size of a

set

would seem

to

be a function of three

features: the logical

structure of the pattern's premises (schematic sentences),
the liberality of the filling
instructions for the pattern,

and the

rules of deductive logic.

adds a further constraint: the predicates used

Concerning the stringency

in

Later,

we

will see that Kitcher

the pattern must be projectible.

of patterns, Kitcher writes:

Derivations may be similar either in terms of their logical structure or in
terms of the nonlogical vocabulary they employ at corresponding places.
The notion of a general argument pattern allows us to express the idea that
either of these ways have a common pattern.
However, similarity is a matter of degree. At one extreme, a derivation is
maximally similar to itself and to itself alone; at the other, any pair of
arguments can be viewed as having a common pattern. To capture the
notion that one pair of arguments is more similar than another pair, we need
to recognize the fact that general argument patterns can demand more or
less of their instantiations. If a pattern sets conditions on instantiations that
are more difficult to satisfy than those set by another pattern, then shall say
that the former pattern is more stringent than the latter (433).

derivations similar

in

I

Stringency

is

thus conceived as a measure of the similarity of the instantiations of a pattern

of derivation. Although Kitcher does not pretend to offer a complete account of stringency,

he provides two formal

summarized

criteria of

comparative stringency, the

easily in informal terms.

First,

assuming

that

gist of

which can be

two explanatory

patterns,

P and

P*, have identical classifications, then

(T*) explanatory pattern, P,

is

more

stringent than P*

if

P's filling instructions

are such that the set of substitution instances allowed for P's nonlogical

vocabulary

is

a proper subset of the substitution instances allowed for the

nonlogical vocabulary of P*.
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The second

some

criterion holds in

cases

in

which the

classifications for

two explanatory

patterns are roughly similar, but not identical:
(R*)

suppose the

identical,

classifications of explanatory patterns P and P*
are
except that the classification of P appeals in a certain
place

in the
derivation to certain kinds of general principles,
while the classification of
P* articulates the inference in the corresponding
place by specifying
schematic premises linked in definite ways. Then if the set
of

instantiations

of P*

a proper subset of the set of instantiations of P, then
P*
57
stringent than P
is

is

more

.

The

limitations of these criteria should

the stringencies of

instantiations of

two derivation

one

pattern

most actual comparisons
condition
of

is

satisfied

consequences

consequence

(because

comes

a proper subset of the set of instantiations of the other.

Furthermore, whenever

patterns, the threat of tradeoffs

surfaces: the

set

patterns only under the condition that the set of

condition would not be met.

this

by two

more

In

this

between stringency and wealth

stringent pattern will always

have a smaller

has fewer instantiations) than the less stringent pattern; and the

it

have a

less stringent pattern will

stringency

is

be obvious: they provide a comparative measure of

into play in a

larger

consequence

set.

So

it

seems

that

whenever

comparison, alternative applications of Kitcher's

criteria will

lead to contrary conclusions.

Why,

then, does Kitcher believe that a measure of stringency

explanatory patterns? Stringency

concerns

58

One

.

according to the
least

two kinds

concern

drift

of cases

size of

59
.

think, to address a

cited.

First,

and wealth

couple of related

sets, to

consequences alone. Here

at

distinct derivation patterns, e.g.,

natural selection patterns,

single pattern

of

there are patterns that are the result of

Schematic premises from

The

consequence

I

required for

non-explanatory patterns that display great unifying power

may be

and Darwinian

create a single pattern.

and

introduced,

criteria of paucity of patterns

superficial conjunctions

genetic

is

is

is

may be

logically

would seem, on grounds

have unifying power greater than

44

conjoined so as

to

of paucity of patterns

that of the set containing

the

two

distinct patterns.

stringency

But the gain

would block the inference

unifying

in

power would be

two

distinct patterns.

does not

It

is

A

and Kitcher does not

similar difficulty

Everything that
Everything that

God

desires

is

God
God

to

would

also be less stringent than each of

important to point out, however, that the appeal to
stringency

rule out the superficial conjunction

of patterns)

An appeal

to the conclusion that the conjunction
pattern has

greater unifying power, for the conjunction pattern

the

superficial.

tell

us

how

merely

offsets the original

decide

in

(it

to

appeal to paucity

cases of tradeoffs.

introduced with the following sort of derivation pattern:
desires,

God

creates.

creates, exists.

x.

Therefore, x exists.

Certainly, the objection

would

go, one's account of scientific explanation cannot accept

such explanatory patterns. Considerations of stringency, however, allow
rejected:

more

one could argue

stringent than

one

this pattern to

that a scientifically acceptable pattern of explanation

that explains everything.

Criteria of stringency also

be

must be

accommodate

the fact, noted by Kitcher, that scientists occasionally object to theories on the grounds that

they explain too much.

Darwin's

critics, for

example, complained that Darwin's

explanatory reasoning could be applied to any conclusion whatsoever (Kitcher, 1981, 183).

Are Kitcher's

criteria of stringency useful or

adequate

for these

objection, the weakness of an appeal to stringency has already been

regard to the

first

stated:

to rule out superficial conjunctive patterns, although

it

fails

purposes? With

it

does avoid the

conclusion that the conjunctive pattern has unifying power greater than that of

component
that

patterns.

As

for the

second and

third objections,

such hypothetical explanations should be ruled out,

if

lack of stringency: the theological derivation, for example,

premises lack empirical evidence (what

scientific

nature of God's desires?).
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evidence

its

one has the sneaking suspicion

possible, for reasons other than a

is

is

best rejected because

there, for

its

example, of the

The

third

concern

not that a theory explains too much, but that either

with

all

— or

possible (or available) evidence

the incorrect explanation.

One

thinks, for

Darwinians to see every biological

trait

unfalsifiable

is

proposed theory

- that

phenomena

seems

often

is, it is

which

for

it

to

be

consistent

is

clearly

example, of the tendency of some neo-

as an adaptation resulting from natural selection,
60
.

Evaluation of Kitcher's Theory

The notion
is

it

that a

The complaint

explains

it

without even considering alternative explanations

3. 1.2. 3

complain

- might also be handled differently.

much

explains too

that scientists occasionally

of an explanatory pattern

the ordering of premises

dependence

61
.

The

in

structure of patterns

Kitcher's

the central feature of Kitcher's account, for

explanatory patterns that

acceptance to the explanatory
of consequences.

is

is

determined,

store: the paucity

main

fix

the relations of explanatory

in turn,

is

in

the explanatory derivations found

primary question facing Kitcher's account: Are Kitcher's

adequate

to

account

for the

criteria for

their

that these criteria of unifying

applied to competing sets of primary patterns of derivation,

relevance embodied

by Kitcher's

and stringency of patterns and

thesis, therefore,

explanatory patterns found

in

fix

wealth

power, as

the relations of explanatory

Here

science.

criteria

in

it

we

of unifying

arrive at the

power

science

Kitcher demonstrates the advantages of his theory of scientific explanation by

applying

it

to

two

sorts of philosophical

may be viewed

of explanation (which

an

illustration will

be

instructive.

problems: explanatory relevance and asymmetries

as a special

One example

problem of relevance).

discussed by Kitcher

derivation of the height of a tower from the length of

and some geometrical principles

among

philosophers

is

(call this

its

62

close look at

the notorious

shadow, certain

the shadow-derivation ).

that such a derivation,

is

A

facts

about

The common wisdom

though deductively sound, does not
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light,

constitute an explanation of the height of
the tower.

patterns acceptable to

K

(the current

body

Assume

that S

is

a set of explanatory

of knowledge) and includes the pattern

responsible for the shadow-derivation, and that
E(K)

is

the current explanatory store.

Kitcher

argues:

Within E(K) there are derivations that yield conclusions
about the heights of
towers, the widths of windows, the dimensions of
artifacts and natural
objects alike, which instantiate a general pattern of
tracing the present
dimensions to the conditions in which the object originated and
the
modifications that it has since undergone. Sometimes, as with
flagpoles and
towers, the derivations can be relatively simple: we start with
premises
about the intentions of a designer and reason to an intermediate
conclusion
about the dimensions of the object at the time of origin; using further
premises about the conditions that have prevailed between the origin
and

we reason that the object has persisted virtually unaltered and
thus reach a conclusion about its present dimensions. With respect to
some
natural objects, such as organisms, stars, and mountain ranges, the
the present,

derivation

which

is

much more complex because

the objects have careers

their sizes are substantially affected.

However,

in all

in

cases there

very general pattern that can be instantiated to explain current size.
call derivations generated by this pattern origin-and-development

I

is

a

shall

explanations (485).

Now,

5 either includes the origin-and-development pattern, or

Kitcher, then 5 contains at least

one more

shadow-derivation

If

is

founded.

If it

does, argues

the pattern on

which the

is

smaller than that of E(K), for the pattern

by the shadow-derivation does not generate as many consequences

origin-and-development pattern.
that of 5,

i.e.,

doesn't.

S does not include the origin-and-development pattern,

then 5 must have a consequence set that
instantiated

pattern than E(K),

it

and

Kitcher's theory

In

either case, the unifying

would thus account

power

of E(K)

for the irrelevance of the

as

does the

would surpass
shadow-

derivation.

Kitcher's introduction of an "origin-and-development" pattern should immediately

raise suspicions.

First,

it

is

doubtful that there

Kitcher's origin-and-development pattern.

mountain ranges

— are too diverse,

it

is

any actual pattern of explanation

The phenomena he mentions

would seem,
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to

like

— organisms,

be covered by any single

stars,

pattern.

As

Eric

Barnes (1992) points out, however, Kitcher's
argument does not require there to be a

single origin-and-development pattern.

even

if

there are a

number

For the argument from unifying

power goes through

of origin-and-development patterns in the
explanatory store, so

long as one covers the origin of towers.
Nonetheless, one cannot
with his notion of a

resist

At the

pattern.

the suspicion that Kitcher

least,

is

in

fast

and loose

the vagueness and imprecision of Kitcher's

"origin-and-development" pattern belies the apparent precision of
explanatory patterns

playing

his description of

general, and of the variety of specific examples he cites

Darwinian Simple Selection pattern above).

One

must remember

Kitcher's theory of explanation requires precision

in

that to

(cf.

the

be convincing,

the determination of patterns and their

explanatory scopes. Without precision, one doubts that the unifying power (and

explanatory force) of theories can be assessed or compared
Putting these concerns aside for the

remains unpersuasive as

it

stands.

First,

moment,

unifying

in

any meaningful way.

Kitcher's treatment of the

power

is

always the

problem

result of three

simultaneously present (and interdependent) properties: the paucity of explanatory patterns,
the stringency of patterns, and the size of the consequence

however, are considered

Kitcher's argument,

in

pattern, then 5

stringent than E(K) to

deviant pattern

in

5

is

set of substitution instances

Whatever the

some

more

of these,

in isolation

S does not include the origin-and-

set that

is

smaller than that of E(K).

suggests, however, that 5 could also be

degree. Extrapolating from principles (T*) and (R*),

stringent than the origin-and-development pattern

is

a proper subset of the

filling instructions of Kitcher's

filling instructions of

if

must have a consequence

The premise seems reasonable. The consequent

more

Only two

and these are appraised only

under different conditions. Consider the premise:

development

set.

latter's set

if

63

the

the former's

of substitution instances.

origin-and-development pattern might be, the

the shadow-derivation pattern could be written such that
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its

set of

substitution instances

pattern.

S

would be

would thus be more

This

is

a general

of a pattern’s stringency

a proper subset of that of the
origin-and-development
stringent than E(K).

problem

on the

for Kitcher's

size of

its

stringency of a pattern (or set of patterns)

consequence
between

set.

Without

account, and

consequence
is

s

from the dependence

Roughly speaking, the degree of

set.

is

no way

to

judge the

power. Kitcher realizes

provides no guidance here (477-478). Faced with a tradeoff

example (and Kitcher

results

inversely proportional to the size of

explicit rules there

different aspects of unifying

it

effect of a tradeoff

that tradeoffs

in

its

may

the tower and

exist,

but

shadow

other examples as well), his solution to the asymmetry problem

is

inadequate.

In

any case, even

development

Kitcher could clarify both the nature of the origin-and-

if

and the apparent

pattern

consequences, more serious
First,

the shadow-derivation

tradeoffs

difficulties

is

theorem

not as weak, on Kitcher's

of Kitcher's explanatory store.

to derive the length of

belongs to the explanatory

Pythagorean pattern
real

and imaginary,

exhibits,

pattern.

it

is

derivation instantiates

it,

But

he claims,

for

it

such pattern employs the Pythagorean

right triangle

64

from the lengths of other

Intuitively, the

used extensively

in

if

an

awesome

mathematics. Moreover, the

The Pythagorean

contribution to the unifying

E(K) contains a

sides,

Pythagorean pattern already

applied legitimately to derive values for the lengths of

criteria,

E(K).

criteria, as

— patterns which are probably already

as well as mathematical, objects.

on Kitcher's

explanatory store,

store, for

may be

One

any side of a

and might be called the Pythagorean

of

confront his treatment of explanatory irrelevance.

instantiates very general patterns of derivation

members

between stringency and wealth

many

pattern thus

power

of the

Pythagorean pattern, and the shadow-

then Kitcher's account no longer rules out the shadow-derivation
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as deviant.

Indeed, Kitcher's account would seem to
sanction the explanatory force of the

shadow-derivation.
This discussion indicates,

if

power

unifying

is

to

I

think, a grand

be the ultimate and sole

problem

for Kitcher's

view of explanation:

criterion of explanatory

power, then there

is

nothing to prevent purely mathematical or formal
derivations from being employed as
explanations

in

many

areas of empirical science.

formal derivations would probably, on Kitcher's
(e.g.,

Furthermore, purely mathematical or
criteria,

dislodge

many

legitimate kinds

causal) of explanation, for there are few theories (or patterns
of derivation)

natural sciences with the generality

in

the

— and thus unifying power — of theorems of

mathematics and other formal sciences. The formal sciences would, on grounds
of unifying
power, run explanatory roughshod over empirical science.
It

is

see

difficult to

how

Kitcher could exclude a Pythagorean pattern from the

explanatory store, but Kitcher might develop

He might

ways.

plausibly argue that even

explanatory store,

example,
only of

it

if

his

argument

there

is

any

not instantiated by the shadow-derivation.

is

origin-and-development pattern. But

how

tower

is

pattern

is

He could

in

of other

the

argue, for

best placed as a conclusion

could he defend

not by appeal to unifying power: for the unifying power of E(K)

which

number

of a

a Pythagorean pattern

that the statement describing the height of the

his

in

is

the

this

same

move?

Certainly

regardless of

given responsibility for the derivation of the height of the tower, so long as

both the origin-and-development and Pythagorean patterns are already members of the
explanatory store. The dispute between the Pythagorean and origin-and-development

one

of explanatory scope, and Kitcher's theory provides

patterns

is

to settle

such disputes

There

is

no resources with which

65
.

another reply that Kitcher might

examples, Kitcher often

rejects patterns

try.

In his

on the grounds
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discussions of problematic

that their predicates are

unprojectible (480-2, 486-7; this

is

the extension of the theory

I

mentioned

Kitcher could argue that the Pythagorean
pattern can be applied broadly

sciences only by employing predicates that are
unprojectible.

have assumed

shadow

that the

tower

straight, stands

is

of a particular length.

If

the Pythagorean pattern

will

the natural

the shadow-derivation

In

we

perpendicular to the ground, and casts a
is

science, however, such conditions will not always be met.

origin-and-development pattern

in

Perhaps

earlier).

cover not only

to

be applied broadly

Now,

common

in

Kitcher claims that the

middle-sized objects but also

atomic, cellular, and astronomical-sized objects, as well as
objects of various shapes. To

cover an equal range of objects, the Pythagorean pattern would have

to contain

predicates describing the disposition of objects to form right triangles

when placed

to lines of

and lengths

made by

cited

in

the projectible predicates of our language, for the right triangles

the predicates are of heterogenous kinds. That the predicates are

unprojectible suggests that the Pythagorean pattern
different sorts of patterns.

Once

power

would thus be

one would see

was

an illegitimate fusion of

many

disintegrated into legitimate

that these patterns

cannot match the

and they

rejected.

is

not very promising.

and "length," when applied

seem no

really

of the set associated with the origin-and-development pattern,

This reply

etc.,

is

the illegitimate fusion

patterns with projectible predicates,

triangle"

adjacent

determinable length. 66 Surely, Kitcher could argue, these predicates cut across

the distinctions

unifying

complex

less projectible

On

the

one hand, Pythagorean terms such

to the diameters of planets

and

than the terms "mass" or "velocity,"

objects by Newtonian mechanics.

On

cells,

when

as "right

heights of towers,

applied to the same

what grounds could Kitcher exclude the predicates

of the Pythagorean pattern yet include the predicates of legitimate general patterns of

explanation such as those of Newtonian mechanics?
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On
pretty

the other hand, the predicates of Kitcher's
origin-and-development pattern look

messy themselves,

origin-and-development
viruses,

stories,

suffer equally

is

is

a fusion of

many

radically different kinds of

e.g„ those of trees, buildings,

and the moon. Thus, even

were accepted, there

would

for the pattern

if

human

beings, boulders,

criticism of the predicates of the Pythagorean
pattern

reason to believe that Kitcher's origin-and-development
pattern

under scrutiny of

predicates.

its

Equally important, Kitcher offers no theory of predicate
projection, and there

reason to doubt that he has an adequate theory of predicate
projection
his

seminal discussion of the "new problem of induction,"

Goodman

is

at his disposal.

In

equates a theory of

projection with a theory of lawlikeness (1983, 121), and Kitcher accepts
that an adequate

account of lawlikeness depends on a

satisfactory analysis of predicate projectibi

67
I

ity.

Kitcher has a novel theory, however, about the nature of laws: laws are simply those

generalizations that appear

one might surmise

in

patterns

in

the explanatory store (1989, 447). Consequently,

that projectibility, for Kitcher,

patterns of the explanatory store.

is

determined by the predicates used

But then his argument to rule out deviant patterns by

reference to the unprojectibility of their predicates begs the question, for
the deviant patterns are not

members

Let us turn to a perhaps

more

discussed recently by Eric Barnes

The case

rests

on a

fact

in

of the explanatory store.

realistic

appeals to

this

is

closed,

that

68

some

to suggest that

two

laws of mechanics can be constructed: he

that

it

particular time

52

temporally

to

and derive descriptions of

and backward

patterns of explanation

calls

is

one can apply Newton's laws

the motion of a planet, both forward

symmetry

must assume

case than the shadow-derivation, one

about Newtonian mechanics, namely,

descriptions of the state of the world at

e.g., of

it

connection with Kitcher's theory (1992, 564-566). 69

symmetrical: assuming that the system

phenomena,

in

in

time.

Barnes

employing Newton's

them the Newtonian Predictive and

Retrodictive Patterns.
Pattern

The only difference between these

employs information about the preceding

patterns

state of the

is

that the Predictive

world to derive descriptions of

subsequent events, while the Retrodictive Pattern employs
information about the

subsequent

state of the

world

to derive descriptions of

imagine what such patterns might look

There

is

one

further difference

preceding events.

It

is

easy to

like.

between the two

patterns: the Predictive Pattern

provides derivations that are intuitively explanatory, 70 while the
Retrodictive Pattern does
not, for

phenomena cannot

in

general be explained by citing facts that occurred subsequent

to the

phenomena themselves

store,

which includes the Newtonian

A,

is

Each

stringent.

if

set of patterns has the

A

in effect, that

same number

Moreover, the consequence

not identical. E(K)

Since

Barnes argues,

is

sets of

not, therefore, to

A

is

seems unable

is

to

The

be preferred

the explanatory

explanatory patterns,

power equal

A

to that of

and the patterns are equally

set of patterns are

be favored over

is

replaced by the Newtonian

of patterns,

each

set of

has unifying

contains the nonexplanatory Retrodictive Pattern

Predictive Pattern, however, E(K)

suppose E(K)

Predictive Pattern. 71

identical to E(K), except that the Predictive Pattern

Retrodictive Pattern.

E(K).

Now

(Barnes, 1992, 565).

roughly the same

according to Kitcher's

in

size,

criteria.

place of the explanatory

intuitively.

Again, Kitcher's account

to distinguish explanatory derivations from non-explanatory derivations.

Kitcher might argue, as he did

Newtonian Predictive

Pattern

matched by the Retrodictive

is

in

the case of the shadow-derivation, that the

embedded

Pattern.

in

a

more general

This general pattern

pattern that cannot

would have

to

however, on the sole difference between the Predictive and Retrodictive

be

be based,
Patterns: the

opposite temporal orderings of their premises. The pattern Kitcher needs would be a very
general pattern

events.

in

which events-to-be-explained are derived from descriptions

Kitcher could then argue that the Predictive Pattern
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is

to

of antecedent

be preferred because

it

can

be embedded

in this

inferences are

more general

pattern with

made from consequences

even greater unifying power. But

in

comparable

states,

embedded. Such

to that of Kitcher's

One

which descriptions

derived from information about consequent
Retrodictive Pattern could be

science

to antecedents (e.g., effects to causes)
just as

frequently as from antecedents to consequences.

opposing very general pattern

in

more general

could therefore construct an

of antecedent states of the world are

and

in

a pattern

pattern, yet

derivations. This reply to Barnes's objection therefore

which the Newtonian

would promise unifying power

would

yield unexplanatory

seems unpromising.

Kitcher has another option: he could simply concede that, given
the identical

unifying

power

To

force.

of the Predictive

and Retrodictive

Patterns, they

have equal explanatory

Barnes replies:

this,

This admission,. ..besides implying (absurdly) the explanatory force of the
Retrodictive Pattern, would entail (on Kitcher's antirealist account of
causation) that there
of a

If

is

Newtonian system

no causal asymmetry between

earlier

and

later states

(566).

Kitcher swallows this absurdity, says Barnes,

it

will bring additional

refers to Kitcher's hypothesis that relations of causal

dependence

problems. Here he

are derived from the

explanatory ordering of things and processes. Speaking of the idea that explanatory

asymmetries signal causal asymmetries, Kitcher
[T]his

deny.

is

writes:

not something that a proponent of the unification view ought to

What

about the unification view is that it proposes to
ground causal claims in claims about explanatory dependency rather than
vice versa. So we account for the intuition that appeals to shadows do not
explain the heights of towers because shadow lengths are causally
dependent on tower heights, by suggesting that our view of causal
dependency, in this and kindred cases, stems from an appreciation of the
is

distinctive

explanatory ordering of our beliefs (1989, 436).
But

if

Kitcher supposes that causal explanation

beliefs,

and also accepts

that the

is

72

founded on a

Newtonian Retrodictive

equal to that of the Predictive Pattern, then

it

prior explanatory ordering of

Pattern has explanatory

follows, argues Barnes, that

54

power

Newtonian

systems are causally symmetrical.” The
thus

compounded by

first

absurdity,

on

Kitcher's

account of causation,

is

a second.

This objection, though not decisive, highlights
a further difficulty for Kitcher's view.

The objection

power

unifying

would

fall)

not decisive because

is

assumes

it

that

(or that class of orderings, at least,

implies a causal ordering.

explanatory orderings necessarily

any ordering founded on

under which Newtonian mechanics

Kitcher does not believe, however, that primary

entail causal relations:

mathematical and other kinds of noncausal explanatory

premise

is

insufficient:

if

kinds of explanation are

dependency,

i.e.,

show how one
draw such
retains

its

is

criteria of

they can also be the basis of
relations.

But simply rejecting the

causal, mathematical, functional, structural, intentional,

all

to

and other

be derived from more primary relations of explanatory

from relations grounded on principles of unification, then Kitcher must
to distinguish these different varieties of explanation.

a distinction

is

unclear.

Barnes's objection, which

force so long as Kitcher cannot

us

tell

how

is

How

founded on

Kitcher might

this unclarity,

to distinguish different kinds of

explanatory orderings.
Kitcher's theory thus falters in the

well,

and

we

are

left

interesting case of

with the strong suspicion that

improvement on Hempel's:

his

explanatory derivations. With
scientific explanation

more

seem

to

in

one respect

Kitcher's

account

is

as

no

theory simply cannot distinguish explanatory from nonthis latest

have run

development, the neo-positivist

into a

intuitions

about

dead end.

3.2

Paleo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation

3.2.1

The Pragmatics of Explanation:
The proper application

Newtonian mechanics

Scriven's Contributions

of scientific

knowledge

in

explanatory contexts

may

require

attention to various pragmatic factors that logical models of explanation tend to ignore.
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The

pragmatic aspects of explanation have been investigated
by a number of authors / 4 and

many

important insights have

come

to light through these studies.

explanatory pragmatic contexts have been studied:
intentional context;

background

and

beliefs, or

(iii)

gaps

the epistemic context,

knowledge. The

in

discussed here. At the same time,
authors, there

is

more

it

will

(i)

in

the context of why-questions;

which the focus

insights of these

be shown

At least three kinds of

that,

be

will

contrary to the views of

to scientific explanation than pragmatics.

It

will

the

either broad

approaches

words, that although pragmatic aspects of explanation are important,
is

is

(ii)

some

be shown,

scientific

in

other

explanation

not merely the pragmatic application of scientific knowledge.
Scientific explanations

must contain a certain kind of information, namely, causal information.

We

begin our discussion of the pragmatics of explanation with a discussion of

Michael Scriven’s work, which

notable

is

Covering-Law Model of explanation,

in

for his

three respects: for his incisive criticism of the

emphasis on the

between explanation and

link

understanding, and for his discussion of the pragmatic characteristics of explanation. As

have completed a discussion of the inadequacies of the Covering-Law Model, only the

two

we

latter

respects will concern us here.

In

discussing the relationship between explanation and description, Scriven writes:

The question we have

to answer is how and when certain descriptions
count as explanations. Explaining how fusion processes enable the sun to
maintain its heat output consists exactly in describing these processes and
their products. Explaining therefore sometimes consists simply in giving the
right description.

What counts

as the right description? Tentatively,

consider the vague hypothesis that the
fills in

a particular gap

whom

the explanation

in
is

right description

is

the

we

can

one which

the understanding of the person or people to
directed. That there

is

a gap

in

understanding, or a

misunderstanding, seems plausible since whatever an explanation actually
does,

in

making

order to be called an explanation

at all

it

clear something not previously clear, that

must be capable of
is,

of increasing or

The difference between explaining
the difference between explaining and

producing
and "merely" informing, like
describing, does not, shall argue, consist in explaining being something
"more than" or even something intrinsically different from informing or
understanding of something.

I

describing, but

in its

being the appropriate piece of informing or describing,
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the appropriateness being a matter of its
relation to a particular context
distinguishing features will be found. ..in the
known or inferred state of
understanding and the proposed explanation's relation
to it
(1

962

176).

The function
always a gap

of explanation, on Scriven's view,

the understanding of

in

explanation has been given

which the gap

in

demands

some

is

to

fill

Scriven

in

in

1

75

understanding, which

specific person or persons.

is

To judge whether an

attention, therefore, to the explanatory context
in

understanding has been noticed. An inquirer's lack of
understanding can

have a number of sources, the remedy of which requires
information.

gap

a

'

The

Following

is

specific kinds of explanatory

a survey of the kinds of explanatory information discussed
by

various places. 75

First,

an inquirer

may have

false beliefs that obstruct his or her

phenomenon. Accordingly, an explanation can provide
beliefs ("truth-justifying

grounds"

in

information that corrects false

Scriven (1962)). This includes the correction of false

presuppositions of why-questions, the importance of which,

emphasized by van Fraassen. Corrective information
as corrective

is

understanding of a

is

we

will see

below, has been

clearly pragmatic, for

what counts

a function of the false beliefs of the particular inquirer. Corrective

information has

at least

one

feature that does not

depend on

context,

however

—

it

must be

true.

Second, an inquirer often lacks knowledge about the phenomenon or about
connections between

it

and other phenomena. Once the novel information

inquirer understands the

phenomenon and

its

is

grasped, the

connections to other phenomena.

Explanation can thus provide novel information about the

phenomena

or their connections

(especially causal connections).

The novel information provided by an explanation may,

some

that

contexts, be no

explanation of

y.

more than

some

x,

which

is

This kind of explanatory information

Scriven (1962).
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already familiar to the inquirer,

is

is

in

the

called "role-justifying grounds" by

Viewed from
inquirer

never

is

the opposite angle, providing information
that

sufficient, in itself, to

already

is

boost his or her understanding. This

is

known

to the

not to say that

every piece of an explanation must be novel; the
reiteration of known information can

improve the coherence and comprehensibility

known

already

question.

usually plays an essential role

of an explanation.

in

understanding the

Explanations must, nonetheless, include

some

addition,

In

what

phenomenon

information that

is

is

in

novel to the

inquirer.

Third, an inquirer

of interest.

may

require information of a particular type or from a certain
area

Explanations must therefore be of the intended type

the requested area of interest.

(e.g.,

type of cause) or from

For example, one seeking a psychological explanation of

behavior would be unsatisfied with a purely physical description of a sequence of actions.
Similarly,

one seeking an evolutionary explanation

would not be
coloring

satisfied

of the melanic coloring of

with information about the physiological development of wing-

individuals or about the function of melanism, even

in

were novel

some moths

to the inquirer.

The type-requirement seems

relevance relation discussed by van Fraassen, which

we

if

these kinds of information

embody something

to

will treat in detail

like the

below.

Like van Fraassen, Scriven also cites implicit contrast or emphasis as a factor that

determines type-relevance.

it

will not suffice to tell

him

When

a

that the

boy asks why
oxygen of the

his

air

the boy's question requests an explanation of
specifically,

and an answer which
in

caused the gun

why

his

refers to a factor

including those which have not rusted,
explain the distinction implicit

gun rusted when

is

gun

left in

the basement,

to rust, for

rusted, his

common

not relevant, since

to all guns,
it

fails to

the request (1975, 14).

Fourth, an inquirer requires information at a suitable level of difficulty or expertise.

Consider again the boy seeking an explanation of
in this

case, to provide an

rusting.

A

answer including the

his rusted

full

It

would be

inappropriate,

molecular details of the process of

proper explanation corresponds to the general
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gun.

level of

understanding of the

inquirer: providing information that

is

incomprehensible to the inquirer cannot

fill

a

gap

in

understanding.
Related to the fourth kind of information

The need

precision.

it

for a specific

the need for information of a suitable

degree of precision has

reflects the inquirer's level of expertise.

e.g.,

is

In

addition,

it

at least

two

distinct sources.

First,

serves functions of convenience,

ease of calculation or manipulability. Explanations that
provide information of the

third, fourth,

and

Scriven

(1

kinds are called "type-justifying grounds" by Scriven
(1962).

fifth

962,

1

975) thus cites evidence of

at least five

pragmatic features of the

provision of adequate explanations:

(i)

Correctivity. information that corrects the false beliefs of the
inquirer) correctivity
as a special case of novelty;

may be viewed
(ii)

Novelty: information about

unknown

phenomena and

their (causal)

connections that

is

to the inquirer;

Type-specificity: information of the type or from the particular area of interest to

(iii)

the inquirer.

(iv)

Comprehensibility: information that

is

comprehensible

to the inquirer.

Precision: information at the level of precision desired or required by the
inquirer; precision overlaps comprehensibility.

(v)

Each of these features

is

a pragmatic, contextual function of the beliefs, interests, or level of

understanding of the person seeking the explanation, and

These pragmatic features are prominent

in

is

thus pragmatic.

explanations, and Scriven's

work

is

important for having emphasized them. Of special importance to pragmatic theories of
explanation
that the

is

the notion of type-specificity.

development
As

difficulties.

of this feature

for the other features

correctivity), comprehensibility,

theory that

I

develop

the discussion to follow,

In

by pragmatic theories

mentioned by Scriven

and precision

— they will

later.

59

is

it

will

be shown

insufficient to avoid crippling

— novelty (including
be incorporated

into the causal

The Pragmatics of Explanation: Van Fraassen's
Theory

3.2.2

Van

Fraassen's theory

is

of

Why-Questions

exemplary of the contemporary approach

that considers the

context of why-questions to be crucial to
understanding explanation. Van Fraassen,
other

Humean

positivists

(cf.

Mach), began with a metaphysical and
epistemological

program, and then, recognizing that explanation

in

formulate an account of explanation consistent with

science cannot be ignored, sought to
his

program. This pursuit has ended

a pragmatic theory of explanation, according to
which explanation

drawn from the body

like

of science that

is

simply knowledge

into the contextual requirements of a given

is fit

in

why-

question.

Van

Fraassen's general program, which he has

dubbed

"constructive empiricism,"

declares that:

Science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate; and

acceptance of a theory involves as belief only
76
adequate.

Van Fraassen acknowledges
the provision of

concerned

to

show, however,

offered

in

it

is

one

criterion of theory

that although the provision of

is

no reason

empirically

phenomena, and

acceptance

(1

983,

1

69).

that

He

is

good explanations may be one

to believe the theory to

be

This argument

true.

is

service of the fundamental doctrine of his program, namely, that empirical

adequacy alone provides evidence
explanation and truth

entities,

is

it

that science seeks to explain interesting

good explanations

reason to accept a theory,

that

is

another tenet of

provision of

of a theory's truth.

Van

Fraassen's separation of

also part of his defense of anti-realism concerning unobservable

his constructive

good explanations

is

empiricism. Van Fraassen maintains that

no reason

to believe a theory to

be

true,

reason to believe that the unobservable entities postulated by the theory

then

it

if

is

the

also

no

exist.

So explanations provide information, on van Fraassen's view, but the explanatory
force of this information can

in

no way assume

60

or confirm the truth of the theory

on which

the explanation
theory.

Humean

entities postulated or

of explanation that allows

presupposed by the

him

what are the

on the

skepticism.

kind of information, on van Fraassen's view, do
explanations provide, and
benefits of explanatory information?

The

starting point of

an important unpublished paper by Bengt Hannson
(1974),

in

van Fraassen's theory

which Hannson shows

a successful theory of explanation requires a pragmatics
of explanation. 77

consider the proposition,
did

to carry

Bengt Hannson: The Necessity of a Pragmatics
of Explanation

What

is

founded, or the existence of the

Van Fraassen thus seeks an account

tradition of

3.2.2. 1

is

Adam

eat the apple?"

equivocal, for

Adam

ate the apple,"

Upon

reflection,

can be interpreted

it

and the corresponding

remarks Hannson,

this,

interrogative,

this interrogative

three ways, each of

in at least

To see

that

"Why

is

which can be indicated by

the use of emphasis:

(i)

Why

(ii)

(iii)

did

Why

Why

Adam

did

did

and not Eve)

(i.e.,

Adam

eat

Adam

(i.e.,

and not save) the apple?

eat the apple

The emphasis expresses the

eat the apple?

(i.e.,

and not the pear or the banana)?

focal aspect of the question,

suggest contrasting alternatives.

An answer

to a

and the parenthetical remarks

why-question, Hannson points out, must

respect the focus and contrastive force of the question, for an answer suitable for a question

with one focus

may

not be appropriate for one with a different focus (and contrastive force).

"Because he was hungry,"
will not suffice as

force of

(iii):

for

example, may be suitable as a response

an answer to

(iii),

for

it

to

(ii),

but

it

probably

does not address the emphasis and contrastive

"Because he was hungry" does not

tell

the pear or the banana, the explanation of which

61

is

us

why Adam

demanded by

ate the apple instead of
78
(iii).

This point about the equivocality of
interrogatives has significant
consequences for
the theory of explanation: explanations
must take account of the focus and contrastive
force
of interrogatives (or of explananda).
in this

Under the formal model

respect.

explanandum

is

always a proposition.

set of truth conditions.

same

The Covering-Law Model,

On

this

of language

A

for

example,

inadequate

assumed by Hempel's theory, an

proposition,

in turn,

is

characterized by a unique

view, the statements underlying questions

proposition, and therefore the

is

same explanandum, namely, "Adam

Covering-Law explanation of any statement expressing

this

proposition

is

(i)-(iii)

express the

A

ate the apple."

thus ipso facto an

explanation of any other statement expressing the same
proposition, for any grounds for
believing one

wo uld,

(iii)

would be grounds

The explanation

of

any one of

on the Covering-Law Model of explanation, automatically be an explanation

the others. This does not, as
therefore be

be

for believing the others.

more

Hannson shows,

fit

(i)-

of

explanatory practice, and there must

to an explanation than providing

grounds

for believing the

explananda

to

true.

Hannson's point about focus and contrastive force

explananda

in

declarative form exhibit the

explanation has

little

to

same

is

not restricted to interrogatives:

equivocality.

do with why-questions, per

se,

Even

if

one believes

one cannot thereby escape

Hannson's concerns about equivocality. The equivocality (focus and contrastive
explananda

is

a

problem

for

that

force) of

any theory of explanation.

Explanations must therefore respect the focus and contrastive force of whyquestions.

/9
It

is

clear,

function of context.

that

all

moreover, that the focus and contrastive force of why-questions

To incorporate these aspects

why-questions be taken to have the form,

constitute a contrast class of alternatives

would be

<Adam

ate the apple,

Adam

80
.

The

into his

Why

in

theory,

Adam

contrast to Q?,

ate the

a

Hannson suggests

contrast class of question

ate the pear,

62

P

own

is

where P and

(iii),

for

Q

example,

banana >, while

for

(ii)

it

< Adam

might be

ate the apple,

Adam

saved the apple

with a particular why-question, suggests Hannson,

and

is

usually

Van

3. 2. 2. 2

left

unmentioned because

it

is

is

>

.

The

contrast class associated

determined by

its

(intentional) context,

obvious within the context. 8

'

Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions

Why-questions and

their

answers (and explananda,

in

general, and their

explanations) thus have a pragmatic dimension unrecognized
by previous theories of

explanation. Taking this cue from Hannson, and drawing
on further work by Belnap (1963)

and Belnap and

Steel (1976),

why-questions.

A

the

same way

van Fraassen embeds

question, he says,

that a proposition

is

is

his theory of

explanation

in

a theory of

an abstract entity expressed by an interrogative

expressed by a declarative sentence.

An

in

interrogative

is

always expressed within a given context, and the why-question expressed by an
interrogative

(1

determined by three

(2)

a contrast-class; and

(3)

a relevance relation.

is

of a why-question

implied by

does the

level of the

and

A

fall.

A

all

direct

ocean

answers

and

rise

is

in

to the question.

fall?"

alternatives.

by an

The

in

is

if its

the why-question, and

For example, the question,

presupposes that the ocean

order, only

contrast class, as noted above,

of possibilities suggested

at

the proposition supposed to be true

is

question arises, or

group of contrasting

looking

factors:

the topic of the why-question;

)

The topic
which

is

presupposition

is

"Why

level does, in fact, rise

true.

82

a set of propositions that includes the topic and a

contrast class selects a why-question from the

interrogative: the intended why-question

is

number

picked out by

the contrast class of possible alternatives. Nonetheless, the topic and contrast

63

class alone

do not

fully

determine the interpretation of

a why-question,

nor the

suitability of

an answer (explanation).

There

is

also a relation of relevance that must hold

The relevance

question.

relation

may

shift

according to topic and contrast

alone do not determine the relevance relation

moths of the species Lepidoptera

in

class to

be

itself.

in

*

Take the question, "Why do certain

England have melanic coloring."

< certain moths have

coloring >, then the topic and contrast class rule out

other contrast classes. 8

but these

class,

England have melanic coloring?" The topic here

"Certain moths of the species Lepidoptera

suppose the contrast

between an answer and the why-

is,

we

If

melanic coloring, they have pale

all

potential answers directed toward

But the topic and contrast class alone do not specify sufficiently
the

explanation tequested. only one of a number of kinds of explanations,
evolutionary, functional, creationist, or even aesthetic

e.g.,

developmental,

the context, for example, of a

(in

painting of English moths), might be relevant and required, even after the contrast
class
settled.

It

should be noted that most of these kinds of explanation are

cannot be assumed
automatically

Van
account.

that relevance relations (or contrast classes) are

in scientific

contexts.

scientific,

is

and thus

it

determined

84

Fraassen thus argues that a question's relevance relation must also be taken into

A number

of different relevance relations are important in science, he says,

including those that pick out descriptions of prior events, of standing conditions, and of
functions (1980,
relations might

1

42).

X

is

,

in

to

not exhaustive, but suggests that a topology of relevance

complete

his

theory of why-questions.

contrast to (the rest of X), because A,

is

85

thus arrives at the following theory: an explanation

the contrast class, and

explanation

list is

be constructed

Van Fraassen
form: P k

This

A

where P k

is

an answer of the

the topic of the why-question,

bears relevance relation R to the couple

< P X>

thus a three-place relation between scientific knowledge,

64

is

k,

fact,

86
,

Scientific

and question-

context, and the pragmatic structure of
the why-question (or the explanandum)
determines

which

body

part of the

of scientific

Scientific explanations,

knowledge

knowledge

be explanatory

will

the given context.

in

on van Fraassen's view, are thus an application
of

to satisfy desires for descriptive information,

scientific

and these desires are

specific to a

question-context. Scientific explanations are scientific
only insofar as they draw information

from the body of

knowledge, and they are explanatory only insofar as they

scientific

satisfy

the constraints of the interrogative context.
Scientists not only provide explanations

search for explanations.

Van

applied

of question contexts

in

is

described

the search for explanation

in

is

is

driven by two factors: the immediate

and the general need

The search

question-contexts.

of science, but

for empirically strong theories to

for explanations

Evaluation of

The degree
explanation

is

statement can,
question

88
.

Van

by no means a search

in

some

This result

8

"

thus

for ultimate truth or reality;

truth

is

to

be a

part

any

denied.

For one,

it

in

capturing the notion of scientific

follows from van Fraassen's view that almost any

situation or other, constitute a suitable

is

acknowledged

Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions

of van Fraassen's success

debatable.

is

be

terms consistent with van Fraassen's constructive empiricism:

connection between explanation and metaphysics or

3. 2. 2. 3

questions, however, they also

Fraassen's theory provides a rationale for the search for

explanation. This search, says van Fraassen,

demands

when asked

so counterintuitive that

reductio of van Fraassen's theory

answer

to

any given why-

some philosophers consider

it

to serve as a

89
.

Yet more concrete concerns trouble van Fraassen's theory. His talk of the "context"
of a why-question

in

is

ambiguous. There

which the why-question

is

is

posed, and

the immediate question-context,

in

which the intentions and

65

i.e.,

the context

interests of the

speakers play a significant

This

role.

is

the context

in

which

a certain contrast class

certain relevance relation are specified, by
the speakers, from sets of possibilities.

description suggests, however, there

may

and a

As

this

also be sets of possible contrast classes
and

relevance relations outside of and prior to any particular
immediate question-context.

These

sets,

I

submit, are determined

question-context

- call

the

it

wide

in

a context broader than that of the

possible contrast classes and relevance relations?

approaches are

possible.'

10

First,

What can be

historical context.

one could deny

It

seems

that there

to

is

me

said

immediate
about these

that three general

anything to say about

contrast classes and relevance relations outside of immediate
question-contexts.

Fraassen seems to be taking this approach

pragmatic, and that he has solved

Despite these claims,
partial

it

insists that

explanation

is

sets of

Van

purely

the major philosophical problems of explanation.

should be noted that van Fraassen found

it

possible to furnish a

typology of relevance relations that includes events-leading-up-to, standing

conditions, and functions (1980,
that

all

when he

sets of

much remains

for a

1

42).

Taking

this

cue from van Fraassen,

elucidate the foundations of this typology. 91

First,

would seem

theory of scientific explanation to do: specifically, one could

attempt to construct a complete typology of possible relevance relations

possible.

it

one could

try to

in

science, and to

Here two general directions of pursuit are

construct the typology of relevance relations believed to be

universal and immutable across scientific disciplines and throughout the history of science.

Most contemporary theories
viewed

as attempts to

do

of explanation

just this,

though

(e.g.,

in all

Hempel’s, Salmon's, and Kitcher's) may be

fairness

it

should be noted that

many

of

these authors recognize that explanatory practices differ across scientific disciplines,

especially

between physics and the

"softer" sciences.

92

A second approach would be

attempt to demonstrate that typologies of possible relevance relations change across
disciplines, historical eras, paradigms, research

66

programmes, research

traditions, or

to

whatever, and then

try,

localized contexts.

My own

accordingly, to construct and explain the
typologies for these more

sympathies

lie in this

direction, although

not emphasize the historically local features of
explanation:

dependent upon knowledge of causal

knowledge
In

is

always located within

any case,

it

seems

question,

s

capacities, and, although

historical

groups of

discussion will

successful explanation

have not stressed

I

this

it,

scientists.

van Fraassen's theory of why-questions does not
complete

that

the task of the philosopher interested

Fraassen

make

I

my

in scientific

how van

explanation. Consider

theory might be applied to an individual case. Suppose
one were to ask the

"Why do

these butterflies have wings, rather than not?" The topic and
contrast

class of the question are obvious from the (unnatural)

manner

in

which the question

is

posed, but to answer the question properly, the relevance relation must also be
specified.

Now,

to a biologist, various legitimate kinds of explanations based

relevance relations

come

to

mind

on

distinct possible

— functional, developmental, or evolutionary, for

example; other kinds of explanations based on other possible relevance
theological or aesthetic, are ruled out.

The

biologist might then question the inquirer to

— functional, developmental, or evolutionary — the

discover what sort of explanation

questioner desires, before he or she provides the suitable explanation.
context, e.g.,

if

a questioner

before a Dali painting

different.

sets

in

were

which

to

pose the question

butterflies

ruled out (including,

Now we come

it

to

an

can be imagined,

In

art historian

were depicted, the

Different sets of possible relevance relations

would be

relations, e.g.,

a different

while standing

result

would be

quite

would come

into play,

and

all

different

those of interest to the biologist).

to the point: van Fraassen's theory tells us only that the explanation

provided by the expert must match the selected relevance
relevance relation

is

determined by the context.

determine the relevance relation

I

and proposes

that the

agree that the immediate context does

to a certain extent:

67

relation,

The immediate context

(i.e.,

the

intentions of the questioner) determines,
for example, whether a biological
explanation

sought, rather than

some

other, e.g., art historical.

The

intentions of the questioner

determine, furthermore, what kind of biological
explanation

is

may

sought, e.g., evolutionary,

is

developmental, or functional. But the intentions of the
questioner and other aspects of the

immediate question-context do not explain the

do they

origins of these explanation-categories, nor

specify the content of each category, e.g., what
counts as an acceptable

evolutionary explanation. The selection of a particular
explanation-category (relevance
relation, in

van Fraassen's terms)

is

selected locally

intentions, but the origin, structure,

and content of explanation-categories

the structure and content of these categories
the theory of explanation.

context

accord with the questioner's

in

FHere the

wide

is

is

Moreover,

not.

not arbitrary, and should be accounted for by

historical context

is

decisive: the

wide

historical

— not the immediate question-context — determines the structure and content of

the relevance relations that are significant for the biologist, for example, or for the

art

historian.

Because van Fraassen's theory cannot account
categories

—

it

— for

cannot

it

as they

sit

clarify, to

any degree

butterflies to regulate

on a heat-radiating

they are to find nourishment,

butterflies

embody

of the work,

is

and content of these

suggests that these issues are settled by the immediate question-context
of satisfaction,

answer, for example, "The wings of these

allow the

for structure

its

butterflies

it

is

fulfill

appropriate for the biologist to
the following functions: they

body temperature by trapping warm

surface; they allow the butterflies to

etc.,"

fly,

air

underneath them

which

is

required

if

but inappropriate to answer, "The wings of these

the freedom of the

reduced to absurdity

complete theory of

why

in

human

spirit,

which, as represented by the remainder

the face of the crushing force of social repression."

scientific explanation

A

should not only delineate the topology of possible

68

relevance relations appropriate to each
structure,

and general content of these

The causal theory

field of science,

but also elucidate the origin,

relations in science.

of explanation,

I

will submit,

can do

this:

theory, the structure and content of possible
relevance relations

out of the

scientists'

knowledge

of causal capacities operative

by the subfield. The structure and content of the relevance
determined,

3.2.3

in

a subfield of science falls

the

in

phenomena described

relations in science

is

other words, by scientists' knowledge of the causal
structure of the world. 93

Further Developments

in the Pragmatics of Explanation: Explanation
and
Epistemic Context (Gardenfors, Sintonen)

We

have seen

van Fraassen's theory
explanation.

to

in

according to the causal

We will

that

is

van Fraassen's theory of explanation

not the

last

is

incomplete, at best. But

contribution to our understanding of the pragmatics of

consider two further pragmatic theories to see

if

they provide pieces

supplement the understanding provided by van Fraassen.
Sintonen (1989) agrees that the logic of why-questions

rationale of question-posing

and explaining

in

science.

contain the key to understanding explanation.

approach with a more robust understanding

in part

weak

to reconstruct the

to enrich the interrogative

of the explanatory context: in particular, he

interesting theory of inquiry.

His proposal

from Gardenfors (1980) suggestive discussion of the dynamic epistemic

context of explanation.

It

also

makes use

provides him with a framework

pragmatic theorists, as

The

too

But he believes that pragmatics

He proposes

supplements the logic of why-questions with an
derives

is

we

in

which

of the structuralist

to

view of

theories,

which

develop a Kuhnian theory of inquiry.

have seen, have attended
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Other

to contextual features of explanations.

interest of Sintonen's proposal lies in his attempt to explain these contextual factors.

Sintonen begins by sketching some promising features of the logic of questions
(1989, 254-257). The logic of questions allows us to use epistemic logic to study the
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conditions under which an answer

conclusive for an inquirer. The idea works
well,

is

argues Sintonen, so long as whenever a
question

is

put,

one knows what counts

as an

answer. One's knowledge of what counts as an
answer can be either strong or weak.
strong form, he says, the knowledge confers
on one the ability to enumerate

answers.

In its

weak

form, one

knows only what type

of

answer would count.

the logic of questions works best where a
knowledge of language and
to insuie that both the questioner

Who,

answer.

name

its

possible

In

any case,

categories suffices

and answerer know precisely what would count

as an

what, and where-questions (which are termed "wh-questions")
offer the most

When one

advantageous examples:

knowledge

all

In its

of language and

its

asks, for instance,

"Who

killed the President?",

categories suffices to determine that the answer must be the

of a person.

Unfortunately, argues Sintonen, the logic of why-questions cannot match the
precision of wh-questions

car crack?"

Knowledge

95
.

Take an example of Sintonen's:

of language

and

its

"Why

did the radiator of

my

categories alone does not yield any set of

possible answers to this question. Sometimes, of course, one has enough background

knowledge

be able

to

to

of the cracked radiator, a

enumerate a

mechanic

will

know

is

however,

and

its

In

cases

available, the search for an explanation

determine which of the
that the

categories.

set of potential

answers

set of potential

to why-questions; in the case

that the possible

fatigue, freezing coolant, faulty manufacture, etc.

knowledge

answers

set of potential

is

in

which strong background

becomes

correct.

It

answers include metal

is

a search for evidence to

clear in these cases,

background knowledge required extends way beyond
Moreover,

in

many

cases

we

can say

is

language

— especially those of interest to science — the

answers cannot be delineated, even

hand. Sometimes, the most

that of

that the
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if

extensive background knowledge

answer must be a cause or a reason.

is

at

Indeed, a why-question

may even presuppose

a fact that contradicts the inquirer's

background knowledge.

The

significant differences

between wh-questions and why-questions, argues

Sintonen, suggest that the logic of wh-questions
will be of

questions or constraints on explanatory answers.
interrogative analysis, he believes,

The object
uttering u

needed

understanding why-

to strengthen the

The goal

of Sintonen's project

is

background knowledge underlying why-questions and

of Sintonen's analysis

in

is

in

a better understanding of the background

is

relevant to question and answer sequences.
to put order into the

What

use

little

problem context

p,

the explanation-scheme, S explains to

is

and

its

launching point

is

knowledge

to clarify

and

their answers.

H why

E by

the knowledge-situations

model

of Gardenfors (1980).

3. 2.3.1

Gardenfors: The Dynamic Epistemic Context of Explanation
Peter Gardenfors, like van Fraassen, takes Hannson's unpublished article as a guide,

but offers a theory of explanation that accounts for explanation

dynamic epistemic
situation.

The

contexts.

scientist

is

The

intuitive

expect the event

to occur.

unexpected explanandum

The goal
into

the former's "surprise value."

to

make sense

of this process.

terms of the features of

touchstone of Gardenfors' theory

confronted with an event

surprises the scientist because his or her

in

(or fact) that

is

surprising.

explanandum,

In

E, is

The event

of explanation,

on Gardenfors' view,

is

to

to bring the

accord with the background knowledge, thereby reducing

He proposes
The

most situations
already

the following

background knowledge did not provide grounds

model

a

basic idea of the

of

knowledge

model

is

situations that

known

in

to

which an explanation
be

true;

its
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probability

presumes

that explanations provide

information that raises the expected probability of the explanandum,

"surprise value."

is

E,

thereby reducing

is

sought, naturally, the

is

therefore

1,

and cannot be

E's

increased by the addition of explanatory information.
Gardenfors' solution to
is

to distinguish various epistemic states,

and

to focus

on the change

in

this

problem

the expected

probability of £ across epistemic states.

Three epistemic

by Gardenfors.

explanandum,
is

identical to

Kethe

K

is

ln state K,

KE

,

for the

When

of £ in K.

some degree

£, i.e.,

K

reduce

(the

if

C

degree of surprise

body

It

the expected probability of £

is

who was

this

in

is

epistemic state

a set of sentences that,

epistemic

is

C

7u

(where 7

C

state, /C TuC ,

is

explains £

epistemic state

K Tl:(

model, would be the

probability, or belief value, of

it

in

calls B(E)

would increase the expected

K,

Finally, there

greater

Gardenfors

inverse proportion to the size of B

should be obvious that explanatory relevance, on

Without going

1

An explanation

a set of singular sentences).

property of sets of informative sentences, for
inquirer.

£.

in

is

knowledge

of

£'s surprise value.

maximizes the expected

that the

epistemic state K, which

is

%

<

B(E)

£ actually occurs, the person

epistemic state K. The best explanation, on
C, that

<

with the addition of potential explanans 7 u

probability statements and

is,

which the inquirer knows

minimal changes required to remove knowledge of £ from

to the inquirer's initial

identical to

in

an explanation are distinguished

after

does not know why. Second, there

and, accordingly, seeks an explanation of

probability of

that

epistemic state

is

true, but

person inquiring

E has expected probability B, where 0

surprised to

when added

is

is

K E except

belief value

in K),

there

First,

£,

states of the

which

a set of

if

than

B TvjC (E) >
it

was

B(E),

in

set of information,

7u

£.

this

account,

is

depends on the knowledge

into further details of Gardenfors' theory,

some

a pragmatic

situations of the

evaluative remarks

can already be made.

One achievement

of Gardenfors' proposal

is

that

it

provides an account of contrast

classes: the information contained in contrast classes, he argues, reflects the epistemic states
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of inquirers. Consider the question,

may be

above,

Why

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Suppose

did

Why

did

Adam

Adam

is

did

Adam

eat the apple?", which, as

eat the apple?;

Adam

eat the apple?; or

eat the apple ?

associated with the contrast class C„„

ate the

A who knows

and bananas. Inquirer

banana >

.

The

inquirer

banana, and the
inquirer A.

fact that

In

epistemic state

(in initial

A

who

KA

)

poses

he did would not

come

(iii)

Now

that

Adam would

thus expects that

< Adam

ate the apple,

thus wishes to

Adam

class of a

If

why-question

Adam were

demand an
A's

initial

.

likes

explanandum) by

as a surprise to, nor require an explanation

E,

"Adam

explanation, for this

epistemic state

KA

outcome

A

is,

to

"Why

KA

did

,

it

was expected

Adam

eat the

contrast class of A's query thus consists of the

state

KA and

initial

,

the

(iii)

and

in part,

its

associated

the contrast

however, inquirer
initial

A would

epistemic state

explanandum

(i.e.,

that

Adam would

.

eat the apple, the

banana instead of the apple?" The

outcome expected under A's

the unexpected

outcome

initial

epistemic

that actually occurred).

The

epistemic state of the inquirer thus not only rules out alternative potential contrast

classes, but also

KA

furnishes, moreover, the contrast class for A's why-question (or

explanandum): Since, according
question that arises for

of the apple,

unexpected under A's

is

ate the apple instead

ruling out alternative potential contrast classes.

banana instead

to eat the

know why

apples but hates pears

epistemic state of an inquirer thus determines,
(or

ate

eat the apple instead of the pear or

other words, the potential explanandum

Cw The

Adam

consider the situation of an

of the pear or banana," has belief value (for A) sufficient 97 to rule out

contrast class

we saw

three ways:

ate the apple instead of the pear or the banana.

inquirer

for,

in at least

Why did Adam

that (in)

the pear,

Adam

interpreted

"Why

shows how questions (and

their affiliated contrast classes) arise for

inquirer.
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an

Gardenfors' account has, nonetheless, a major
weakness: the theory cannot account
for

explanatory relevance." 8 Gardenfors' theory cannot
account for explanatory relevance

because

like

it,

Hempel's theory,

on an epistemic conception of

rests ultimately

explanation: to explain something, on Gardenfors' theory,
(or for

expecting)

it

to

be

This can be seen

true.

following belief about the weather:
rain in the afternoon.

was sunny
did

it

this

Suppose

that,

in

rain

to

my

the afternoon.

is

grounds

a simple example.

sunny

however,

in

it

the morning

rained

of the rain,

in

I

for believing

Assume

expect that

that

rain increases.

My

if

added

of rain this afternoon.

to

my

me

a barometer

and informs

more than one inch within

in fact,

a period of

dropped more than one

original epistemic state,

Equally clearly, this information does not explain

it."

rains.

whenever

24 hours, the

inch.

would have increased the

general, information that increases the expected probability of

necessarily explain

me

it

will

friend points out, moreover, that within the 24-hour period

before this afternoon, the barometer had,
information,

"Why

obvious that information can be provided that

example, that a friend shows

it

would increase the expected

Suppose,

chance of

will not

me,

arises for

why

the reading on the barometer drops

it

the afternoon, although

increase the expected probability of rain, but does not, intuitively, explain
for

have the

I

on Gardenfors' theory, would be

original epistemic state,

It's

to give

was unexpected, the question

An explanation

when added

probability of rain

it

that today,

morning. Since the

rain this afternoon?"

information

when

in

is

why

Clearly, this

belief value

it

rained.

In

some explanandum does

not

Gardenfors' proposed theory does not, therefore, escape the basic

problem of epistemic models of explanation.
Sintonen argues that Gardenfors' account
are

many phenomena

cases,

the

it

is

from further problems.

that are quite familiar to scientists, yet

not possible to raise the belief value

phenomena by

suffers

of, or,

First,

remain unexplained.

under Gardenfors' theory,

such

to explain,

the addition of further information. Consider, for instance, the
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In

there

movement

of the tides: Newton's theory of gravitation
provided an explanation of the

phenomenon, but

did not thereby increase the expected
probability of the

addition, Sintonen complains that even
raising the

if

one assumes

that

there

all

is

phenomenon.

to explanation

In

is

expected probability of the phenomenon, Gardenfors'
account suggests no

rationale for searching for explanations.

expected probability, why,

if

For

if

explanation (and understanding) are tied to

one already knows

that E

is

should one seek out

true,

£'

explanation?

Sintonen's Theory of Explanatory

3. 2. 3. 2

Commitment

The problem with Gardenfors' model, Sintonen

why

believes,

that

it

does not

tell

us

the scientist should keep an eye on past epistemic states (1989, 264). The key
to

resolving the problem, he advises,

is

to

recognize that scientists confront the

bearing pre-existing explanatory commitments. Gardenfors
epistemic context of explanations.

understanding consist of changes

in

He

is

wrong, however,

and posterior expected

the as-yet-unexplained

the search for explanation

question, then,

is,

probabilities, but

phenomena
is

correct to

is

between

confronting the

the desire to

fulfill

phenomena

emphasize the

to assert that explanation

the expected probability of explananda.

opinion, the tension addressed by explanatory information
prior

is

lies

not

in

Sintonen's

differences

prior explanatory

scientist.

In

and

between

commitments and

Accordingly, the impetus of

one's explanatory commitments. The

what are one's explanatory commitments?, and where do they come

from? Sintonen's primary contribution

is

a theory of explanatory

commitment, which he

attempts to extract out of Kuhn's notion of a "disciplinary matrix" and the structuralist

account of theories.

The
theories.

100

structuralist

In

view

is

one

of at least three varieties of the semantic

semantic approaches, theories are conceived

75

in

view

of

terms of models of formal

systems:

models

more

specifically, the semantics of a theory

for the theory.

According

to

is

provided by defining a class of

semantic views, a theory

abstract mathematical structures (laws)

and a

class of models,

is

thus

composed

which are

descriptions that satisfy the mathematical
structure of the theory.

of

some

abstract

Because these models are

isomorphic to classes of empirical phenomena,
they also provide an interpretation of the
mathematical structure. The class of models defined

specifying the scope of empirical application
of the theory.

approaches are a function of the various ways
be defined. Some approaches define the

in

class of

predicate; others define the class of models

such as Sintonen allow the class of models

in

to

may be viewed

for the theory

as

Differences between semantic

which the

class of

models of a theory may

models by defining a

set-theoretical

terms of phase or state spaces. Structuralists

be defined intentionally through the

introduction of Kuhnian exemplars.

According

to the structuralist view, a theory consists of a theory core,
K,

represents the conceptual apparatus of the theory, and a
of the theory.

The theory-core K may be represented by the

M stands for the set of (mathematical)
models of the theory.

Potential

right kinds of properties

Mpp

is

a subset of the

theory
laws.

set,

satisfy the

laws of the theory.

Mp

,

of the intended applications

four-tuple,

M

pp

<M M
pp ,

pl

M,C>.

stands for the set of potential

models are abstract descriptions

such that one can ask whether they

set,

/,

which

that

satisfy

have enough of the

the laws of the theory.

the set of partial models of the theory.

The

partial

models of a

laws of the theory with respect to the non-theoretical quantities of the

Theoretical quantities, roughly speaking, are those for which one must assume the

truth of the theory in order to

measure them. Non-theoretical quantities are those whose

values can be obtained independently of the theory. The
those descriptions about which

model,

i.e.,

it

makes sense

to ask

the introduction of theoretical quantities,
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partial

models of a theory are thus

whether a theoretical expansion of the

would

yield a potential

model

of the

theory.

Finally,

C

stands for the set of constraints, which
ensure that functions appearing

distinct intended applications receive
the

A

simple example will

of static equilibrium. 10

pivot point, e.g., a

same

clarify all this

The theory applies

'

beam balance

value.

terminology. Consider an Archimedean
theory

to systems of objects that are

balanced on a

with iron weights on one tray and apples
on the other.

each case, each object on the balance, o„ has a
certain weight,

g(o,),

from the pivot point, d(o). The theory consists of two
laws:

All objects

greater than zero; and

sum

the

(II)

(I)

of the products of the weights

pivot point of the objects on one side

g(o)d(o) + g(o i+1 )d(oi+ ,) + g(o )d(o ) +
i+2
i+2

=

g(o )d( 0/ )
(

Let

s

assume,

moment,

for the

our Archimedean theory of

weight of any object. The

that

static

)

is

set of partial

models,

Mp
a

,

have a weight

i.e.,

...

a theoretical quantity,

equilibrium must be assumed

certain distance

...

+ g(o /+ ,)d{o l+ ,) + g{o j+2 )d(o l+2 +
weight

and a

In

and distances from the

equal to that on the other,

is

in

in

.

i.e.,

that

something

like

order to determine the

would then include descriptions

of

systems including apples, oranges, and iron weights, and their exact distances from pivot
points between them;

The

objects.

we

it

would not

set of potential

include, however, descriptions of the weights of any

models,

/Vf

pp ,

would include those members

could add descriptions of the weights of particular objects such

whether the descriptions
our theory,

C

a
,

same

have thus

equilibrium.

a

could ask

set of constraints

on

applications of the theory.

in distinct

just

described the core of an Archimedean theory of

static

For our purposes, however, the most important part of the theory remains

uncharacterized: the

potential

laws of the theory. Finally, the

we

M p to which

might include the following condition: that the weight of any particular

object remains the

We

satisfied the

that

of

models

set,

/,

of intended applications.

of the theory,

Mpp

.

Not every
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In

general,

potential model,

/

is

a subset of the set of

however,

is

designated to

be an appl.cation of the theory. Here
Kuhn's understanding of

and

the point at which the structuralists
appeal to

is

scientific theories.

According

to

explicit rules for the application of a scientific
theory.

theory

is

Kuhn, there

The scope

is

no

of application of a

delineated, argues Kuhn, by sets of paradigmatic
exemplars, and one

understand a theory and the scope of

its

this idea,

in

is

the structuralists hold that the

determined by

members

The

structuralists also

<K

fundamental theory,
introduced to

make

l

p

and

number

a

is

set of

between the

a part,

is

therefore

/,

bound

and,

to a

aspirations.

develop the idea of

> and

The complete

a theory-net.

A

theory-net, N, contains a

of specialized theory-elements

specific claims about limited classes of applications.

may

core of a theory

0,

interests

it

are to be designated

/

intended applications,

set of

hence, the empirical significance of the theory of which

community's

of

inexplicit relations of similarity

exemplars and other potential models. Obviously, the

particular scientific

to

other problem contexts.' 02

intentionally through the introduction of paradigmatic
exemplars.

intended applications

comes

application by working through the paradigmatic

examples and practicing the application of the theory
Following

complete

set of

<K„

/,>

The fundamental

thus give rise to a hierarchical structure of specializations. Moulines

(1979) explicates Newtonian mechanics, for example, as a theory-net whose fundamental

theory includes the second law, F = ma, while
that bring the theory to bear

motion of objects

0/

l

p

> -based

in gravitational

theory-element

theory-nets

in

in

s

the motion of pendula, the

the following way: a theory evolution

which each successive theory-net contains

As was mentioned above, the

/,

e.g.,

systems, etc. With the notion of a theory-net,

(or a specialization therefrom) of

fundamental theory and the

specialized theory-elements contain laws

on specialized applications,

describe the evolution of theories

<K

its

set of

its

is

a

one can
sequence of

one

at least

preceding theory-net.

intended applications,

composed

of

l

p

of the

of the other theory-elements of the theory-net, includes not
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only the exemplary applications of the theory,
but also the complete

set of applications

designated by the exemplars. At any given time,
however, only some of the intended
applications will have been

community, there

is

Kn and

be models of the theory. Within a

to

thus a constant tension between the claim
that

applications picked out by

theory

shown

l

p

and the

I,

set of

commitments
been shown

to

lies

some

applications have not yet been

the impetus for the search for explanation.

intended applications displays,

of the theory. At

in

a demonstration that an as-yet-unexplained

for

explanation

phenomenon

Sintonen thus argues that the rationale of the search
all

other words, the explanatory

any given moment, some intended applications have not yet

be models of the theory. The search

Gardenfors' and

the intended

can be treated by the conceptual apparatus of
the

the fact that, at any given time,

confirmed. Therein, argues Sintonen,

The

s

all

scientific

is

truly a

— has

discrepancy between a theory's explanatory commitments and

simply the search

model

for explanation

other epistemic accounts of explanation

is

of the theory.

— which
its

for

source

is

in

missing

in

the

explanatory

its

achievements.
Sintonen's account presumes to handle other puzzles of epistemic accounts, as well.
For example,

it

provides an account of the relative interest of unexpected phenomena.

Why

do not

upon

their

set of

intended applications receive serious attention. Sintonen's proposal also leaves room

all

phenomena

with low

initial

appearance? Sintonen's theory

for explanatory pluralism in science, for

distinct types of inquiry, the

demands

understanding and standards of

of

it

belief values motivate a search for explanation

tells

us that only those

accommodates

phenomena

(1989, 274).
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fall in

the possibility that there are

which are determined by

intelligibility

that

distinct

modes

of

the

3. 2.3.3

Evaluation of Sintonen's Account

Whatever

insights the structuralist

view of theories

theories and their evolution, Sintonen's use
of
scientific explanation.

determined by the

by a

set of

in

is,

theory;

(2)

Unfortunately

one

of

A

S

is

set of

similar

(for

model

statements S

(in

is

is

delineated,

which

is

in turn,

explained, therefore,

if (1

)

S

is

a

the right way) to an exemplary application

Sintonen's view), laws and theories have

(3)

5 had not

many

applications

in

explanation. Other uses of theory include the calculation of

making

processes, and the design of experiments.

in

of a theory, he argues, are

of the theory.

quantities, the prediction of events, the

are often found

to elucidate the nature of

other words, an intended application of the theory);
and

yet been demonstrated to be a

science, only

little

intended applications of the theory, which

paradigmatic exemplars.

of the theory (S

does

The explanatory commitments

set of

model of an accepted

it

offers into the nature of scientific

of theoretical inferences, the control of

Exemplars of these other kinds of applications

science textbooks, and they must be included

in

the set of intended

applications that defines the semantics of a theory. The set of intended applications
therefore displays a variety of theoretical

explanatory

them.
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commitments

— both explanatory and non-

— and Sintonen's theory provides no means by which to distinguish between

The

set of

intended applications thus does not demarcate the theory's explanatory

commitments.
Sintonen might reply that some applications of theory are intended by the

community
scientists

One

do

to

be explanations, others calculations,

intentionally distinguish

still

others predictions, etc. Granted,

between explanatory and other applications of theory.

can even grant the Kuhnian thesis

that explanatory applications are

delineated through the introduction of exemplars. But can

it

is

to

be explanatory than

that

it

is

scientific

we

sometimes

say nothing

more about what

intended by the scientific community to be explanatory?

80

Are there no general features of explanatory
applications of theory
from other applications ?

all

that an explanation

explanations,

not

raises other concerns, as well.

explanations are theoretical

demands

seem

to

e.g., that

them
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Smtonen's account
that

that distinguish

in

the

way

seems doubtful,

It

for

example,

required by Sintonen's account, which

be a model of some theoretical

the primary factor responsible for

structure.

AIDS

is

Some

scientific

the presence of HIV,

do

be models of any formal theory.

Additional criticisms of Sintonen's structuralist-pragmatic
account of explanation
will

be introduced below

in

the chapter on explanatory controversy.

should already be apparent that Sintonen's theory achieves

little

the pragmatic theory of explanation. With this failure of the

pragmatic account, both of the two major
explanation have encountered crippling
explanation, theories

approaches, but

in

who

new

promise

is

positivist

difficulties.

It

is

grounded not only

theories of causation.

81

it

success as a supplement to

latest

approaches

Nevertheless,

to

developed version of the
accounts of

scientific

time to return to causal theories of
in

the failures of positivist

CHAPTER

4

THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION

When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles,
causes,
or elements, it is through acquaintance with these
that knowledge
and

understanding

The treatment
authors,

is

attained (Aristotle, Physics,

84a 1

1

of causal explanation presented here

Wesley Salmon and Nancy

0ff.).

owes much

first

work

Salmon's argument were the claims

of

and

two

the

detailed and sustained defense of the

that scientific explanation consists in the explication of causes

Essential to

to the

Cartwright. Salmon's Scientific Explanation

Causal Structure of the World (1984) was the

view

I,

that an

account of

and causal mechanisms.

scientific

explanation

requires a distinction between causal and non-causal laws, and that this distinction
cannot

be captured

in

terms of epistemic

causal theory presented

First,

Salmon's theory

below

relies

— including statistical

differs

relevance

from Salmon's (1984)

in

a

— relations alone.

number
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The

of significant ways.

on an indefensible theory of counterfactuals.

I

will

show

that

the causal theory (including Salmon's) can be defended without the use of
counterfactuals.

remains very

lll(
’

much

Second, although Salmon's theory of explanation

a

is still

still

conceived by Salmon

understood as capacity ascriptions. As a

1

992),

result,

I

will

it

in

regularity;

these laws.

107

causal explanation does not consist

in

Taking

in

the

the assertion that certain

particular cases (or kinds of cases).

82

be laws of

argue that causal laws are better

subsumption of phenomena under causal laws, but

causal capacities are operative

to

phenomena under

the (logical) subsumption of

cue from Cartwright's recent work (1989,

(logical)

a causal theory,

a covering-law theory as well: causal laws, though they are

distinguished from non-causal laws, are

and explanation

is

The causal theory

of scientific explanation will

be introduced via a

critical

discussion of theories of causation and of the
nature of causal laws. Although
reasons will

be given to doubt

by

Dowe

that a universal theory of causation

and Salmon

will

emerge

is

possible, a theory recently offered

as the best current candidate.

between causal capacities and causal

The important

interactions will then be proposed, and,

distinction

pace

Cartwright, the interpretation of causal laws as capacity
ascriptions will be defended. With

an improved understanding of causation and causal laws

improved causal theory of explanation

will

be outlined.

scientific explanation, scientific theory, experiment,

in

In

hand, essential features of an
addition, the relations

and process control

will

between

be elucidated

with respect to the causal theory.

The argument
The

four stages.

first

in

favor of the causal theory of scientific explanation takes place

stage

was accomplished

in

Chapter

non-causal theories suffer from severe philosophical

pursued

in

Chapters

4, 5,

and

6.

advantages of the causal theory

— will

where

difficulties.

it

was demonstrated

The other three

that

stages are

At the conclusion of Chapter 4, the philosophical

will

be rehearsed

objections to causal theories of explanation
skeptical philosophy

3,

in

be shown

to

in detail.

In

Chapter

5,

common

— most importantly, those arising from

be innocuous.

Finally, in

Chapter

6,

Hume's

a series of

detailed historical studies will be invoked to adjudicate between causal and positivist
theories of explanation.

4.1

What
It

is

is

a Cause?

usually

demanded

of the causal theory of explanation that

adequate theory of causation. This demand
generic term
precision.

(like "object,"

Common

is

difficult to

"evidence," or "theory")

it

provide an

meet, for "cause"

whose meaning

is

is

a loose,

hard to specify with

definitions of "cause," such as "a person, thing, fact, or condition that

83

brings about an effect, or that produces
or calls forth a resultant action
or state," are
unsatisfactory as a basis for a theory of
causation because they rely on terms

produces,

or "calls forth") that, as vague synonyms,
provide

no

(e.g.,

and no

analysis,

clarification, of "causes."' 08

I

W. Salmon,
It

is

introduce an interesting theory of causal
interaction advanced by

will

enough

P.

Dowe

and

but the causal theory of explanation does not
rest on the success of this theory.
to

demonstrate, as

will, that (1)

I

interactions can be specified

in

are testable

and

in

specific cases;

clear terms;

(3) that

non-causal accounts such as those

in

the natures of particular causal capacities
and

(2)

causal capacity and interaction ascriptions

causal capacity ascriptions are not reducible to

terms of counterfactual conditionals, regularities, or

necessary and sufficient conditions. Of course,

it

would be nice

if

we

had an adequate

theory of causation. But the causal theory of explanation should not
be dismissed for lack
of a theory of causation so long as
clear

and

it

can be shown that specific causal ascriptions are both

testable.

Traditional Views of Causation

4.1.1

Causation, or causal ascriptions, are analyzed most often

in

one

of

two ways:

as

statements about regularities, or as counterfactual conditionals. These and other traditional

analyses of causation will be discussed

4. 1.1.1

in this

chapter.

Causation As Regularity
Twentieth-century discussions of causality have been dominated by the regularity

view of

causality.

According

to this view,

philosophy of science, a causal ascription

cause

C

appears,

its

effect E

which perhaps has
is

appears as well.

its

origin in

Newtonian

equivalent to a claim that whenever,

In

84

Hume's words,

in fact,

a

we may

define a cause to be an object, followed by
another, and where all
first, are followed by objects
similar to the second

e objects, similar to the

t

09
(1977, 51).'

A.J.

Ayer formulates the

view as follows:

regularity

every proposition of the form "C causes E" is equivalent
to a proposition of
the form "whenever C, then E," where the symbol

"whenever" must be

taken to
infinite

The

regularity

refer,

not to a finite

number

number

of possible instances

of actual instances of C, but to the
(1

952, 55).

view was also held by Hempel, who

stated

it

this

way:

Consider first the explanatory use of what may be called general
statements
of causal connection: these are to the effect that an event of
some kind
A. ..causes an event of a certain other kind 6. ..Without entering
into a more
detailed analysis, we may say that in the simplest case a statement
of this
type affirms a law to the effect that whenever an event of kind A
takes place
,

then there occurs,

at

the

same

location or at a specifiable different one, a

corresponding event of kind B..."To say that X causes V is to say that under
proper conditions, an X will be followed by a V," as Scriven puts it (1965
348).

These various formulations are not
experience; for

Hume,

a cause

is

identical.

that

which has been conjoined with the

Ayer expands the scope of the formulation

Hempel,

in turn,

to include

is

all

past

effect in the past.

possible instances of the cause.

adds that the conditions under which the cause appears must also be

Despite these divergences, the basic idea

specified.

effect, B,

Hume's formulation recognizes only

such that whenever

A

in

each case

is

the same: a cause, A, of

appears (under specified conditions,

if

necessary), B

appears as well.

There

is

another notable difference between the views of

positivist followers

such as Ayer and Hempel. Post-Humean

regularity

account of causation believe causation

consider,

in

Hume, on

to

Hume

positivists

be reducible

to

and those of

who

adhere

his

to a

laws of association: they

other words, the regularity account to be a satisfactory account of causation.

the other hand, did not: causal relations could not, on his view, be reduced to

laws of association because laws referring to unobserved instances could not be validated.
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As a

he turned to a theory of mental propensities

result,

to

account

for

laws of association,

including causal laws. 110

The

regularity

some well-known
laws

view has a number of inadequacies

Law and

s

the

Law

are never instantiated

of Inertia.

The Law

in

nature.

actual behavior (regular or otherwise) of no natural object, for

under the action of
natural

Coulomb

s

law

Humean,

if

their

regularity.

tells

Two examples

it.

all

Humean

response

us the force

in

such cases

two charged

is

It

therefore describes the

natural objects

behave

particles

to appeal to counterfactuals:

would experience, argues

the

masses were zero. Thus characterized, the law describes a counterfactual

The counterfactual theory

why

the

move

of causation will

be discussed

shortly.

For now,

number

of

comes to light when we ask, "Why do we want the masses to go to
The answer: "Because we want to find out what the total force
would be, were there no other forces at work." It is the "at work" that one
first

zero?"

should notice. Put

in this

blunt fashion,

it

suggests that the counterfactual

grounded in ideas about powers and their operation, as no
good Humean would allow...
My second concern becomes obvious when one asks the obvious
next question, "Why do we want to know what the force between charged
bodies would be were there no other forces at work?" This case is just one
particular case among all conceivable ones, and a peculiarly inconvenient
one at that [for it cannot be realized]. Why, then, are these circumstances
so special? They are special because these are the circumstances in which
all the hindrances are stripped away so that we can find out what charged
that is, what they do by virtue of being
particles do "on their own"
charged. This is how they would attract or repel one another were "only"
charge at work; and it is how they try to behave even when other factors
itself is

—

impede them

(1

will

non-Humean

elements:

account

I

to counterfactuals will not save the regularity theory.

as Cartwright argues, the counterfactual account conceals a

The

are

forces.

point out two reasons

First,

111

of Inertia, for instance, describes the

behavior of any object with mass, so long as no forces act upon

The

First,

causal laws cannot be understood as regularities,
for they are conditional

whose antecedent conditions

Coulomb

as an analysis of causation.

992, 49-49).
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Cartwright's point

in

that the rationale for postulating the
counterfactual

is

any terms acceptable

counterfactual account

to the

Humean

in

counterfactual, as a regularity,

antecedent

is

The

not realized

regularity

Humean.

in

view

In

addition, even

would be

of

no conceivable use

112

Given

.

correlation, for

example

to scientists, for

suffers additional

and

statistical correlations)

in

which the

between two events

a true regularity

other.

In

addition,

factors cited

be the

result of a

common

Thirdly, even

can be

settled (by

knowledge

of

if

a

the case that neither

cause

one

is

First,

may be

practical decisions

is

113
.

The

the direction of

the cause of the

the cause of the other, for they

may

114
.

common

cause can be ruled out, and the direction of causation

background information), the nature of the path from cause

which

by the laws

— we may infer that the two events are causally related

may be

it

simply do not

— a true positive statistical

not determined by the associative relation; either one

is

its

problems, as well. Most important,

structure of that causal relation, however, remains underdetermined.

causality

clarify the

nature.

describe completely the causal structure of the world

embedded

one could

incomprehensible

terms, there remains a further problem:
the

regularities (including structural equations

are

if

is

important not only

in

science but

to effect

make

using scientific results to

in

— remains incomprehensible from the view of the regularity.

—

Equally

important, the regularity view provides no rationale for seeking to understand the nature of
the causal path, once the regularities are settled.

Fourthly,

regularities

115
.

mixed causal capacities

This

is

related to the third point above: there

causal factor to the effect,

the effect.

Under

or average of the

of factors cannot always

one

of

which contributes

may be two

causal paths from a

to the effect, the other of

a regularity approach to causation, these

mixed contributions

be described by

which

two paths are blended

(as

of the cause) into a single law of association.
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inhibits

a

sum

Finding

the correct sub-populations can be of help

in this

kind of case: having isolated the
correct

subpopulations, one can sometimes replace the
single law of association with two
laws with
distinct

antecedent descriptions. To find the correct
subpopulations, however, one must

have prior knowledge of the relevant additional causal

no

pair of subpopulations that allows

regularity analysis.

Both causal paths

one

factors.

operative,

In

addition, there

two causal paths under

to distinguish the

may be

116

other words,

in

in

may be
a

every

subpopulation, which blocks the regularity theorist from distinguishing
the two paths. 1,7

The general problem with

regularity analyses

are consistent with any given law of association.

is

many

that

possible causal structures

Lawlike regularities underdetermine

causal structure. This problem has a further consequence that should
be mentioned here:

the regularity view of causes cannot provide an adequate distinction between
causal and

non-causal laws of association.

Gas Law) express

Many

laws (especially mathematical laws such as the Ideal

a purely functional relationship
H

considered causal.

The

regularity

view

offers

between

quantities.

Such laws cannot be

no grounds, however, on which

to

distinguish purely functional laws from causal laws.

Hempel

has introduced a distinction that

is

typically cited as a solution to this

problem: the distinction between laws of coexistence and laws of succession (Hempel,
1

965, 352). Laws of coexistence express a purely functional (especially mathematical)

relationship

between properties or

temporal changes

in

quantities.

Laws

of succession, in contrast, concern the

a system. Causal explanation, he notes, clearly "presupposes laws of

succession." Covering-Law explanations that use laws of coexistence exclusively, on the

other hand, cannot be said to be causal.
Unfortunately, Hempel's suggestion does not do the

trick.

On

the

one hand, a law

containing temporal references does not necessarily describe causal relations. Galileo's

Law (which

is

Hempel's example of

a law of succession)

88

may be

written:

V =
Employing

this law, the acceleration of a

velocity and the time of

its

body

At.

may be

starting at rest

On

is

its

final

motion. This derivation constitutes a Covering-Law
explanation

of the body's acceleration, but this explanation
(assuming, for the

explanation)

derived from

moment,

that

is

it

an

surely not causal.

the other hand, causal laws

may

contain no temporal reference at

Consider

all.

as evidence the following ascriptions of causal
capacity:

Metals conduct

(i)

(ii)

electricity.

Electrons carry a negative charge.

(iii)

The

The

heart

pumps

blood.

difficulties of the regularity

view are most evident

regularities are settled, yet scientists continue to argue

in

between race and IQ

about what the actual

statistical

test

performance.

which the

common where

A good example

controversy about race and intelligence, which centers on
relationship

in

about causal responsibility and the

nature of the relevant causal mechanisms. Such arguments are
correlations play a strong epistemological role.

cases

Some

is

statistical

the recurring

statistical

analyses of the

contributors to the debate argue

correlations are, or about the significance of the factors

studied, such as the value of IQ-test performance as a measure of intelligence. These points
of contention are extremely important.

Nonetheless, there are additional points of vigorous

dispute that arise even under the assumption that significant

statistical

correlations

between

race and measured intelligence are settled. These disputes concern the causal origins of the

behavior

some

in

question:

Is

genetic

endowment, economic

other factor most important

in

that significant statistical correlations

that

IQ

test

performance

is

well-being, education, racism, or

determining measured intelligence? Even

between race and IQ

test

if

performance are

we assume

settled,

and

an interesting measure of some aspects of intelligence, the causal

89

path between race and measured intelligence
correlations alone

The

is

underdetermined by the

statistical

119
.

regularity

view

inadequate as an analysis of causation.

is

It

is

not surprising,

then, that regularity theorists often submit the
regularity view as an analysis of lawlikeness,

not of causation, and tend to

downplay

the importance of causation. At the

presume

somehow

contained

that causal laws are

regularities,

and

do

that they will

their jobs

to

be a subset of laws of

that the

regularity,

can

120

account

for causal explanations

4.1. 1.2

Probabilistic Theories of Causation

.

most interesting recent developments

of the

time, they

the laws they describe as

when needed. Thus Hempel assumes

Covering-Law Model, which assumes causal laws

One

among

same

in

the theory of causation has been

the sustained pursuit of a probabilistic theory. Probabilistic theories of causation are

motivated by two
statistical

facts

about science.

First,

causal inferences

information. Second, scientists believe that

some

in

science often rely on

natural processes contain

elements of inherent randomness, and are thus best described by stochastic theories. The

prominent role of
causation

in

statistics in

terms of

science has encouraged philosophers to seek a description of

statistical relations.

All probabilistic theories of causation

of a cause increases the probability of

exactly

in

(S)

A
A
Nearly

all

its

proceed from a basic postulate: the presence

effect.

This postulate can be expressed

more

the following manner:

An event B is a cause of an event A only the conditional probability of
when B occurs is greater than the unconditional probability of
if

occurring

occurring.

authors defending probabilistic theories of causation recognize, however, that

more must be

said

if

causation

is

to

be characterized adequately. For the occurrence of

90

every effect

mercury
be said

in

to

is

statistically correlated

many

with

factors that are not

its

causes.

The

a barometer, for example, increases the
probability of a storm, though

cause the storm. This general

difficulty has

falling of

cannot

it

been named the problem of spurious

correlations.

An
Simpson

s

especially striking class of spurious correlations has
acquired the

paradox:

statistical relations

smoking

is

is

these cases, background correlations result

when one moves between

populations.

of

the reversal of

in

Consider a population

which

in

strongly correlated with a second factor, e.g., regular
exercise, that prevents

heart disease, and

smoking

in

title

at

assume

causing

that exercise

121
it

is

more

effective at preventing heart disease than

For this population, the unconditional probability of getting

.

heart disease

is

greater than the conditional probability of getting heart disease for those

who

If

(S)

this

smoke.

were accepted

as a theory of causation, then

population, to prevent heart disease. Yet although there

smoking and regular exercise
regular exercisers

in

the population,

do not smoke. As

is

smoking would seem,
a strong correlation

some smokers do

a result, the population

relevant sub-populations. Consider a sub-population containing

people

who do

regularly

disease indicated by

will

be

less

(S) will

this

who do

of people:

not exercise

group, the causal relation between smoking and heart

be reversed

— the unconditional

probability of heart disease

than the probability of heart disease conditional upon smoking. Despite

reversal in the probabilistic relation, however, there

the causal role of smoking

is

some

divided up into

two kinds

not exercise regularly and do not smoke, and those

and do smoke. Within

between

not exercise, and

may be

in

is

no reason,

this

intuitively, to believe that

different in this subpopulation than in the population as a

whole.

Such reversals of
visible of

which

is

statistical relations

medicine.

are found

Newspaper readers

91

in

many

areas of science, the most

are often bewildered by the apparently

contradictory conclusions of medical studies
that examine the relationship
between the

incidence of

some

disease, e.g., breast cancer, and a variety
of potential causal factors.

frequent reversals of explanatory fortune

(e.g.,

while one study shows a certain birth control

to increase the incidence of breast cancer,
a

pill

second shows

it

to

decrease

it)

leave

readers shaking their heads, and doubting the
competence of medical researchers.
the problem

is

often not

one

of

incompetence

The

(or

In fact,

exaggerated claims on the part of some

researchers and reporters) but a result of the difficulties of
recognizing and controlling for

background

The

factors that are correlated with the factors

under study. 122

probabilistic theory of causation clearly requires additions
to

the basis of a theory of causation.

influential additions to

We will

although

(S),

it

(S), if (S) is

to

be

consider a number of representative and

must be noted

that

our discussion

by no means

is

exhaustive.

One
off

popular addition to

condition

demands

that

a

is

We can

see

is

how

Trouble appears
given a drop
a storm.

in

the

Because the

made

statistically irrelevant to /A.

C

only

if

there

is

no

as the conditional probability of A, given

is

there

More

is

no other

specifically:

partition of

such that the conditional probability of A, given

supposed

work by looking

to

the mercury of the barometer

we

level of

all

in air

/A

if

The no-screening-

at

C

alone.
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the barometer example.

the barometer example because the conditional probability of a storm

in

pressure, but not

given a drop

same

screening off

But suppose

pressure (which

is

genuine cause of event

events including an event

B and C,

the "no-screening-off" condition. 123

B be considered a genuine cause of A only

which B

factor, C, with respect to

(NSO) Event 6

(S) is

we

will

is

greater than the unconditional probability of

account other

partition events to take into

assume contributes causally

mercury

in

to the

factors,

development

a properly functioning barometer

such as

air

of storms).

depends

strictly

on the

air

barometers function properly, the conditional probability of a storm

pressure

is

equal to the storm's probability conditional upon both a drop

92

in air

off a

pressure and a drop

drop

in

the level of mercury

spurious one (changes

in this

amount

extraordinary

air

recommended by

that

of

one look

at

the relative

knowledge beyond

statistical

relevance of other factors

In spite

that of the statistical relations

of

strong epistemological

its

between the

demands, (NSO)

the fact that scientists use something like screening-off to

actual science, though perhaps not so

much

relative strengths of various causal factors in

There are reasons

to doubt, nonetheless, that

(S)

distant causes from their effects; this

in

which

scientists

some

factors

A

is

unconditional probability of death. Yet the presence of bacillus

disease occurs. Despite

its

every population

causal role, bacillus

A

is

to screen off

is

a type of fatal lung

— bacillus A or bacillus B.
A

in

causes as to

that are contrary to the

probability of death by lung disease given the presence of bacillus

death by the occurrence of lung infection

causal

and (NSO) together form an

normally identify causes. Suppose there

any of two

is

particular population.

tendency yields conclusions

infection in apes that can be caused by

make

to rule out spurious

adequate probabilistic theory of causation. For one, proximate causes tend

manner

pressure screens

case, a genuine cause (changes in air
pressure) from a

purported cause B and the effect A.

measure the

is,

the populations under study. As a result, the
satisfaction of (NSO) requires an

in

in

a barometer: that

the mercury level of barometers).

in

(NSO) demands

inferences

in

the mercury of barometers from the advent
of a storm. Screening-off therefore

allows us to distinguish,

appearing

in

in

is

The

greater than the

screened

off

from

which death by lung

ruled out by (NSO) as a cause of death

by lung disease.

Salmon (1984) has
proximate coincident

from

its

effect.

offered a

effect, as

of additional

examples

that

show

that a

well as a proximate cause, can screen off a true distant cause

Suppose a beginning

corner pocket, and, given

number

billiards player

is

attempting to sink the eight-ball

his skill level, the probability that the eight-ball will
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drop

is

in

Vi.

a

Unbeknownst

to the player,

however,

the eight-ball drops as planned, the
chances of the

if

cue-ball falling into the adjacent corner
pocket are close to

the cue-ball dropping

cue
to

from the

ball

(S)

and (NSO),

in

1

In this situation,

.

the event of

the corner pocket screens off the event of
the beginner stroking the

effect-of- interest, the eight-ball

dropping

therefore, the dropping of the cue-ball

beginner striking the cue-ball,

in

the corner pocket. According

in

the corner pocket, not the

the cause of the eight-ball falling.

is

These counterexamples can be handled by the addition of

a

temporal constraint to

is

no

(NSO):

(NSO T

)

Event B

is

genuine cause of event

a

earlier events including an event

A, given B and C,
alone.

(NSO

1

is

the

same

C

1
)

partition of

as the conditional probability of A, given

off

genuine causes from

C

only by factors that occur earlier than

(NSO T

sources of criticism.

together with

),

to rule out spurious correlations.

later

their effects.

Nevertheless, the temporal constraint of

fail

there

thus handles both the proposed counterexamples, for they rely on

factors to screen off

and

if
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(NSO

they do.

only

such that the conditional probability of

allows purported causes to be screened

)

A

(S),

(NSO

1
)

can both

fails

fail

to rescue

(NSO) from other

to pick out true causal relations,

Brian Skyrms (1980) points out, for example, that

show up in ways other than by screening off.
change into negative correlations within the cells,
independence (Skyrms, 1980, 108).

spurious correlations can
Positive correlations can
rather than to

(S)

and (NSO

1
)

are therefore too weak. Skyrms provides the following example. Suppose

there

is

a strong correlation

there

is

so

much

air

pollution

pollution on their lungs, are

smoke

so

much more

acquiring lung cancer

and lung cancer

is

between
in

living in the

country

less likely to

(S)

(perhaps

smoke). Imagine that country dwellers

than city dwellers that living

?(UC)

spurious, but

and smoking

the city that city dwellers, already fearful of the effects of

much

(L), i.e.,

(C)

is it

>

in

the country increases the chances of

P (/.). The connection between living

shown

to

be so by (NSO
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1

)?

The answer

in

is

the country

"no,"

because the conditional probability of

L

probability of L given S alone: S does not
reveals

to

it

be negatively correlated with

S alone includes both country

spurious correlation between

and (NSO

(S)

and

average influence of various

because

factors,

example
and

90%

—

may

i.e.,

of fatal lung infections

bacillus B.

Suppose

not equal to the conditional

statistically

independent of

the correct relation

is

Hence, (NSO 1 and
)

statistical

common

out

effect;

infection.

bacillus

A

Bacillus B,

in

apes, which

that bacillus

immune

A

we

in at least

two ways:

second, a causal factor

in

is

first,

may

— some effect.

those apes

in

is

present

which the lung

A

infection,

even

if

A

in

infection

appears

in

is

these

in

only

60%

of apes that die of lung

probability of death by lung infection given the presence of

thus greater than the unconditional probability of death by lung infection.

bacillus B are

(S)

exhibit a

systems have been overburdened by the infection by

A

In

from death

a significant percentage of diseased apes die of lung infections

caused by bacillus B rather than by bacillus A. Here the causal

thus

coincident

Consider our

addition, the presence of bacillus B will not screen off the presence of bacillus

by lung

P(L/S), for

noted can be caused by both bacillus

rarely appears in healthy apes, but

on the other hand, appears

The conditional

<

to catch the

(S) fail

actually caused only by bacillus B (imagine, for example, that bacillus

bacillus B).

P(L/S&C)

reflect inaccurately the causal

both contribute to and inhibit

of the apes that die of lung infection, even

cases because the apes'

but actually

L,

relationships often indicate only the

and may therefore

may be averaged

causal factors can mix to generate a
for

L , i.e.,

city dwellers.

fail

relationships.'^’ Causal influence

mixed capacity

make C

is

C and L

can also

)

C

given S and

blended together

and (NSO) are unable

in

efforts of bacillus

the statistics on the occurrence of

fatal

A and

lung infection, and

to delineate correctly the causal structure of the disease in

most populations.
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Cartwright (1988,

by

statistical

moth

- call

1

989) argues that mixed causal capacities
also cannot be captured

measures such as
it

M-

allele

is

and (NSO T ). Suppose

(S)

responsible for two

that a certain allele in a species
of

traits: first, allele

M contributes to the

production of a hormone that makes the moths
more viable than those with alternative
second, allele

alleles;

M produces

melanic coloring

in

the moths' wings, which,

unfortunately for the moths, makes them highly
visible to predators
trunks of white birch trees, which are predominant

question: what

is

that carry

seems correct

it?

It

the causal influence of allele

to say that

in

M on

when

the moths' habitat.

resting

on the

Now we

ask the

the survival and reproduction of moths

two causal claims about

allele

M are true: allele M

both causally contributes to moths' survival and reproduction
and causally inhibits moths'
survival

and reproduction. 127 Yet

relationship.

(S)

and (NSO T cannot capture
)

this

complex causal

For any given population, the conditional probability of a
moth's survival

through, for example, one cycle of reproduction, given that the moth has
allele

and c

will

survival

be either greater than, equal

to,

and reproduction through one cycle of reproduction.
will reflect the

In

alone that

statistical

allele

averages. As a result,

M has a mixed causal

has a single causal role

out

in

the

in

average

we

results of the

role,

cannot conclude from the

nor can

we

legitimately

any population: because mixed causal

given

statistics, a

statistical

relationship

is

(S)

may be

and (NSO

1

)

M will

be

statistical relations

conclude

roles

mixed

that the allele

would be averaged

always consistent with both a singular

causal role or any of a variety of mixed causal roles, even

the correlation

c,

any case, the relationship

causal influences of allele M. Information about the dual causal roles of allele
the

be

or less than the unconditional probability of

between c and the unconditional probability

lost in

M will

if

we

ignore the possibility that

spurious.

are thus unable to perform the job of a theory of causation: they

often cannot distinguish spurious from genuine causal relations, and, because of the
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averaging effect of

statistical

measures, they

causes or mixed capacities are

and (NSO

above

1

)

at

fail

to delineate causal structure

work. Probabilistic theories of causation
other than

are possible, but none, so far as

I

know, can avoid the

difficulties outlined

128

addition, there are reasons to think that no
probabilistic theory can

theory of causation. Take the case of allele

AT.

I

have argued

cannot mediate the correct conclusion about the
dual causal

must be conceded

accurately reflected

which populations

that there are populations in

the

in

allele AT are held fixed.

allele AT, this

is

statistical relationships.

that

which

all

course,

have devised many ways of doing

especially difficult, because allele AT

example, and

in

(via

improved

which the influence

also held fixed.

To know

be

knowing
strategy

is

causes that might interfere with the causal operation of

Scientists

and reproduction

is

A common

itself

this.

In

viability) in a

the case of

has multiple and contrary causal

powers. Nevertheless, one could measure the positive causal influence of
survival

Nonetheless,

roles of allele AT will

difficulty, of

of a

)

role of allele AT.

which the causal

The

do the job

and (NSO 1 alone

(S)

yield accurate data about the causal relationships.

to find a population in

were

(S)

.

In

it

where multiple

allele AT

on

population that has no predators, for

of other factors influencing survival

that the statistical data for a

and reproduction

subpopulation correctly

reflect

the causal relationship between allele AT and survival and reproduction demands, however,

extensive knowledge of the causal factors that influence the moths' survival and
reproduction. At the

minimum, one must be able

to

assume

that

all

causal factors (other

than allele AT's effect on viability) affecting survival and reproduction are fixed

population under study, even
for

is

if

one cannot

example, of a randomized experiment).

always the possibility

upon

identify

If

all

these other factors

one cannot make

this

in

(this is

were

in

the point,

assumption, then there

that the statistical relations revealed in a population will

further study, as they

the

be reversed

the examples of Simpson's paradox. Causal inferences
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can thus be read from

statistical relations,

causal factors have been accounted
for

Cartwright generalizes

presence of

which

all

C

C

assumption into a principle:

this

causes E

P(£/C ±

factors for E

interfering

all

the experimental setup.

increases the probability of E

non-C causal

(SC)

in

but only under the assumption
that

in

C

causes E

if

and only

the

if

every population of an exhaustive
partition

have been held

fixed.

and only if
> P( —iC ± F +...+ EX
C} is a complete causal set for

in

Cartwright's words:

In

if

+...+ F „)

F,

1

where

{F u ..., Fn>

E (Cartwright,

1

989, 56).
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(SC) suggests that causal inferences from
statistics require a kind of bootstrapping
from prior

causal knowledge.

bootstrap

in

the

1

*

0

way

The

practical difficulties of acquiring

suggested by (SC) are impressive.

In

knowledge

addition,

if

sufficient to

something

like (SC)

is

correct, then probabilistic theories of causation
face severe philosophical, as well as
practical, difficulties:

knowledge, then
is

causal inferences from

statistical

statistical relations

;

,...,

to

knowledge

F „} be specified

of statistical relations.

in

require prior causal

theories cannot illuminate the nature of causation.

whether the knowledge from which new causal knowledge

reduced
{F

if

terms of

In

is

The question

bootstrapped can

itself

be

other words, can the set of causal factors

statistical relations

alone?

If it

cannot, then probabilistic

theories of causation cannot be successful.

Although

my

intuition tells

probabilistic theories of causation,

I

will not

claim that there never

Nevertheless,

we

have seen

me
I

will

that Cartwright

is

correct about the futility of

have no strong argument

in

favor of this view, and thus

be an adequate probabilistic theory of causation.

that representative probabilistic theories of causation face

serious difficulties. Although

statistical relations

of causal propositions, the probabilistic theories

provide a certain kind of evidence

we

in

favor

have discussed (which are

representative of a large group of extant theories) cannot provide the basis of a theory of

causation.
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Having

criticized regularity

views as analyses of causation,

it

must be noted,

nevertheless, that although regularities
probably cannot provide a satisfactory
analysis of

causation, they

do play an important

role in causal inference, at least

broadened version of the principle of the
rough terms, as the postulate

that

cause: this principle

one accepts a

may be

stated, in

every true correlation has a causal
explanation. With

principle in hand, regularities, including
association, can provide

common

if

statistical

one important kind

this

correlations and other laws of

of evidence for the existence of causal

relationships.

The Counterfactual View

4.1. 1.3

David Lewis has proposed an analysis of causation extracted
from a statement by

Hume,

which causal

in

An event

c

is

relations are clarified

a cause of event e

would not have occurred (1973,
not

all

that different

3
'

Not

and only

556f.).

It

if it is

the case that

if

c had not occurred, then e

should be noted that the counterfactual view

from the regularity view: the counterfactual view distinguishes

only by focusing on regularities
worlds).'

if

by reference to counterfactual conditionals:

in

counterfactual situations (or

surprisingly, the counterfactual

in

is

itself

possible but non-actual

view shares many of the problems of the

regularity view.

First,

happens,
causes.

for

In

c

may be

example, when e

addition,

conditionals

a cause of e,

is

it

no easy

is

well

task.

is

and yet not

satisfy the counterfactual criterion.

This

overdetermined by the presence of multiple redundant

known

that specifying the truth conditions of counterfactual

Moreover, van Fraassen has argued

that

even

if

truth

conditions for a counterfactual can be given, the truth conditions will require a degree of
contextual dependence that

make them

unfit for the analysis of scientific

118).
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claims (1980,

1

1

4-

Finally, satisfaction of the
counterfactual criterion

existence of causal relations, but

it

does not

settle

may

provide evidence of the

the structure of the causes

regularity analyses, counterfactual
analyses underdetermine causal
structure.

Lewis's counterfactual criterion

may cause

are possible: c

possibility

e,

e

is

satisfied

may cause

by some c and

c,

or they

- that c and e have a common cause -

e,

many

may have

a

Assuming

different causal structures

common

perhaps the

is

- like

The

cause.

least intuitive, so

last

perhaps

an example would be helpful. The following
case, which was presented by Salmon

in his

discussion of reference class homogeneity,
provides a good example of this possibility:

Suppose, slightly simplifying the actual situation, that
the neutral K-meson
K can decay in either of two ways: in mode
N (neutral) it decays into a pair
of neutral pions; in mode C (charged) its
decay products include a positive
pion and a negative pion. Among the class AC of all
K° decay-events,

approximately

25%

are of

mode N and

the remaining

75%

are of

mode C

(1984, 75).

Consider the

which

set of trials in

The appearances

products.

condition

(if

anything

in

a positive pion

and

a negative pion are

among

the decay

of the oppositely charged pions satisfy the counterfactual

nature does), for

we

can see that

if

the positive pion had not

appeared, then the negative pion also would not have appeared. Yet neither
of these two
events

is

the cause of the other: they are the result of a

of the neutral

In

K-meson

regularity.

many

As a

perfectly

for

cause, namely, the decay

K°.

general, there

views of causation,

common

is

not

much

difference

between the counterfactual and

regularity

they are both closely bound up with the notion of a lawlike

result, their

good causal

inadequacies as accounts of causation are similar: they exclude
laws, while the laws they include, moreover, underdetermine

causal structure.

100

4.1.2

Salmon's Theory of Causation (1984)

Salmon has proposed
relations.

Causation

is

fundamental change

a

often thought of

the

in

by philosophers as a

this perspective, events are the
basic entities of interest

example of an event-ontology

is

dog

it

as a relation

in this

way, a plausible approach

between events

- as a relation,

bundles of properties. But what
relations

between events seem

contiguous

in

On

sort of relation

to

be the

in

between events; from

to

Once

be understood,

short,

been pursued

in

many

understanding causation

can

this

account of causation. Salmon suspects
of an event-ontology, and suggests

we

and time: causal events are often

of these

failed to

tactic

make up

is

that events are relatively localized in space

spatial extent.

from relations between events

many

cases,

much

greater

space-time diagrams, events are represented by points,
while processes are represented by lines. A baseball colliding with a
In

window would count

as an event; the baseball, traveling from the bat to the

window, would constitute a process. The activation of a photocell by a
pulse of light would be an event; the pulse of light, traveling, perhaps from
distant star, would be a process (139-40).
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in

assumption

and time, while processes

in

in

produce a widely acceptable

difference between events and processes, he says,

have a much greater temporal duration, and

to

events

approaches have,

that this failure originates, in part, in the

turn our attention

is

causal processes.

The main

view

be? The only available physical

between them. Both
have

to

is

other words, between instantaneous

relations of space

variations, but

in turn,

substantial things in the

space and time to their consequent events. Another possible

of finding logical connections

typical

be analyzed as temporal

search the relations between the properties or bundles of
properties that

hope

A

of analysis.

Russell's view, substantial

particular things are to

as instantaneous bundles of properties (or
universals).” 1

world are analyzed

relation

or an electron, are to

sequences of events. The events composing

think about causal

and the object

that of Bertrand Russell.

things (particulars) in the world, e.g.,
a

way we

a

to

This simpie difference masks
greater contrasts that

come

to light

when one

confronts the

philosophical problem of causation.
Under the assumption of an event-ontology,
the

problem of causation appears

to

concern the nature of the

relation, or

connection, between

causal and consequent events (or
between their respective properties).

If

one assumes

processes to be the entities basic to causal
relations, however, the problem
the challenge

processes.

becomes

that of distinguishing causal

from non-causal

is

transformed:

pseudo)

(or

133

Salmon develops a

criterion of causal processes that refers
to the ability of causal

processes to transmit "marks":

The difference between
causal process transmits
not.

The

distinction

a causal process and a pseudo-process. ..is
that the
its own structure, while the
pseudo-process does

between processes

that do and those that do not
revealed by the mark criterion. If a process
a causal process
is transmitting its own structure,
then it will be capable
of transmitting certain modifications in that structure
(144).

transmit their

own

structure

is

—

What

is it

to transmit a

mark? Here Salmon introduces what he

causal propagation. According to the
in

a causal process to point B

mark

at

each point between

MT:

Let P

processes,

in

the

A and

at-at

calls the at-at

theory, the transmission of a

same process

—

theory of

mark from point

equivalent to the appearance of the

is

B without further interactions.

In

more formal

be a process that, in the absence of interactions with other
would remain uniform with respect to a characteristic Q, which

terms:

it

would manifest
time points

A

consistently over an interval that includes both of the spaceand B (A not equal to B). Then, a mark (consisting of a

modification of

means

Q

into Q'),

which has been introduced

of a single, local interaction at point A,

manifests the modification Q' at B and at

and B without additional interventions

The

criterion for

mark transmission

is

all

is

into process P

transmitted to point B

stages of the process

P

A

(148).

employed

to formulate

an account of "structure

If a process is capable of transmitting changes in structure due to
marking interactions, then that process can be said to transmit its own

ST:

(1

if

between

transmission" and the "propagation of causal influence":

structure

by

54).
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A

PQ: A process that transmits its own
structure is capable of propagating
g
causal influence from one space-time
locale to another (155).
'

Salmon's proposal
causal processes, but

theory detract from

it

its

is

of great interest, especially as
an epistemological criterion of

seems unconvincing

force.

First,

no harm

if

is

Two

"mark introduction" and "interaction"

obviously causal processes, yet their nature
transmission, which

as a theory of causation.

is

assumed

in

aspects of the

in

(MT) are

Salmon's criterion of mark

the foundation of his definition of a
causal process. This

Salmon's account were considered only as an
epistemological

would do

criterion, for

one

could view the methodology offered as one of
bootstrapping from knowledge of mark
introductions and other interactions to knowledge
of previously

As a theory of causation, however,

it

will not

do

unknown

causal processes.

to refer to causal processes in the

account

of the nature of causal processes.

The other area

of concern

is

Salmon's counterfactual formulation

mark transmission (MT). Salmon believes
ensure that the "mark" appearing

in

mark introduction and not

of

of the

Above we noted

that

many

the criterion of

that the counterfactual formulation

the process after mark introduction

some

in

is

is

required to

actually the result

other causal intervention.

philosophers believe that the truth-conditions of

counterfactual conditionals require contextual knowledge. Salmon, like other philosophers,
fears that the use of counterfactuals brings with

scientific claims.

it

the risk of introducing subjectivity into

FHe believes, nevertheless, that this risk

Science has a direct

we

assertions

way

need not worry

us:

of dealing with the kinds of counterfactual

require, namely, the experimental approach.

In

a well-

designed experiment, the experimenter determines which conditions are to
be fixed for purposes of the experiment and which allowed to vary. The
result of the experiment establishes some counterfactual statements as true

and others

The

results of the

for all the factors

as false under well-specified conditions (1984, 149-50).

experiment are convincing, of course, only

deemed by

if

the experimenter controls

other scientists to be relevant to the particular experimental
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situation.

Thus, Salmon has not shown that
the testing of counterfactual
claims

not contextual. His
testing

comments

may be broader

in

science

- broad enough,

test.

do not believe

that

I

play no role

in

Salmon's strategy

is

critics.

be considered "ob |e ctive"

Scientists

can

the formulation or testing of causal claims.

believes he needs are also strong enough to

bypass any counterfactuals

(i.e.,

the

first

test

-

- though they do
allowed

to vary

necessary, however, for counterfactuals

background causal knowledge powerful enough

that

in fact, to

- agree on which factors should be fixed and which should be

during an experimental

is

suggest, however, that the context
relevant to experimental

than the subjective context offered by
philosophical
not always

science

in

In

favor of this belief

to test the counterfactuals

mark introductions

directly,

I

will

argue

Salmon

and thereby

to

clause of MT). Consider an example of testing

proposed by Salmon:

Suppose we want

to see whether the beam traveling from the spotlight
to
capable of transmitting a red mark. We set up the following
experiment. The light will be turned on and off one hundred times. At

the wall

is

a

point

midway between

the spotlight and the wall,

we

station

an

experimenter with a random number generator. Without communicating
with the experimenter who turns the light on and off, this second
experimenter uses his device to make a random selection of fifty trials in

which he
fifty

will

instances

make
in

a mark and fifty in which he will not. If all and only the
which the marking interaction occurs are those in which

the spot on the wall

in
in

red, as well as

all the intervening stages in the
with reasonable certainty that the fifty cases
was red subsequent to the marking interaction are cases
is

we may conclude

process, then

which the beam
which the beam would not have been

red

if

the marking interaction had

not occurred (1984, 150).

Salmon submits
must

first test

that in order to find out

the counterfactual,

not have been red."

One
that

He

"If

whether the beam

will transmit a red

the red mark had not been introduced, the

then describes an experiment for testing

the marking attempts coincide with the

no marking attempt

is

beam being

red.

On

all

the

beam would

It

turns out

trials in

made, the beam remains white. This should convince
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we

this counterfactual claim.

experimenter attempts to introduce (randomly) red marks into the beam.
all

mark,

which

us, says

Salmon,

that the counterfactual, "If the
red

no. have been red,"

is

mark had not been introduced, the
beam would

We are thus on

true.

the road to showtng that the

beam

is

capable of

transmitting a mark.

Strong assumptions are required, however,
to infer the truth of the required
counterfactual.

In particular,

one must assume

that there are

no sources

of red marking

other than the experimenter. This assumption
can be justified by checking around and
ruling out potential alternative sources
of red marking.

method

is

randomly

used: the randomized experiment.
into treatment

which ensures

that the

groups

will

enough

to

emphasize

trial

beams

be homogeneous with respect

manning the

will not discuss the efficacy of the

is

Here, the

Salmon's example, another
are distributed

those that will receive a marking attempt) and
control groups,

(i.e.,

red marking (such as the person

it

In

light

to

extraneous sources of

switch placing a red lens on the

randomized experiment

in ruling

light).

I

out extraneous causes;

that ruling out (or averaging out the effect of) extraneous
causes

the goal of randomization, and that the experiment will not be
successful unless this goal

is

is

achieved.

Under such strong assumptions, however,
that the

beam

is

were made on a white beam,
travel, including at the wall;

We

seems

to

me

that

we

can directly

infer

capable of transmitting a red mark, without worrying about verifying the

intermediate counterfactual. To do so

white.

it

have ruled out

after

we

reason thus:

of red marking attempts

each of which the beam appeared red

when marking

(either

A number

attempts were not made, the

at

each stage of

its

beam remained

by checking or randomizing) the existence of other

potential sources of red marking. Therefore, the

beam

has transmitted the red marks, and

thus a causal process. The truth of the intermediate counterfactual

been introduced, the beam would not have been
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red")

is

("If

is

the red mark had not

superfluous to

this

reasoning.

Why

does Salmon believe

that the criterion of

mark transmission (MT) requires
the

counterfactual clause? The counterfactual
formulation

is

required, he thinks, to

overcome a

certain objection:

Suppose our rotating beacon is casting a
white spot that moves around the
and that we mark the spot by interposing
a red filter at the wall.
uppose further, however, that a red lens has
been installed in the beacon
just a tiny fraction of a second
earlier, so that the spot on the
wall becomes
red at the moment we mark it with
our red filter, but it remains red from
that
point on because of the red lens. Under
these circumstances, were it not for
the counterfactual condition, it would
appear that we had satisfied the
wall,

requirement formulated

MT

in

(1984,

48).

1

Without the counterfactual formulation, Salmon
causal.

fears,

MT

will validate

Such cases present no problem, however, once we
make

assumptions of good experiments. As
the counterfactual,

experimenter, the

"If

successful

trials

beam would

Once

of marking) that the

in

result,

filter

by the

these are ruled out, however, one need no longer

beam

one can

infer directly (given

otherwise

has been marked. Counterfactuals

may be

philosophy of science, but a counterfactual formulation of

required to avoid the counterexamples that Salmon

As a

above, the inference to the truth of

not have been red," requires one to rule out
alternative

truth of the counterfactual, for

needed elsewhere

explicit the causal

the red mark had not been introduced with the
red

potential sources of red marking.

worry about the

we have shown

pseudo-processes as

MT

is

not

fears.

Salmon's criterion of mark transmission should be rewritten without the

counterfactual condition:

MT*: A mark

(consisting of a modification of characteristic

which has been introduced
interaction at point A,

modification

Q

at

is

B and

Q

into Q’),

transmitted to

P by means of a single local
point B if P manifests the

at all stages of

the process between

into process

A and B

without additional interventions.

The key phrase here (which was included
additional interventions."

before,

I

in

Salmon's original formulation)

is

take this clause to rule out interventions not only

"without

after,

and simultaneous with, the marking attempt. This condition corresponds
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but

to the

experimental requirement of ruling out
extraneous causes, and precludes the
need

for the

counterfactual condition.

In

any case, even

of testing instances of

Salmon's theory

MT or MT*
controls for

MT

we

accept that experimental methods offer
an acceptable means

(with or without

its

counterfactuals)

inadequate as a theory of causation. For

be successful,

will

all

is

if

has been shown, only

it

if

it

is

clear, nonetheless, that

scientific tests of instances of

the experimenter successfully

of the causal factors relevant to the given
experimental situation.

MT

conditions of any instance of

knowledge about

(or

causal processes.

MT*)

thus require a significant

The account cannot,

therefore,

amount

of

The

truth

background

be treated as a theory of

causal processes. 134

4.1.3

Dowe's (1992) and Salmon's (1994) Theory
Salmon

counterfactuals

s

of Causation

theory of causal processes has received heavy criticism for

(e.g.,

Kitcher

1

989).

Salmon (1994) has responded

proposing to replace the mark criterion (MT) with an entirely

advanced by

P.

original theory

account, the

Dowe

(1992a,

1

992b,

1

992c). Although

I

new

its

to this criticism

theory

promises to describe and

is

more

have argued

interesting as a theory of causality.

to explain causation,

and not merely

that

Salmon’s

For the

to provide

their

new

theory

an

epistemological criterion of causal knowledge.

Dowe
A

and Salmon's new theory can be

causal interaction

is

stated quite succinctly:

an intersection of world-lines that involves the

exchange of a conserved (and

invariant) quantity.

A

conserved (and invariant) quantity is exchanged when at least one
incoming and at least one outgoing process manifest a change in the value
of the conserved quantity.
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by

theory of causality

needs no counterfactuals, and, hence, need not be replaced on

new

reliance

on

A

causal process

amount

is a world-line of an
object that transmits a non-zero
of a conserved (and invariant)
quantity at each moment of its

history.

A

process transmits a conserved (and invariant)
quantity from A to B (A not
if it possesses this
quantity at A and at B and at every
stage of the
between A and B without any interactions in the
half-open interval
A'BJ that involve an exchange of that particular
conserved

equal to B)

(or invariant)

quantity.

We

look to currently accepted theories, says
Salmon, to

tell

conserved (and to provide us with the laws of conservation
In his original

quantities, but

univocally

Salmon

some

in

formulation,

criticizes

Dowe

him

what quantities are

that

govern exchanges).

focuses on conserved, rather than invariant,

for using the

terms "conserved" and "invariant"

passages. Salmon argues that since causal relations
are invariant across

frames of reference, the quantities exchanged

in

causal interactions should be restricted to

those that are invariant, and not merely conserved.

conservation and invariance

in

my

One

I

have thus referred

to both

formulation.

What does Dowe and Salmon's
causal knowledge?

us

theory of causation suggest about the nature of

might expect to find science textbooks

filled

with the names of

causal processes and descriptions of the kinds and amounts of conserved and invariant
quantities they transmit and exchange, as well as descriptions of the typical kinds of causal
interactions in

which they engage. Open any contemporary textbook

physics or chemistry, and one will indeed find causal knowledge

of fundamental

in this

form,

e.g.,

descriptions of the mass-energies and charges of subatomic particles, of the energy-states of

atoms,

etc.,

In

and laws describing the exchanges

most

scientific textbooks,

of these quantities.

however, one finds no explanations

transmission and exchange of mass-energy, charge, angular

and invariant
but

it

is

quantities.

also true of

many

This

is

overwhelmingly the case

texts in the physical sciences.
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momentum,

in

This

biological

is

that refer to the

or other conserved

and

social sciences,

not because causality

is

unimportant elsewhere

in

analysis in these areas.
related

science, but because causality

The question

of

how

treated

is

As

I

micro and macro-levels of causation
are

stated above, the causal theory of
explanation

causation, so long as

it

can be shown

who would demand

For those

would add, however,
interesting,

is

does not require a theory of

that specific causal ascriptions are
clear

a theory of causation,

a closing caveat.

Dowe and

dependent upon recent physical

I

present

Dowe

theory.

outside of fundamental physics and chemistry,
at best; often, the

to

is

is

theory

unlikely,

I

is

and

testable.

and Salmon's theory.

I

Salmon's theory of causation, though
Consequently, as a tool

analysis of causal concepts used in past historical
periods, or even

have

different levels of

important, but will not be addressed
here.

is

It

on

Dowe

in

for the

contemporary sciences

and Salmon's theory

is

anachronistic,

simply inapplicable.

think, that a universal theory of causation

is

What we

forthcoming.

a universal, but loose, concept of causation that can be
described only by reference

synonyms,

Connected

e.g.,

causation as the bringing about, production,

to this loose

concept of causation

is

a set of

more

etc., of

an

specific causal concepts in

science, e.g., inertia, force, binding, reproduction, respiration, heredity,

themselves connected
definitions

in

and theories

complicated ways.

In

effect.

etc.,

which are

contrast to "causation," clear, analytical

of specific causal concepts can often be given, usually

in

terms of

other (non-synonymous) causal concepts. Though specific causal concepts can thus
be

analyzed (and defined) with success, one does not thereby remove causal terms from
scientific discourse (this point will

specific causal concepts, there

is

be defended

in

the following chapter).

historical

changes

these

also a history of scientific understanding: their

science changes as causal knowledge advances. Although

analyze

Of

in scientific

it

would be
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meaning

in

interesting to

understanding of causal concepts,

be approached here.

more

this project

cannot

4.2

Causal Knowledge: Causal Capacities
and Interactions

Two

varieties of causal

knowledge are

singular causal interactions and

knowledge

First,

claim, contra

I

My view

of causal laws.

which has been strongly influenced by Nancy
doubly anti-Humean.

essential to explanation:

Cartwright's

Hume,

work 136

must emphasize, nevertheless,

I

that

of causal

is

of

knowledge,

Aristotelian

and

that singular causal interactions
are

observable, and that the observation of singular
causal interactions
science.

,

knowledge

my view

is

indispensable

in

not a kind of foundationalism:

is

I

maintain only that causal knowledge presents
no epistemological problems not shared by
other kinds of empirical knowledge. Causes
are as observable and as testable as are
other
objects of empirical knowledge.

But this fact does not provide causal knowledge
with any

privileged or certain foundation.

Second,
as

knowledge

I

believe,

pace

knowledge

Aristotle, that

of causal capacities.

We,

like Aristotle, live in a

with a great variety of causal capacities. Accordingly,

We also

reference to their capacities.

between a

relationship

far as

I

can

tell,

never adequately

and actual behavior. For
jumble of
essence

essential structure

important consequences for

supposed
structure

that

and

which

its

Aristotle

world of things endowed

explain the behavior of things by

is

a close

causal capacities (including

was most

clarified the relationship

and
and

his

capacities.

In

interested).

between

But Aristotle, so

structure, capacities,

addition, Aristotle believed that a thing's

capacities) determines

view of the body

once one acquires knowledge

capacities),

and

best understood

instance, the Aristotelian essence, or form, of a thing contains a

structural properties

(its

in

we

is

believe, as did Aristotle, that there

thing's internal structure

which are the capacities

functions,

of causal laws

its

actual behavior. This had

of scientific

knowledge

of the principles of a thing

one can deduce the

thing's actual behavior.
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in

(its

general: he

essential

From knowledge

of

what a thing
explanation)

in other

is,

is

words, one can infer what

deductive

was

Aristotle

in

it

does. Scientific understanding
(and

character.

correct about the explanatory
importance of capacities and about
the

close connection between structural
properties and capacit.es.

however, forces three revisions
that

in

the Aristotelian account.

Modern

First,

modern science demands

our knowledge of capacities be supported
by observable evidence. Second,

separate structure from causal capacities:
what a thing

nor can the

latter

structure, but the

be deduced, a

is is

method,

scientific

not the

same

as

what

we must
it

can do,

from the former. Capacities are a function
of

priori,

connection between them

is

contingent 137 not logical. Nevertheless,
,

once
to

we

discover the connection between a structure and
a

we

believe

it

be permanent.
Finally,

for

set of capacities,

we must

what happens

in

any

recognize that capacities alone do not determine actual
behavior,
particular case

is

a function of

many

causal capacities of the things present at the scene of the

variables independent of the

phenomenon. Accordingly,

capacity ascriptions are an essential ingredient of explanations, but
another ingredient
also required,

operative

in

one must

specify, out of

all

the causal capacities present, which ones are

the case at hand, and support this claim with evidence.

One

words, describe the causal interactions that actually take place, as well as
that are present.

The

interactions) has a

distinction

number

is

between causal capacities and

of important consequences.

First,

must,

list

in

other

the capacities

their operation (causal

explanation

is

always

explanation of particular phenomena, because an explanation always refers to causal
capacities that

were operative

in

some

particular set of cases.

about causal capacities are often made,

Of course, general statements

"Smoking causes cancer," but such general

e.g.,

statements do not explain anything, for they do not imply that there are any actual cases

which cancer was caused by smoking

.'
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Second,

1

1

scientific explanation

in

does not have the

deductive structure envisioned by Aristotle
(and by modern empiricists),
because statements
describing causal capacities and those
asserting the operation of causes
are (usually) not
linked by deductive logic.

The capacity
causality, for the

which

is

meshes well with

Dowe and

conserved and invariant quantities on which

The capacity

capacities.

laws,

analysis of causal laws

Salmon's theory of

their theory rests are causal

analysis runs contrary, however, to the
regularity

view of causal

the most popular current account.
According to the regularity view, causal

laws describe regular observable behavior: they
are about what things actually do. The
capacity account,

in

contrast, claims that causal laws describe
not

they have the capacity to do, irrespective of
what actually occurs
portrays the contrast

in this

what things do, but what
in

nature. Cartwright

way:

[Mjodern empiricists

in the Hume tradition remain just as
eager as Hume
himself to reject powers. Laws of nature, they insist, are
about what things
do.
want to maintain, by contrast, that fundamental laws are generally
not
about what things do but what it is in their nature to do. Consider
I

Coulomb's law of electrostatic attraction and
that the force between two objects of charge

repulsion.

Coulomb's law says

and q 2

2
is equal to
q,
q,q 2/r
not the force the bodies experience; they are also subject to the
law of gravity.
say that Coulomb's law gives the force due to their

Yet, this

is

charge.

But this

.

We
is

no concept

that actually occurs; rather,

it

for

is

an empiricist: Coulomb's

a hypothetical

is

not the force

power hidden away

in

the

actual force (Cartwright, 1992, 48).

The
explanation)

logic

is

regularity

is

deductive

required to

is

closely allied to the view that scientific

in structure, for

move from

contemporary view of
scientist

view

is

scientific

phenomena

demanded,
at

logic

laws are about regularities, then only deductive

laws to the phenomena. This

method: when investigation

smoothly from the observation of

prediction

if

moves

knowledge (and

is

is

regularities to laws;

indeed a

common

the goal, logic

when

moves

the

explanation, control, or

the scientist smoothly again from the laws back to the

hand.
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The capacity account has a

view of

different

connections between the structure of things,
occurs
in

nature are contingent

in

their causal capacities,

- not logical - and complex.

the world, but these are found only
where the

laws do not describe regularities, but

Because the relationships between
complex, the
laws

is

scientific

as

difficult,

is

scientific inquiry.

phenomena

and what actually

with causal capacities.

and behavior

in

regularities

are relatively simple. Causal

community's path from empirical evidence

the correct application of these laws

view, the

this

There are some

link structural properties

structures, capacities,

On

is

contingent and

new

to the discovery of

explanation, prediction, and

control.

4.2.1

The Nature of Causal Capacities and Their Ascription
Causal capacities have the following characteristics, which
they share with

many

other dispositional properties: 139

Causal capacities are actual properties, not merely possible or potential
ones.
(1)

For example,

if

a

woman

has worked out regularly to improve her cardiovascular efficiency,

she has increased cardiovascular capacity, whether or not she ever displays
(2)

it.

Causal capacities are properties of entities (individuals, systems) with a
and are thus relatively localized in space and time.

particular structure,

Capacity ascriptions
ascriptions

embody

link capacities to entities with a certain structure.

an inductive assumption, namely, that

As a

result,

capacity

such structures have the

all

capacity named.

(3)

A
A

A

difference

in

causal capacity entails a difference

in internal structure.

causal capacity does not, however, entail any particular internal structure.

single capacity

biological world,

may be

carried by diverse internal structures. This

where any given capacity

with vastly different (respiratory) structures.

(e.g., respiration)

It

is

113

less

is

common,

is

obviously true

in

the

performed by organisms
but no less true

in

the world

Of physics.

For instance, an object

capacity to do work. But

many

may

haye,

in

virtue of the energy

i,

carries, a certain

kinds of things with various kinds
of internal structures (and

bearing different kinds of energies, e.g„
gravitational potential, kinetic, or
the capacity to
structures

and

do work. There

in

on the other hand,
implies difference

other words, a many-one relationship
between internal

does not imply

identity of structure.

entails identity of causal capacities,

Causal capacities are mutable as a result of causal
interactions that

it

will

not changed through causal interaction. This

entities are necessarily stable, but

causal interactions they undergo.

once
to

we

keep

have evidence

its

only that

14

if

is

interactions,

continue to have the capacity so long as
not to say that the causal capacities of

they are unstable, they are so

virtue of the

in

This has important consequences for scientific inquiry:

that allows us to attribute a causal capacity to a thing,

judgment

relies

on causal background knowledge.

If

about actual conditions or about which kinds of causal interactions can

the capacity

knows

it

we

expect

it

capacity, so long as intervening causal interactions can be ruled out.

In practice, this

little

capacity

in

in structure.

an entity has a particular causal capacity,

is

Identity of structure,

and thus a difference

change structure. In the absence of intervening causal
however, causal capacities endure.
If

have

capacities.

Identity of capacity thus

(4)

is,

electrical)

in

question, then

one cannot be

one knows
interfere with

certain of the capacity’s persistence.

But

a lot about possible interfering factors, the environment of the object, etc., then

can be confident

in

if

one

one

the expectation that the capacity will or will not persist.

Causal capacity ascriptions are independent of actual conditions, and
thus entail nothing about manifest properties or actual behavior, past or
(5)

future.

It

may be

true that

all

it

may be

true that

in

capacities have been manifested at

one time

order to have knowledge of a capacity,
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it

or another.

Furthermore,

must be manifest

at

some

time.

The

truth of a capacity ascription

does not require, however,

that

any property be

manifested. The manifestation of a capacity
requires that the conditions be

but a

right,

capacity statement entails nothing about
what the actual conditions will be. This
respect that distinguishes dispositional
from non-dispositional properties.
dispositional property,

lioness

is

pregnant.

"is fertile,"

with the non-dispositional property,

pregnant" entails that she

On

is

manifest properties of the lioness.

becomes pregnant. Of

It

is

fertile," implies, in itself,

entails only that,

if

course, background knowledge

associated with manifest properties,

e.g.,

an increase

in

one

Compare

"is

the

pregnant." "The

carrying an offspring, and this must be
true

the other hand, "the lioness

is

she

if

is

nothing about the

the conditions are right, the lioness

may

inform us that

fertility

in fact,

is,

body temperature. But such

properties are not entailed by the disposition alone.

Capacities must be distinguished from propensities. Propensities,
as

them

understand

I

here, are stronger than capacity ascriptions, for they assert
not only the existence of a

capacity, but a probability that the capacity will be manifested.

must take

into

account the probability

In

order to do

this,

they

that certain conditions enabling or disabling the

capacity will be actualized. Darwin's theory of natural selection, for example,
says that
fitter

organisms are more

"fitness"

is

likely to

achieve reproductive success than are the

less

fit.

Here,

best understood as the (relative) propensity of an organism to reproduce

successfully.

In

declaring that an organism

is

relatively

fit,

one

asserts that the

only has the capacity to reproduce, but that conditions are such that

it

is

organism not

likely to

reproduce

with a certain relative probability.
Similar to propensities are tendencies, which take into account past behavior and,
like propensities, assert that the

tendency-statement

is,

"John

is

behavior

is

likely to

continue

in

the future.

a cigarette-smoker" or "lions are carnivores."
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An example
Capacity

of a

ascriptions are

weaker than both propensities and tendencies,

(including the likelihood

of)

actual manifest properties,

for they entail

nothing about

whether of the past or the

future.

Ascriptions of causal capacity entail ceteris
paribus factual conditionals.

(6)

This expresses correctly the relationship
between causal laws and regularities. For
example,

"sodium chloride
dissolves

in

water-soluble" entails that

if

the conditions are right,

sodium chloride

water. Sometimes, the conditionals
associated with capacities are written

subjunctive form,
conditions),

is

it

e.g., "if

would

sodium chloride were placed

dissolve."

The subjunctive form

is

in

in

the

water (under otherwise correct

acceptable, but

it

must not be

confused with counterfactual or hypothetical forms, which
are not entailed by capacity
statements.

In

counterfactuals and hypotheticals, the antecedent
condition

is

clearly false,

or at least unlikely. Capacity statements, on the other
hand, entail nothing about the
likelihood of conditions or states of

The problems

affairs.
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of counterfactuals, such as the formulation of truth-conditions
for

them, are therefore irrelevant

to causal capacity ascriptions.

easily tested, unlike counterfactual conditionals,

Causal capacity ascriptions are

which assume conditions

that are false or

extremely unlikely.

(7)

Causal capacity ascriptions are testable.

A common method

of testing capacity claims

is

to

observe the display (induced or

discovered) of a (suspected or unknown) capacity under conditions
causal factors (capacities) can be ruled out.

scenario that

is

When
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which

alternative

a thing manifests a causal capacity

well understood, often a single instance of display

causal capacity.

in

is

in

a

sufficient to verify the

4.2.2

Causes As the Operation of Capacities

The capacity

Causes As Regularities

v.

analysis of causal laws has

many advantages over

its

leading

(1)

contender, the regularity view: 142

Laws
true regularity

is

of regularity, as

we

consistent with

many

regularity of the form,

have seen, underdetermine causal

structure:

contradictory causal structures.

"Whenever A, then B”

is

In

any given

general, any true

consistent with three possible causal

relationships:

(1

A

)

causes

B.

(2)

B causes A.

(3)

Neither

A and

A

nor B

is

the cause of the other,

i.e.,

a third factor

C

causes both

B.

The capacity account

suffers

from no such

failings:

once the operative capacities have been

specified (and sufficient evidence of their operation
presented), the ambiguity of causal
structure

removed, and the causal relationship

is

(2)

is

The capacity account can handle mixed

settled.

capacities.

As

we

have already noted, a

causal factor can have the capacities both to promote and to inhibit the
occurrence of an
effect

— and

may even

pathways by which
breast cancer.

operate

both ways simultaneously. There

in

certain birth control

pills, for

in

capacities.

virtue of

An

example, both contribute

mixed

The capacity account handles cases

regularity account, in contrast, cannot.

of causes

well be parallel

to

and

inhibit

But counteracting regularities cannot take place. The regularity account,

therefore, cannot describe the operation of

(3)

may

effect

effect are present at

its

is

its

distinction

in

capacities.

which causes are overdetermined; the

The capacity account handles the overdetermination

between causal capacities and the operation of

overdetermined when many factors having the capacity
occurrence. Yet under the capacity account

attribute the effect to only one, or

some

we

for that

can correctly

other subset, of the capacities present: the
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responsible capacities,

we

were operative

say,

in this

allows one to rule out present, but
inoperative, causal

The capacity account allows

(4)

The capacity account thus

case.

factors.

for a distinction to

be made between causal and

non-causal laws. Causal laws describe the
causal capacities of things (with a
specified
structure).

account

Non-causal laws (laws of coexistence or
succession) do

for causal laws

is

among

if

their

comprehensible, useful, and

even though
(6)

The

tells

of causal laws that contain unrealizable

us the force that acts

masses are zero. There are no charged

and hence the law describes no

nature,

other things. 143

The capacity account can make sense

conditions, e.g., Coulomb's Law, which
particles,

it

true:

it

on a two charged

describes a causal capacity that

view also cannot account

refers to a general strategy of inquiry:

for

when we

from the others, often under highly specialized conditions.

apart into pieces, and try to grasp the properties of each

to explain, control, or predict the

components

to

do

phenomenon

so.

When

in

new

their

we

and

component

we know

these ways,

structural) revealed

in

when we want

assemble what
in

phenomenon

of

we

under analysis

situations.

The key aspect
behave on

nature,

Later,

using analytical knowledge

that things will bring the properties (causal

with them into

operative throughout

seek to understand a

isolation

assume

is

of experimental inference. 145 Analytic

we

the relevant

is

contrast, the law

important aspects of scientific

or thing,

it

in

,

describes the actual behavior of no natural objects.

regularity

pull

masses of zero 144

particles with

As a capacity ascription,

regularity.

method, including analytic method and some kinds

method

ability to

important, for causal laws are required
to design and execute

experiments, and to control processes,
(5)

The

not.

of analytic

own. This

method

is

the isolation of

components

to see

how

they

often requires an experiment that creates very special (ideal)

circumstances under which the component can be observed, and
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this

can be extremely

d.fficult to

achieve: the experimentalist must
take into account

all

with or obscure the exhibition of the
behavior of the component

component

factors that will interfere

To measure the

itself.

of force clue to electrostatic forces,
for example, the experimentalist
will try to

construct conditions

in

which other

forces, e.g., gravitational, are

removed or can be

calculated away; indeed, the electrostatic
force can be measured only under
the ideal

conditions of a good experiment.

What does
capacity view,

if

it

mean

electrostatic force can

ideal,

on the

Why

should

cannot be on grounds

It

regularity view?

be measured successfully,

possible conditions.

preferred?

this

for

us

what

is

example, are only a small subset of

subset of conditions rather than another be

that only these conditions generate a regularity,
for

amount

of

work

that scientists

expend

Designing and executing a good experiment,

phenomenon can be

observed,

establishing only that the

experiment,

e.g., that

conditions.

If

make
in

been taken

What makes

The

regularity theorist

cannot

in

getting experiments to perform

in

way.

just the right

capacity

itself.

on the

so special about the conditions of a controlled experiment, nor
can he

explain the great

able to

ideal,

The conditions under which the

alternative sets of conditions will generate regularities,
too.
tell

They are

they are the right conditions for the capacity
to exhibit

experimental conditions

many

to say that the conditions are ideal?

is

i.e.,

one

which the

only half the job. For the scientist

phenomenon

is

target

not interested

in

occurs under the special conditions of the

the electrostatic force

is

such and such a value under these special

the experiment has been well designed and executed, the scientist will be

a further inference to a

more

abstract finding: that the thing tested has a certain

general, independent of any specific conditions.

in

in

Indeed,

if

adequate care has

the design of the experiment, a single-instance of the capacity's manifestation

suffices to warrant the inference to the abstract claim.
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Once

the electrostatic force has been

measured under well-controlled experimental
conditions,
mfer that charged particles elsewhere,
under

upon each other with the same

to act

The

example, the

for

a variety of conditions, also

is

to establish a regularity

to the specific conditions

have the capacity

under which

it

For on his view, the goal

- but the truth of a regularity law
occurs.

Because of

is

always bound

the results of a highly

this,

controlled experiment usually cannot be generalized
to other

(e.g., natural)

circumstances

- so long as we understand the results to be the establishment of a regularity.'
Consider
1

930s.

in
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which

One

how

experimentalists pursued the study of cosmic radiation

approach taken by Carl Anderson and others was

to take pictures of

to observe the particles

cloud chamber

in

cosmic

rays' ionization trails.

to build

46

in

the

cloud chambers

But the experimentalists wanted

under very special conditions. Anderson,

for

example, placed

his

the middle of a powerful electromagnet, the field-strength
of which he

could control precisely. FHe did
as they

can

force.

regularity theorist cannot account for
this inference.

of experiment

scientist

moved through

this

because he wanted

He

a strong magnetic field.

plate during their trajectory through the chamber.

also

to see

what the

made

the particles penetrate a lead

On what

set

among many

would do

grounds could a regularity

theorist justify looking for regularities in the behavior of particles

These conditions are only one

particles

under these conditions?

possible circumstances

— why are they so

special?

It

is

unclear what the regularity theorist can say. Perhaps the physicists sought to

connect the behavior of the
But

this

particles with that of other particles

would be too narrow

of particles

in a

magnetic

that the physicists

wanted

field

moving

in

a magnetic field.

a description of the physicists' goal: describing the behavior

was not

to see

how

them, and they knew that a magnetic

their

main

the particles

field acts

interest.

Another possible explanation

would behave when

upon charged
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a force acted

is

upon

particles with a certain force.

Although

this

explanation of Anderson et

a/.'s

of regular behavior in the presence
of forces

were,

it

is

unclear

why

field

lead plate

on the paths of individual

were added,
particles

measuring the range and curvature of the

momentum and mass

is

more

plausible, establishing laws

was not the point of the experiments.
Even

these regularities should be any

The electromagnet and
magnetic

method

more important than

could be precisely measured. By

among

the cloud chambers allowed them to
observe,

in

others.

of course, so that the effect
of the

particles' paths, physicists

of individual particles,

if it

were able

to

judge the

other things. The special conditions
of

other words, the effects of an important

causal capacity (mass) of the individual
particles traveling through the chambers.

There are therefore good reasons

view

of causal laws.

below

4.3

Some

to prefer the capacity analysis

of these reasons will

become more

robust

over the regularity

in

our discussion

of explanatory controversy.

The Causal Theory of Explanation
The main

origins of the

thesis of this dissertation

phenomenon

to

(1)

that scientific explanations describe the causal

be explained. Having established

understood as capacity ascriptions,
scientific explanations.

is

we

are

now

in

that causal laws are best

a position to delineate the structure of

Scientific explanations contain the following kinds of information:

Internal structures the
:

names

of the relevant causal factors,

and

descriptions of their internal structures;

(2)

Causal capacities: descriptions of the causal capacities of the causal

factors;

(3)

Background conditions: descriptions

(4)

Causal interactions: descriptions of the relevant causal interactions,

including evidence that they

(5)

Global laws; and

(6)

Laws of coexistence.

in fact

of special

occurred;
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background conditions;

(1

in

Internal structures.

)

explanations insofar as

it

Information about the internal structure
of things

explained.

The explanatory relevance

capacities with

compounds

in

which

it

is

desirable

helps to elucidate the causal
capacities of the thing and the

causal interactions (the operations of
causal capacities) that result
148

is

of internal structure

is

in

the

phenomenon

a function of the causal

associated. Aspects of the molecular
structure of

reaction, for instance,

may be

two chemical

part of the explanation of the
reaction, but

only insofar as the features described are
associated with relevant causal capacities.

What counts
of analysis

as internal structure reflects the

were human organ systems,

level; the internal structure of cells

for

example,

would be

chosen

level of analysis.

internal structure

(largely) irrelevant,

may

If

lie at

the object

the cellular

however, as would be the

social behavior of the individuals.

A

description of internal structure

description of the structure of an atom

may

may

include capacity ascriptions.

For example, a

include mention of electrons, understood to be

sub-atomic particles with a certain mass and charge. "Mass" and "charge,"
however, are
causal capacities. 149

(2)

Causal capacities.

interactions

in

which an

entity

A
is

causal capacity ascription describes the kinds of causal

capable of participating.

Some examples

of causal

capacity ascriptions are:

Melanie moths are able
darkened tree trunks.
(a)

(b)

Some

(c)

Light travels at a speed of 3

(d)

Metals conduct

It

be (and

to avoid predatory birds

by hiding on pollution-

species of grass are heavy-metal tolerant.

X 10 8 m/sec.

electricity.

has been thought by Quine and others that the explanatory role of capacities can

is,

in

highly developed areas of science) ultimately superseded by descriptions of

internal structure.

As examples, one could point
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to explanations that refer to the capacity of

acids to neutralize bases or of the
capacity of organisms to replicate
themselves.
of explanations can

now be

Both kinds

replaced by detailed molecular
descriptions that do not refer to

capacities of neutralization or replication.

Below

I

argue that capacities cannot be

will

gotten rid of so easily: reducing macro-level
capacity ascriptions to descriptions
of microlevel structure

cannot be successful unless there are capacities

at

the micro-level. Micro-

reduction thus does not preclude the need
for capacity ascriptions, but consists
of replacing

macro-capacities with micro-capacities.
(3)

Special background conditions. These are
special circumstances (non-causal and

non-lawlike) that contribute to the causal outcome.

high within a certain population? Because the
cigarette smokers,

and

population are

cigarette

all

the explanation, but

is

cigarette

smoke causes

smokers

A

Causal interactions.

is

members
cancer.

is

of this population

The

No

component

required

is

were operative, and describes the causal

An account

of causal interactions tells us

of this

is

an

which causal

interactions that took place.

be narrative descriptions of generic or particular causal sequences of

Consider, as an example, the following description of crossing-over

in

DNA

recombination:

During meiosis, the DNA duplex molecules of homologous chromosomes
recognize each other by some unknown mechanism and become precisely
aligned in synapsis. Crossing over may then occur. In one model of

made at corresponding points in a single strand of
each of the two aligned molecules and each free end is joined with the
broken strand of the other molecule. ..Base pairs then sequentially separate
crossing over, nicks are

and reunite with those
sequence of greater or
recombination

be

important to

of scientific explanations

capacities present

events.

members

to

asserted.

interactions.

to

fact that the

happen

all

causal connection between these

account of causal

These accounts tend

the incidence of lung cancer

a special background condition that

not of a causal nature.

individuals and cigarette smoking

(4)

is

Why

is

of the other

DNA

molecule, forming a heteroduplex

According

to this model,
observed when the heteroduplex region is terminated by a

lesser length.
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he

^

S ' randS

(FTymaT^'st.
This

is

a generic description of crossing
over.

e * ch

^

Explanations of particular events, e.g„
the

recent global warming, require descriptions
of particular sequences of actual
events.
(5)

Global laws. Global laws

refer to systemic properties,

are the properties described by the great
conservation laws.

charge, for example, states that the
the

number

of charge

is

(6)

total

charge

The law

number

(e.g.,

good examples

of

which

of conservation of

of positive unit charges minus

of negative unit charges) of any closed system
remains constant. Conservation
a systemic, or global, property.

Laws of coexistence.

the presence of

some

Finally, explanations

may

things or properties, or the values of

or values of others. Such laws include

statistical

contain non-causal laws that link

some

correlations

quantities, to the presence

and equations

precise quantitative relations between properties of causal
processes.
are especially valuable

when

Gas Law and the law

Ideal

scientific explanation contains

all

for

information are simply irrelevant

particular cases of explanation.

in

the

in

one

of the simple

pendulum.

of these kinds of information.

forms of information may be absent

example, play no role

of coexistence

precise quantitative values of properties are desired.

Examples of laws of coexistence are the

Not every

Laws

that specify

of three reasons.

some

First,

above explanation of crossing-over

in

Particular

of these kinds of

Laws of coexistence,

DNA

for

recombination.

Second, the phenomenon may not be completely understood, and, hence, some relevant
information

may be unknown and

therefore absent.

explanations long before anything was
information

may be

example, appeared

in

of their internal structure. Third, the

generally known, and thus need not be restated for the purposes of

explanation. Lack of novelty does not

theorists

known

Electrons, for

would have

it:

make

information irrelevant to explanation, as

such information can remain a

explanation, so long as the information

is

tacit

causally relevant.
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but important

component

some
of the

Not every

scientific explanation contains

mentioned above. Yet causal information

upon information about the

4.4

is

all

of the six kinds of information

always required, since explanation
depends

relevant causal capacities and causal
150
interactions.

Theory, Explanation, and Causal Knowledge

Most philosophers

some

of science have

special logical relation

between

theory and causal knowledge

assumed

that scientific explanation consists in

scientific theory

and

fact.

The

relationship

between

not simple, however, and the causal theory of
explanation

is

forces a revision of this assumption.

Theories have

many

uses, only

one

of

which

is

explanation: they can be used to

predict events, to calculate the values of quantities, to describe
the internal structure of
natural things, to control processes,

theories can contain

many

and

to design experiments.

Not

surprisingly, therefore,

kinds of information, including global laws, laws of coexistence

(including mathematical equations), the values of important constants, descriptions of

generic causal interactions, descriptions of causal capacities, descriptions of internal
structures, or a mixture of

A

any of these.

theory need not provide any causal information.

of fluid mechanics, for instance, contain

mechanics are sometimes used,
though
heat

is

it

is

known

that fluid

for

Some

applications of the theory

no causal information: the equations

example,

of fluid

to calculate rates of heat "flow" (transfer),

even

mechanics describes incorrectly the causal process by which

transferred.

Nancy Cartwright (1981)

offers the interesting

example

of

quantum damping

distinguish causal accounts from theoretical treatments. She relates that there

universally agreed-upon causal description of

quantum damping, and

its

quantum damping, according

to

is

to

a

which

associated line broadening, are brought about by the emission
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and absorption of photons. Supplementing
the causal
theoretical treatments,

i.e.,

six different

ways

story,

to set the

however, are

phenomena

six different

into the general

mathematical framework of quantum mechanics.
The choice of theoretical treatment

determined by
applications

in

how

the theory

which

statistics

is

to

be used. For example,

participate

or

in scientific

to use

it

in

one

that will provide statistical answers.

Theoretical treatments that provide

little

one wishes

are important, e.g., photon correlation
experiments,

must select theoretical equations

correspondingly

if

is

or

little

no causal information exhibit

no explanatory power. This

is

explanations: they can, but only

not to say that such theories cannot

when supplemented

with

appropriate causal accounts.
Naturally,

a

good example

adaptations

some

theories are causal theories.

of a causal theory:

it

Darwin's theory of natural selection

is

provides a causal account of the evolution of

organisms. Natural selection explanations contain a number of the

in

components mentioned above.

Essential to natural selection explanations, for

descriptions of the capacities of organisms to transmit

traits

example, are

to their offspring (heredity),

and

the capacity to survive and reproduce, as well as descriptions of causal interactions between

organisms and

Some

their

environment.

explanations contain few or no theoretical claims beyond the assertion

assumption) that some causal capacity

An example

exists

of a non-theoretical explanation

and
is:

by multiple gunshot wounds.
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is

operative

John

F.

in

(or

the particular case at hand.

Kennedy died

of the trauma caused

4.5

A Summary

of the Benefits of the Causal Theory
of Scientific Explanation

The causal theory

of scientific explanation offers an
array of advantages

by any competitor theory of explanation. To
summarize these
to recall the set of philosophical

When

(a)

benefits,

problems of explanation canvassed

does some information constitute a

scientific

in

it

unmatched

would be

Chapter

useful

1

explanation?

Wherein lies the difference between description and
explanation,
between descriptive knowledge and explanatory knowledge?
(b)

(c)

What

(d)

How

is

or

the precise relation between explanation and
understanding?

can

we

account

for explanation as

an objective of scientific

inquiry?

The

(e)

ability to control processes

scientific understanding:

(f)

What

What

(g)

is

is

what

is

and

to explain

phenomena both mark

the connection between these

two

abilities?

the distinction between theoretical prediction and explanation?
the correct solution to the asymmetries of explanation, and other

problems of explanatory relevance?

How

(h)

can

we

account

for differences in

and practices among various subfields
in

the history of science?

(i)

Can we explain

differences

in

explanatory framework,

of science?

Among

style,

different periods

the nature, progress, and resolution of

explanatory controversies?

(a)

Information constitutes a scientific explanation, of course,

when

it

describes the

causal capacities and interactions (mechanisms) responsible for the phenomena-to-be-

explained,

in

accordance with the pragmatic demands of the explanation context.

(b) , (c),

knowledge

(or

and

(e):

The difference between

understanding)

mechanisms responsible

lies in

for the

kind of understanding important
derivation), but understanding

knowledge. Moreover, the

descriptive

having knowledge of the causal capacities and

phenomenon. Again,
in

why

knowledge and explanatory

causal

science. There are others

or

how

a

ability to explain

knowledge
(e.g.,

phenomenon occurs
is

is

not the only

understanding a
requires causal

only one kind of competence associated
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With causal understanding: designing
effective strategies of action, controlling
natural
processes, designing and executing
experiments, and making predictions are
others. The

reason for the intimacy between these kinds
of

abilities

is

now

clear:

they are

all

manifestations of causal knowledge.
(d)

This also clarifies

why

the goal of scientific inquiry

often said to be

is

explanation: "seeking understanding" and "seeking
explanation" are sometimes used

interchangeably because both are a search for causal
knowledge.
(f)

The causal theory

of explanation also reveals

why

epistemic or predictive

grounds and explanatory information have been conflated by
philosophers .' 51 Laws of
regularity often serve as the basis of

good

predictive inferences.

In

addition, as

we

have

also noted, scientists believe implicitly that every true regularity
has a causal explanation; a
regularity thus entails that a causal relationship exists

Philosophers have acknowledged these

facts

between the correlated

and mistakenly concluded

epistemic grounds, and explanatory (causal) information are pretty

that causal structure

is

radically

underdetermined by laws of

regularity has a causal explanation, that explanation

is

that predictive or

much

both require inferences from laws of regularity. These philosophers

fail

regularity:

factors.

the same, and that

however,

to note,

though every true

not given with the regularity

itself.

Therefore, laws of regularity can be useful for making predictions, but they cannot serve as
the basis of explanation.

(g)

The causal theory shows explanatory asymmetries

asymmetries between factors of

interest.

to result

Explanatory relevance

is

from causal

a function of

two aspects

of explanation: causal relevance and contextual (pragmatic) relevance.

(h)

Explanatory practices

the complexity of

differ in various

phenomena, the depth

of

sciences

knowledge

in

part

of causal

because of differences

mechanisms, and

kinds of evidence used to support capacity ascriptions and descriptions of causal
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in

in

the

interactions.

For example,

poorly understood,

where phenomena

e.g., in

explanatory claims.

psychology,

Statistical

are

statistical

evidence

is

complex and causal mechanisms

evidence

is

often used to support

used because the weakness of our
causal

knowledge, as well as the complexity of the
phenomena themselves, obstruct
isolate factors in a

phenomena

way

that allows

are relatively simple,

them
in

to

be observed directly

contrast,

more

6).

Statistical

the

1

930s (some of which

magnetic

evidence can be used

to

chamber experiments

be discussed

rigidity) of individual ion trails.

evidence of a causal capacity of individual

because of the

knowledge

will

Where

in detail in

Chapter

information certainly played a role, but so did the
measurements of

trajectories (e.g.,

direct

in

efforts to

individual cases.

in

direct forms of

verify the legitimacy of an explanation.
Consider the cloud

performed by physicists

are

relative simplicity of the

These measurements provided

particles,

phenomenon and

namely, their mass, but only

the strong causal background

available.

To take another example,
physical sciences

is

In classical

different.

it

Ernst

is

sometimes

Mayr,

for

said that the role of laws in biological

and

example, writes:

were considered universal, and Popper's
was based on this conception...
the word law is used sparingly, if at all, in most

physics, laws

falsifiability principle
[In contrast],

[contemporary] writings about evolution. Generalizations in modern
biology tend to be statistical and probabilistic and often have numerous
exceptions. Moreover, biological generalizations tend to apply to
geographical or otherwise restricted domains. One can generalize from the
study of birds, tropical forests, freshwater plankton, or the central nervous

system but most of these generalizations have so limited an application that
word law in the sense of the laws of physics, is questionable
(1988, 18-19).

the use of the

Mayr

is

,

certainly correct

and precision

of, say,

in

noting that modern biology contains few laws of the generality

Newtonian mechanics. The reason

structure of the biological world

is

vastly

for this,

I

submit,

more complex than the world

that the causal

of large bodies

described by Newtonian mechanics. Causal capacities are as stable, and as
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is

plentiful, in

biology as they are

physics.

in

system of capacities

However, each organism

into a causally

carries a

complex environment. As a

result,

capacities are stable across organisms or
environments, behavior

capacity

in

any particular case depends upon

motion of large bodies such as planets or
capacity

- the bodies'

gravity), the effects of

mass

(inertia)

projectiles

relatively regular,

(i)

in

the causal structure of large

Explanatory controversies

chapter. There

the

phenomena

of controversy.

it

will

be shown

of interest,

and

result of this causal

is

thus a function of

biological systems.

the history of science will be discussed

in

(e.g.,

and can be described accurately

that explanatory controversies

in

the

last

concern the causal origins of

that this partly explains the nature, progress,

and resolution

Explanatory controversies are tenacious, for example, so long as the causal

structure underlying a

phenomenon

knowledge

it

is

body and

the

on a single

of forces

As a

with a few laws of great scope. The distinction
pointed out by Mayr
differences

In contrast,

entirely

number
ease.

though individual

not: the operation of a

depends almost

- and a relatively small

is

is

a great variety of factors.

which are calculable with comparative

simplicity, behavior of large bodies

huge (usually unique)

lacking,

is

difficult to

is

poorly understood.

decide, with any

When

finality,

relevant causal

between competing

explanatory hypotheses. The experimental illumination of causal structure and mechanisms
can, on the other hand, decisively resolved long-standing explanatory controversies.

But

the design and execution of decisive experiments requires a rich background of prior causal

knowledge, and thus cannot be pursued

We see that the

in

every case.

benefits of the causal theory are impressive.

has been subjected to numerous attacks, most of which are based on
In

the next chapter,

we

will see that the

serious as critics suppose

them

presumed disadvantages

to be.
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But the causal theory

Humean

assumptions.

of the theory are not as

CHAPTER

5

OBJECTIONS TO THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION

Hume, causes and

After

while other objects of Hume's

causal

knowledge

criticism,

such as

into disrepute in philosophy.

fell

scientific theories

regained their philosophical reputations, causes
have remained
unfortunate and unjustifiable:

about causes, too. This

is

it

is

high time,

not to say that

will argue, to

I

in

And

and induction, have
disgrace. This situation

repudiate

is

Hume's skepticism

Hume's arguments should be

ignored, or can be

dismissed out of hand. They present legitimate hurdles
to any account of causal

knowledge. But Hume's arguments are philosophical obstacles

to

be overcome, not

conclusive grounds for dismissing causal knowledge as unintelligible,
unjustifiable, or
eliminable.

therefore urge a shifting of the burden of proof, similar to what
has occurred

I

regarding induction and the status of scientific theories.

shown

that causal

(regularities).

knowledge cannot be reduced

In this

are indispensable

in

chapter,

science;

I

will

(ii)

to

In

Humean

demonstrate further that

that

Hume's

that the epistemic credentials of causal

favor of this

I

have already

laws of association

(i)

causes and causal knowledge

argument can be answered; and

skeptical

knowledge are

shift,

as

good

as those of

(iii)

any kind of

knowledge.
First,

good theory

I

should make clear some of

— be

between theory

it

my

a theory of science or of

(or rules)

and accepted

methodological assumptions. The search

some

practice.

other activity

Goodman,

in

— consists of a dialectic

discussing

how

to justify

induction, describes this view succinctly:

Rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into
agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we
are unwilling to accept; an inference

unwilling to

amend

is

rejected

(1954, 64).
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if it

for

violates a rule

we

are

As with inference

rules, so

is

it

methodological principles.

First,

scientific practice as possible.

and the

with theories of science. This view
yields two
theory should

knowledge claims accepted by the

particular

scientific

to relinquish

knowledge thereby bring upon themselves an
which accepted

account

for as

"Accepted practice" includes both

arguments whose conclusions require one

in

try to

extra

of accepted

scientific

methodology

community. Second,

accepted

scientific

burden of proof:

methodology or knowledge should be

scientific

much

rare

methodology or

indeed

is

the case

jettisoned in favor of

philosophical theory.

These two
explanation.

fail

have consequences

rules will

for

our discussion of causal knowledge and

Epistemological arguments leading to skepticism about
causal capacities often

the second principle: they apply equally well to

Hence, the arguments, rather than our knowledge

more cherished kinds

of

knowledge.

of causal capacities, should

be doubted.

Ontological arguments against causal capacities, on the other hand,
tend to flounder on the
first

methodological principle: they yield an account of science on which much of
what

impressive and important

in

and inference, and process
Before

we

take up

of causal knowledge,

knowledge

in

we

is

science, such as scientific explanation, experimental design

control,

is

incomprehensible (and even

Hume's argument and concerns about

will

examine two preliminary

irrational).

the epistemic credentials

issues: the

importance of causal

science; and the philosophical status of dispositions (including causal

capacities).

5.1

The Importance of Causes

Some

in

Science

philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, have argued that causal concepts are

no longer important
therefore gratuitous.

in

science, and that the appeal to causal concepts

Philosophers

who

insist

upon the importance
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in

philosophy

is

of causal concepts,

it

is

implied, have simply not yet caught
up with the realities of

This objection

urged by those

is

theoretical physics, most likely)

who

have looked

at

modern

quantitative science.

science (though no further than

and found nothing of importance beyond

sets of

quantitative formulas expressing functional
relationships between variables and
constants.

many eminent

Indeed,

scientific laws, e.g.,

about the causal relations between the
also true that the

Despite

evidence

is

a

in

or nothing

little

and properties represented by them.

It

is

rarely in scientific reports.

to the contrary,

causal concepts are not widely used

physics text

entities

word "cause" appears

this

Newton's Second Law, say

however,

it

is

impossible to maintain that

The following passage from

science.

a noted

good example:

[Describing the operation of an

ammonia maser...] In summary, the
molecule enters the cavity, the cavity field
oscillating at exactly the right
frequency
induces transitions from the upper to the lower state, and the
energy released is fed into the oscillating field. In an operating maser

—

the

—

molecules deliver enough energy to maintain the cavity oscillations
not
only providing enough power to make up for the cavity losses but even
providing small amounts of excess power that can be drawn from the cavity.
Thus, the molecular energy is converted into the energy of an external
electromagnetic field (Feynman, 1989, 1-9-1 2).
1

In

case one believes that a textbook

is

recent issue of a respected journal to a

the

1

wrong place

to look for real science,

random page and found the

I

opened a

claim:

Asymmetric cleavage of the zygote results in the formation of an embryo
with a suspensor and embryo proper that have distinct developmental fates
Science 266 (1994): 606).
(.

Both passages are

One
reports

filled

with causal language.

might maintain, of course, that although causal language appears

and textbooks, the heart and

soul of science consists of the equations of theories

their purely (or mostly) functional relationships.

e.g., for heuristic

least,

in scientific

Causal concepts

may be used by

scientists,

purposes, but the causal concepts themselves are not science proper,

are relatively unimportant.
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and

or, at

Th.s attitude about

however,

what

most of what

that

is

important

do and

scientists

important to science. For most,

if

not

all,

is

science has the unfortunate
consequence,

write

is

not science,

scientific research

elucidation, description, and control of
causal mechanisms.
of contents of the

same

issue of Science

is

or, at least, is

not

directed towards the

Look, for example,

at

the table

mentioned above: Here one finds papers with

titles

such as

"Causes of Decadal Climate Variability over the North
Pacific and North
America,"

"An AIDS-Like Condition Induced

in

Baboons by HIV-2," and

"PHAS-I as a Link between Mitogen-Activated Protein
Kinase and
Translation Initiation."

It

is

that causal

5.2

one cannot dismiss philosophical appeals

clear that

concepts play no important role

in

to causation

merely on the ground

science.

Dispositions

The causal theory
well: a causal capacity

of explanation appeals not only to causes, but to dispositions, as

a disposition to interact causally.

is

I

have suggested that causal laws

are best understood as ascriptions of causal capacity, yet dispositions are distrusted
by

philosophers

— typically by those who also despise causes.

discussion of

Hume,

therefore,

it

would be

best to deal

first

Before

we

some

turn to our

with potential objections arising

from the dispositional character of causal capacities.

We will
positivist one:

begin with Carnap's analysis of disposition terms. 152 Carnap's goal

he would

like to

and therefore cognitively
a starting point,

(1)

a

is

show

significant.

that disposition terms are verifiable

Let's take as

water-soluble

if

and only

if

whenever
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a

by observation

an example the property of solubility. As

Carnap considers the following account

dissolves, or

is

a

is

of solubility:

placed

in

water,

it

5(a) = (t)[W(a,t)

3

D(a,t)]

(Carnap 1936/37, §7).

This account captures part of the
meaning of solubility; however, the account
presents
difficulties, as well.

As Carnap points

long as a has not been placed

Carnap attempts
(2)

(2)

Whenever

is

follows from (l)that any a

it

is

water-soluble, so

water.

improve on

to

a

in

out,

placed

(1)

by replacing

water, a

in

is

it

with the "reduction sentence":

water-soluble

if

and only

if it

dissolves, or

(t)[W(a,t)

,

unlike

(1),

3

(5(a) h D(a,t))].

does not

attribute solubility to

have the opposite problem, namely,
have been,

at

some time

or other,

in

it

all

things not

in

water.

It

does, nonetheless,

attributes water solubility only to those things
that

water (and have dissolved). This clearly does not

capture the accepted use of the term, as Carnap readily admits: such
reduction sentences,

he concedes, can be viewed as no more than
(2)

has a second disagreeable consequence that has been emphasized by
Mellor

(1974, 160-1):

it

makes water

time or other, dissolved

in

solubility

water.

an immutable property of a so long as

adding a temporal index
(3) (t)[W(a,t)

3

however, remains:
other,

in

(3)

it

is

mutable, and

can be

will not

a

manner suggested by

satisfied

do

is

thus an improvement on

clearly

Storer (1950-51) by

in

may

we

properties have not been manifest.

1

(2)'s first

at

problem,

some time

or

suffice as a (partial) epistemic criterion of water

as an account of solubility, for

general:

(2).

only by those things that have been,

even when they have not already been dissolved
dispositional properties

is

= D(a,t))].

water and dissolved. This

solubility, but

in

(2)

some

to the predicate "is water-soluble":

(S(a,t)

allows that solubility

a, at

Most dispositions are not immutable, and so

inadequate. This problem can be repaired

(3)

partial definitions.

attribute

”
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in

we

attribute solubility to things

water. This

them

to things

is

a distinctive feature of

even when the dispositional

The

situation, argues

Hempel

(1950),

even worse

is

for dispositions of a

theoretical" character, e.g., gravitational
potential or electric field:

a system of reduction sentences for the
concept of electric field were
to oversimplify the point a little
it would be possible
to
describe, in terms of observable characteristics,
if

available, then

-

-

some necessary and

sufficient conditions for the presence, in
a given region, of an electric field

of

any mathematical description, however complex.
Actually, however,

such

criteria

can

at best

be given only

for

some

sufficiently

simple kinds of

fields (1950, 121).

Hempel's point

complex

is

that constructing a system of reduction
sentences for theoretically

dispositional predicates

Some

is

extremely

difficult,

philosophers have concluded from the preceding sorts
of deliberations that

dispositional properties are not real properties at

viewpoint

is

is

the claim that a thing

may have

not being, and has never been, manifest.

disposition to a thing, even

Viewed

and practically impossible.

in this

if

Of

special importance to this

a dispositional property, although the property

It

the disposition

all.

therefore seems that

one can

makes no empirical difference

way, dispositions assume a ghostly character

— especially those with positivist sensibilities —

ill

that

attribute a

to the world.

makes some philosophers

at ease.

Gilbert Ryle, for example, argues that:

Disposition statements are neither reports of observed or observable states
of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable states of affairs.

They

narrate

He concludes

125).

that dispositions are not actual or real properties. 154

details of Ryle's

If

no incidents (1949,

argument,

a property

is

it

real,

is

clear that

then

its

it

real

property must

attribution

Ryle's

make an observable

argument

philosophy of science,

seem

to

make no

is

must be a report of observed or

for scientists are also

in

affairs.

difference to the events of the world.

plausible, especially

empirical difference

into the

requires a further premise:

observable, or unobserved or unobservable, states of

A

Without getting

when

applied within the realm of

wary of postulated

the world. There are
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155

entities

good

and processes

that

reasons, nonetheless, to

be suspicious of Ryle's argument

156

For one, Ryle's argument applies
equally well to

.

nondispositional properties. Consider the
ultimate nondispositional property,
the molecular
structure of table

That table

salt.

salt

events, observable or unobservable.

producible

in

has a certain molecular structure
entails no particular

Of

course, there are events, both incidental
and

experiment, that indicate the nature of

are also events that can indicate the

Here one must be

salt's

salt's

molecular structure. But there

dipositional properties, e.g., solub

careful to distinguish the direct display
of a property

as well.

and

observable events that constitute evidence of a property's
existence. Only by conflating
display and evidence do dispositional and nondispositional
properties seem different.

Once

display and evidence are separated, however, there

dispositional

and nondispositional

properties: there are nondispositional, as well as

dispositional, properties that are not directly displayed.

dispositional, as well as nondispositional, properties

evidence. Assuming that

we

structure as real, then Ryle's

no difference between

is

Moreover, the existence of

may be

affirmed by suitable observable

must accept nondispositional properties such as molecular

argument provides no grounds on which

to reject dispositional

properties as unreal, for dispositional and nondispositional properties are indistinguishable

by

his

argument

157
.

One's suspicion of dispositions might not be so
dropping and breaking a
glass

was

dropped?

fragile

I

glass

may

indicate that the glass

an hour ago, or that other glasses are

dropped

this

one, and

easily dislodged,

it

broke

is

fragile.

fragile,

if

But

however. Sure,

how do know
I

the

they have not been

— but that does not provide me with a way to

distinguish other fragile glasses from nonfragile ones.

This problem

means

is

no more than the problem

of induction,

restricted to attributions of dispositional properties.

general laws describing non-dispositional properties, too.
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however, and

it

is

by no

Induction presents a problem for

Hugh Mellor

suggests that behind the suspicion of
dispositions lurks the belief that

dispositions cannot carry out their

presumed explanatory

functions.

When one

the explanatory use of dispositions, one thinks
naturally of examples such
virtue of their dormative powers, will help

powers" of the

pills

surely

would be wrong

It

Why

cannot explain.

relieves headaches.

presume

is

did

you

no explanation of why the

my headache

is

help one to

pills

go away? Because

Here the explanation

none the worse

for

pills,

by

fall

asleep.

that dispositions

took an aspirin, and aspirin

I

- which the reader will find
(i.e.,

"these

Reference to the "dormative

conclude from such examples, however,

to

- makes reference to the capacity

headaches, and

to sleep."

as,

considers

legitimate,

I

disposition) of aspirin to relieve

it.

The difference between these two examples may be accounted

for

by the epistemic

context of explanation, not by any supposed distinction between dispositional
and
nondispositional properties, or between certain dispositions
others

dormative powers).

(e.g.,

In

a context

in

headache-relieving capacity of aspirin (and that

answer given above
explainee

is

will not explain the

probably looking

explained by citing

its

for

headache

when

is

is

1

took an aspirin for

my

headache) the

disappearance of the headache.

how the

On

In this

aspirin works,

the other hand,

if

case, the

which

is

not

the explainee

aspirin, citing the capacity of aspirin to relieve

in

nondispositional terms. The failure of

some

dispositions to

therefore independent of their dispositional character.

better off

(1960,

and

both informative and explanatory. Similar contextual considerations are active

Other philosophers argue
is

I

capacity to relieve headache.

explanations are given

explain

relieve headaches)

which the explainee knows about the

an explanation of

does not know about the capacities of

(e.g., to

when

that,

even

if

dispositions are not disreputable,

they are reduced to nondispositional terms

969), Armstrong (1968,

1

973)).

(Goodman

(1954),

This kind of reduction often occurs
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still

in

science

Quine

science, e.g.,

the biological disposition term
"heritab.lity"
structure of genes

and

is

now

explained

their typical interactions in
reproduction.

The approach advised by such philosophers
the kinds of reductions suggested are

succeed

in

terms of the molecular

in

common

in

is

optimistic, to say the least.

science, the reductions usually

removing dispositions from discourse. What they
accomplish,

rather,

Although

do not
the

is

reduction of one set of dispositions to another. Thus,
although heritability, solubility, and
other dispositions

may be

explained

atomic descriptions are themselves
behavior

at

in

molecular and atomic terms, these molecular and

filled

with dispositional properties. For example,

the atomic and molecular levels

electrostatic forces,

more than two

is

characterized

part

in

by reference

which are described by Coulomb's law (and superposition,

charges).

The

electrostatic force described

if

to

there are

by Coulomb's law, however,

is

a

dispositional property of charges.

In

addition, the reduction of nondispositional terms can be achieved

way, though no philosopher thereby concludes

it

must be replaced by

— though

abstract

its

not less real

"is

same

dissolving" can be replaced by a

that "is dissolving"

molecular description.

the

that nondispositional terms are best

eliminated from science. For example, the property,

molecular description, but no one suggests

in

"Is

not a real property, or that

is

dissolving"

is

simply a more general or

— property than those properties detailed

in its

corresponding molecular description. Disposition and nondisposition terms can both be

reduced

to

more

precise, analytical terms,

and reduction therefore provides no grounds

for

avoiding dispositions.

I

them

to

conclude
be

that dispositions are respectable,

less real

than other properties.

We

and

that there

have seen that

all

of dispositions are shared equally by nondispositional properties.

these difficulties

is

is

no reason

of the

to believe

supposed

difficulties

The most important

of

induction; ontological concerns about dispositions are often driven by
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epistemological worries about inductive inference.
But induction

what one accepts

remove some

to

there

is

in his

or her ontology.

The progress

to believe that these other properties

case, eliminative reduction

is

nondispositional properties

may

argument

only on a case-by-case

them

may allow one

to other properties.

must be nondispositional.

also be reduced to less abstract descriptions.

left is

basis,

problem no matter

But

In

any

not restricted to dispositional properties alone,
for

thus provides no grounds for avoiding dispositions
possible, the only

a

of science, of course,

dispositions from discourse by reducing

no reason

is

one

in

of ontological

and applies equally

general.

In

Reduction

cases where reduction

economy, but

this

is

argument applies

as well to reducible nondispositional

properties.

Knowledge

5.3

of Causal Capacities and Interactions

Dispositions are not as unintelligible as

some philosophers imagine. Hence,

dispositional nature of causal capacities need not trouble us.

causes and causal knowledge.

causes

I

will

verified

to

have already provided evidence of the indispensability of

argue that Hume's grounds

some

for skepticism

need not trouble

us.

Furthermore, a

detailed scientific examples will yield evidence that causal beliefs can be

by empirical evidence.

The Grounds of Hume's Skepticism
The source

work

Neither should the appeal to

science and of the irreducibility of causal claims to regularities or counterfactuals.

now

look at

5.4

in

I

the

of David

of

most twentieth-century skepticism regarding causal knowledge

Hume. Any

is

the

successful causal theory of explanation must therefore face up

Hume's arguments. What characterized
I

in

Chapter 2 as

six doctrines:
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Humean

positivism consists of

Duality of knowledge: there are two
distinct kinds of knowledge
mathematical and empirical.

— logical-

(1

(2) Verifiability: significant

(3)

propositions must be verifiable.

Pro-observation: empirical propositions are best
verified by observation.

(4) Anti-cause: there are no knowable causal
connections
the regular associations of objects in
experience.

nature. There are only

in

(6)

Anti-induction: ampliative inference

(5)

from observed cases

to those that

in

— that the inference
- has no epistemic

empirical matters

have not been observed

is

foundation.

Anti-metaphysics: metaphysical propositions are unverifiable
and therefore

meaningless.

Most important
on doctrines

),

(2), (3),

and

connections

in

in

A

support of

is

favor of

effect

(4),

Hume

(4),

(4) relies in

the conclusion that there are

argues that causal beliefs

a necessary connection

cannot be a

is

no causal

Hume

argues

and

this

rest

on principles

that are

(e.g.,

first

between

that the

argument

is

events).

How

pursued

in

warmth

of

its

effects:

that object

fire,

that

it

would consume him. No object ever

discovers, by

the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced
it,

or the effects

can

two ways.

an object be presented
if

founded
belief

we

connection between cause

to a man of ever so strong natural reason and
be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the
most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its
causes or effects. ADAM, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the
very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity, and
transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and

Let

We will

First,

presented with an unfamiliar object supposed to be a cause,

impossible to infer the nature of

abilities;

part

on Hume's view, consists of the

belief,

between objects

logical connection,

he remarks that when one
is

though

Hume's argument.

obtain knowledge of this connection?

and

(4),

defense of the causal theory of explanation requires one

on neither experience nor inference. A causal
that there

doctrine

is

nature (and no epistemological foundation for causal judgements).

turn to the details of

In

(5).

Hume's arguments

to confront

now

(1

to the causal theory of explanation

which

will arise

from

it
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(1

977,

1

7)

it

Second, argues Hume,
without the appearance of

When

I

its

it

is

always consistent to suppose a given
cause to occur

supposed

effect:

see, for instance, a Billiard-ball

moving

in

a straight line towards

another; even suppose the motion in the
second ball should by accident be
suggested to me, as the result of their contact
or impulse; may not
conceive, that a hundred different events might
as well follow from that
cause? May not both these balls remain at
absolute rest? May not the first
ball return in a straight line, or leap
off from the second in any line or
direction? All these suppositions are consistent
and conceivable. Why then
should we give the preference to one, which is no
more consistent or
conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings a priori
will never be able to
show us any foundation for this preference.
I

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct
event from its cause. It
could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the
first invention or
conception of it, a priori must be entirely arbitrary... In vain,

therefore,

,

should
effect,

A

cause

is

cannot be

we

pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or
without the assistance of observation and experience
(1977, 18-19).

always logically

distinct

inferred, a priori.

from an

effect,

The knowledge

and hence a connection between the two

of causal connections

must therefore

rest

on

experience.

What, then, of the evidence provided by the senses?
that causal

All will agree, declares

Hume,

connections cannot be directly observed:

must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from
all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial
It

qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles,
on which the influence of these objects entirely depends. Our senses
inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense

nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities, which fit it for nourishment
and support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual
motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would
carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which
bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form
the most distant conception. ..It is allowed on all hands, that there is no
known connexion between the sensible qualities and their secret powers;
and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion
concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it

knows

of their nature

(1

977, 21).

Causal connections cannot, according to
causation cannot be observed

in

Hume, be observed

directly; in other

the single instance. This portion of
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words,

Hume's argument

is

often

unmentioned

left

Hume

One

reason for this neglect, perhaps,

general skeptical conclusion follows even

s

may be observed
neglect

commentary.

in

may

object to

in

be, as

the single case. This will

Hume

But this hardly seems

it.

mentioned by Hume,

made

suggests, that the point

e.g., color,

upon

likely,

not already

one

if

evident below. Another reason for
so obvious that no philosopher could

is

Do

the sensible qualities

us something about the causal properties

of the objects that exhibit them, namely, that they
have the power,

produce

objects, to

in

us a perception of color? Similarly,

the examination of a stationary billiard ball what
if

I

see the ball

roll

into another, striking

observed the causal influence of the

Hume would

it

first

it

and sending

in

some

This reply

is

cases, but

I

of causes,

it

into

the case of colored

not be able to infer from

I

roll

it;

on the other hand,

motion, have

I

not directly

rest

on a misunderstanding of the

causation requires the existence of a necessary

In particular,

cannot observe,

in

I

may observe

a connection

between

the single case, a connection of necessity.

suggested by the following passage,

When we

may

in

on the motion of the second?

rolling ball

or infallible connection between objects or events.

events

I

do when

will

perhaps answer that such claims

notion of causal connection.

that

affirms that causal connections

reflection.

tell

is

among

others:

look about us toward external objects, and consider the operation
are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or

we

necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and
renders the one an infallible consequence of the other.
find only, that
the one does actually, in fact, follow the other (1 977, 41 ).

We

Leaving further discussion of

this

Hume's general argument. Hume argues
connection between two objects
experience.

He

But

why

objects,
is

is

important point

until later,

that the only empirical

we

will

continue with

evidence of a causal

the fact that they have always appeared together

continues:

this

experience should be extended to future times, and to other

which

for

aught

we know, may

the main question on which

from being the same,

/

I

would

have found

that

be only

insist..

in

appearance

similar; this

.These two propositions are

such an object has always been
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far

in

past

attended with such an effect, and foresee
that other objects, which
appearance, similar, will be attended with similar
/

,

effects.

you please,
other.. .But

desire

Thus, even

if

you

that the
if

to

however,

for

it

is

has

the future.

it

I

in

the past,

required, something to the effect that nature
will proceed
in

The

observed,

if

one

is

to infer that similar objects will

validity of this principle itself

in

be so

cannot be demonstrated,

can be confirmed neither by experience nor by inference.

The important aspects
(1)

if

be inferred from the
made by a chain of reasoning

justly

experience confirms that two objects have always
been conjoined

unobserved cases as
in

are, in

shall allow,

you insist, that the inference is
produce that reasoning (1977, 21-22).

an ampliative principle

conjoined

one proposition may

I

Causality

is

of

Hume's argument may be summarized

as follows:

said to consist of an infallible, or necessary, connection

between

objects or events.

(2)

Empirical propositions are significant only insofar as they can be verified
by

observation, or inference therefrom.
(3) The objects of experience are always logically distinct. Therefore, knowledge
of
causal connections between any two cannot be inferred, a priori, but must observed
or inferred from experience.

(4)

Causal connections cannot be observed

(5)

Experience confirms,

at

in

any single instance.

most, that two objects have always appeared together

in

the past.

(6)

The demonstration

of causal

an ampliative principle that

Hume's conclusion,

of course,

is

that causal

foundation, and cannot be verified.
verifiability (doctrine (2)) to talk

by Hume's argument:

in

It

is

past experience requires
however, undemonstrable.

knowledge

is

without empirical or inferential

thus meaningless, according to his doctrine of

about causes

to say that

appeared together regularly

knowledge from

is itself,

in

nature, except

one thing causes another

is

in

the restricted

way allowed

merely to say that they have

past experience.

Further conclusions follow from

denial of ampliative inference applies to

Hume's argument.
all

First,

it

is

notable that Hume's

empirical inferences beyond given experience,
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and not merely
refer to

to causal inferences.

unobserved as well as observed cases, are also

of ampliative inference.

experience would seem

In

addition, our

knowledge of

to require causal theories of

knowledge, so long as they

cast into

doubt by Hume’s rejection

external objects or of past

memory and

perception. Thus,

besides those relying on the properties of immediate
sensation, are

beliefs,

Hume

All sorts of descriptive

s

argument. Hume's skeptical conclusions therefore
extend

causal knowledge.

It

is

a curious fact that

many,

if

not

all,

far

all

uncertain by

left

beyond doubts about

subsequent philosophers of

science have chosen to ignore Hume's broader skeptical
conclusions, even as they

embraced

his mistrust of causal

The

my

foci of

knowledge.

discussion will be

denial that causation can be observed

in

Hume's

rejection of inductive inference (6)

the single instance

(4).

I

and

his

accept that Hume's

criticism of the foundations of inductive inference presents
profound difficulties.

Nonetheless,
For

this criticism

provides no reason to disparage causal knowledge

Hume's devastating argument

important theorists,

e.g.,

(since Carnap) see

which

is

it

as

applies equally to non-causal knowledge, as

Goodman

the problem of induction to be

grounds

in particular.

(1954), recognize. Yet, while

fatal to

taken by most philosophers

some philosophers view

theories of causal knowledge,

The

for general skepticism.

who

write about

few philosophers

correct approach

knowledge

many

in

general

— the one

—

is

to

view

the problem of induction as an important philosophical problem that should be handled,
possible, but not as a sufficient reason to repudiate

all

knowledge claims

that

if

go beyond

immediate experience, including causal claims. Consider an example of non-causal
knowledge,

e.g., that

DNA consists

of

two complementary polymeric chains twisted about

each other

in

restrict this

claim only to those pieces of

the form of a right-handed double helix.

no philosopher or

scientist considers

DNA

of

philosopher or scientist would

which we have had experience.

Hume's argument
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No

to

be

fatal to this

Equally,

claim. Although

Hume's

criticism of inductive inference has
not

been

philosophers do not therefore doubt the truth of

We are forced
inference, though

it

all

generalized claims

to the conclusion, therefore, that

provides no special reason to reject causal knowledge

The main
lies in (4),

defend

thrust of

Hume's argument

in

is

premise

in at least

science.

against inductive

in

general,

For the repudiation of

the criticism of causal knowledge.

for skepticism

two ways, one

knowledge

particular.

the assertion that causation cannot be observed

this

in

Hume's argument

yields concerns about the foundations of

inductive inference finds no special application

by modern developments,

nullified

about causal knowledge thus

in

Hume

the single case.

can

which focuses on the nature of causation,

of

the second of which concentrates on the content of immediate
experience.

Suppose one were

to

deny

As noted above,

single instances.

Hume

the nature of causation, for causation

and

effect,

is

might reply that to assert

this

is

in

misunderstand

to

One

any single instance.

in

between cause

might pursue,

at

an investigation of the nature of the necessity that causal connections are said

Hume

conceived necessary connections, of course,

events (or statements),

much

to

like tautologies or analytic truths.

Kant, for example, believed that

some

be

logical relations

Other views are possible.

,

true.

But what reason could there be for insisting that causal knowledge

something necessary?

Historically, the

to establish the certainty of causal

most important impetus,

knowledge

however, nothing stronger than induction
thus avoided

if

we

between

non-analytic truths could be known, a priori and

could therefore be considered necessarily

is

be observed

said to imply a necessary connection

and necessity cannot be established

this juncture,

to have.

asserting that causation can, in fact,

(4),

is

in

I

take

it,

the face of skepticism.

is

knowledge

of

has been a desire

To do

this,

needed. The whole investigation into necessity

accept that the only epistemic pedigree required
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for causal

knowledge

is

that provided

by induction or some similar principle of
inference. As

seen, however, the problem of induction

Hume

could, and

that the content of

There

relations.

thought

in fact

immediate

is,

in his

this point to

is

in

defending

in

(4):

he argues

experience contains no information about causal

words, no "impression" of causation

in

experience.

Hume

be obvious, and subsequent philosophers have generally
agreed.

intend to provide strong evidence, however, that

be observed

already

not endemic to causal beliefs.

does, take another approach

(singular)

we have

Hume was

I

wrong: causation can indeed

the single instance.

The Perception of Causation

5.5

Since most philosophers of the past two hundred years have followed
dismissing the idea that causation can be observed

otherwise

may seem

in

Hume

in

a single instance, an attempt to prove

quixotic, at best. Yet recent experimental

work

in

the psychology of

perception has forced psychologists to revise long-held assumptions about the nature of
perception,

some

literature in the

thus be

of

which are

essential to

lean.

Indeed,

psychologist, Albert Michotte

(1

I

(e.g., Kolers,

881-1 965)

grounds on which
First, let's

in

1972).

to reconsider

rehearse

our discussion of

on the remarkable

rely heavily

been performed by Gestalt psychologists,

above

158
,

although

as well as by

Nonetheless,

Hume's

I

it,

My own
my

I

see that

it

study of the

discussion will

results of a single

much complementary work

has

more recent experimental

believe this experimental

work provides

criticism of the observation of causation.

Hume's claim about

the "impression" of causation. As

Humean

Hume

positivism,

experience contains no impression of causation.

and examine

critical position.

psychology of perception has only recently begun, and

somewhat

psychologists

Hume's

If

I

we saw

argued forcefully that the content of

pick up any object,

e.g., a billiard ball,

has certain properties such as shape, color, and weight.
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No

amount

of scrutinizing, however, will yield

powers are not evident

ball’s causal

that

it

strikes another,

see only the

ball

ball

first

sending

that

to the senses.

flying,

I

first.

There

is

is

consistent with

disk,

many

to a stop.

at rest

I

until

it

surface, a silent gust of

reflection

on a

causal event

wind from the

I

touches

on the

saw the

it,

after

which

fact that

I

I

see the second

any given perceived

disk begin to

possibilities (e.g., a

For instance,

move and

move, but

slides

as to

what

magnet moving beneath the

side, a subtle tilting of the surface, etc.),

none

is

certainly correct, at least with respect to the following point:

observed, there

is

no

of

phosphorous

pixels arranged

on

my computer

significant assumption, namely, that there

is

a

in

is

no perception of causation

strict

This important assumption, however, has been

there

is

letters

rests

point-to-point correspondence

sensory stimuli and the content of resulting perceptions

incorrect:

a

the way, for example, that the white

screen correspond to the white

But the conclusion that there

perceive.

when

distinct sensory stimulus in the sensory field that

corresponds to any particular sensation of causation

stimuli.

the ball across the table so

observed.

Hume was

I

roll

low-friction surface, begins to

can say that

caused the acceleration, there are many

words

I

inconsistent, underlying causal scenarios.

which was

coming

five feet before

I

if

corresponds to a causal concept.

suppose a metal

which

Even

— the

powers

simply no particular sensory impression, according
to

Hume's view seems confirmed by
event

of the ball's causal

have no impression of causation, says Hume.

still

advance on the second

withdraw from the

Hume,

it

knowledge

and

on a

between

159
.

shown by

Gestalt psychologists to be

no point-to-point correspondence between perceptions and

local sensory

Rather, perceptual structures are the result of a process of extraction and

organization that

endows them with

specific global properties that

particular part of the sensory stimulus.
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do not correspond

to

any

Everyone

is

familiar with Gestalt

phenomena such

as Rubin's picture that

can be

perceived alternately as two black faces on a white
background or as a white vase on a
black background. Such examples demonstrate
that identical sensory stimuli can
yield

perceptions of radically different contents. Recent
experimental work reveals that the brain
not only organizes given sets of sensory stimuli into
perceptions of coherent objects:

adds information

to the content provided

it

also

by the stimulus. This has been demonstrated,

for

example, by Kolers’ (1972) experimental work on the perception
of moving and changing
objects.'

60

The simplest example

is

that of a colored spot that

appears briefly on a

contrasting background, followed by the appearance of a similar
spot a short distance away.

The

interval of time

between the two appearances can be

quite short, then the spots

two spots appear

seem

to

varied.

appear simultaneously.

to flash in succession.

If

If

If

the time-interval

the time-interval

is

is

longer, the

the spots are flashed successively within a time-

period of 10 to 45 milliseconds, however, observers perceive a single spot moving

smoothly from the

first

location to the second.

In

order for this perception to occur, the

brain provides a suitable spot during the time-interval

One need

between

flashes.

not pursue controlled laboratory experiments to
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become convinced

that

processes of extraction, supplementation, and organization underlie perception, for

examples are
screen,

common

in

one perceives the

everyday
text to

life.

When

move up

or

text

is

scrolled through

down, though

in fact

on a computer

there

is

no such

continuous movement. Here the mind supplements the given stimulus information
generate a perception of motion where there
really

moving does nothing, moreover,

common

is

none. The knowledge that the text

to disrupt the perception of

to

is

movement. As a

not

final

experience, consider that the mind often constructs three-dimensional objects

perception out of essentially two-dimensional cues. This occurs

149

when

in

the objects actually

do have

three dimensions, but also

representations painted on a

now

flat

when we know

do

they

not, e.g.,

when

the objects are

surface.

widely accepted

among

cognitive psychologists that no one-to-one

correspondence between sensory

stimuli

and perceptions

is

It

result of

complex processes

exists,

of extraction, supplementation,

and

that perception

is

the

and organization. 162 The old

assumption of correspondence between stimulus and
perception has been repudiated.

The

revision of this long-held assumption enabled
Michotte

reapproach the problem of perceived causation, and

his

and

his

colleagues to

experimental results have

important consequences for Hume's view of causation (Michotte
and Thines 1963/1991,
67).

Hume

analyzed the contents of perceptual experience,

found no element
results

that

Hume was

Hume was

simply looking for causation

the

same way

in

the

wrong

correct to hold that the perception of causation does not correspond
to

any localized sensory stimulus. But causation
in

through the pieces, and

could be said to correspond to causation. Michotte's experimental

demonstrate, however, that

place.

sifting

as

is

is

perceived, nonetheless, and

it

is

perceived

motion, three-dimensionality, and Gestalt properties: causation

is

part

of the global content of perceptions, the result of mental processes of extraction and

organization.

5.6

Michotte's Experiments
Michotte's experimental methods are both simple and forceful.

experiment
squares

(5

moment,

A

(hereafter, "the basic experiment"), observers

mm

the

stops the

sides) at rest,

left

square

moment

it

40

mm from

(A) sets off

comes

In

a typical

view two elementary colored

each other, on a white background. At a given

towards the

right

into contact with B at
,

150

square

(B) at a

speed of 300 mm/sec.

which time B begins

to

move away

from

*

mm.'

63

speed of

at a

The

1

00 mm/sec. Then 8

result of this

stops after covering a distance of
about

20

experiment, which Michotte and his colleagues
performed with

hundreds of observers, was unequivocal:
the observers see object
it,

shove

it

forward set

A bump

it

into object

motion, give

in

B and send

it

off (or

launch

a push).

The impression is clear
it is the blow given
by A which makes B go, which produces B's
movement'
(Michotte 1947/1963, 20).

The

,

italicized expressions are taken

reported,

it

from the reports of observers. The subjects
consistently

other words, that they perceived object

in

emphasized, moreover,

A

causing object B to move. Observers

that the perception of causation

perception of successive movements by the two objects.

experimental setup to show that

this

was
In

perception of causation

distinctly different

from the

addition, Michotte varied the

is

independent of the

size,

shape, or color of the objects used.

One

could argue, of course, that observers were supplying Michotte with some

sort

of reflective interpretation of events, or an inference (albeit subconscious inference)
based

on past experience. Yet Michotte supplied experimental evidence
perception of causation

is

direct,

and cannot be the

to

confirm that the

result of reflective interpretation or

inference from past experience. Michotte did this by carefully manipulating the stimulus

conditions of the experiment and recording changes

in

the response patterns of observers.

Michotte found that when the conditions of the experiment were manipulated
slightly, the

perception of causation disappeared.

time interval between the

began

to

move. He found

moment
that

if

of contact

this interval

In

the simplest case, Michotte varied the

between A and B and the moment

at

were increased beyond 200 milliseconds, the

perception of causation disappeared completely, replaced by a perception of two

independent movements.

In this

which B

case, the objective stimulus conditions are almost
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identical to those of the experiment
that

resulting perception

In

is

distinctly non-causal.

another example, the causal impression could
be

increasing the speed of

A and

no longer see the impact
across the screen.

different colors,

halfway across
In

produced a perception of "launching,"
yet the

of

When

speeds are very high,

e.g.,

to disappear

by

1100 mm/sec., observers

launching B into motion, but only a single
object

Interesting effects can

one sees a

(at

/\

B.

made

single object

be added here. For example,

A move

the point of impact with

if

A moving

A and B

across the screen, but changing

are

its

color

B).

other interesting cases, the perception of launching
was

made

to disappear

by

manipulating the contextual stimuli of the experiment. Michotte
borrowed the term

camouflaging
C,

on

is

to describe the conditions.

In

one such experiment, a

introduced to the basic experiment cited above.

B's opposite side.

stationary.

Both

A and C meet B

A and C

its

move

moves away from A

original motion, disappearing

other side from which

it

started

and continuing

its

sits

equidistant with

A

from

B, but

simultaneously towards B, which

simultaneously, and, as

stop at impact, at which point B

hand, continues

begin to

C

third colored square,

in

the basic experiment,

for a short distance.

under

A and

B,

C,

is

A comes

to a

on the other

then reappearing on the

motion. Thus, the movements of

A and

are identical to those of the basic experiment (which produced a distinct perception of

launching), except that the cross-motion of the third object, C,

is

added. Contrary to

expectations, the perception of causation disappears under these conditions.

In all

these cases,

when

the stimulus conditions were modified slightly, the

perception of causation (launching) disappeared. 164 This constitutes important evidence
favor of Michotte's claim that the perception of launching

past experience or reflection: for

differences that

it

is

is

in

not significantly influenced by

unlikely that the stimulus modifications correspond to

would be weighty enough

in

past experience to influence the perceptual
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B

habits of observers. This conclusion

is

strengthened by consideration of the
abstract nature

of the objects used in the experiments:
the objects used by Michotte

dimensional shapes) appear rarely
participate

It

is

in

in

(e.g.,

colored two-

everyday experience, and even more rarely
do they

the kinds of causal interactions represented
by Michotte's testing apparatuses.

thus unlikely that the experimental observers'
perception of causation could have been

influenced

in

any

specific

way by

past experience.

Michotte's claim that causation

experiments

in

which he succeeded

in

is

perceived directly

is

fortified further

by

generating perceptions of causation under

conditions that clearly contradicted any relevant past causal
experience of observers; he
called these cases "paradoxical" cases.
to the basic

wooden

For example, Michotte did tests

experiment described above, but using objects of kinds so

ball

and a dark two-dimensional (shadow-like) shape,

that

in

conditions similar

different, e.g., a

experience could not

possibly suggest any causal relation between the two. Yet under the correct
temporal and

other conditions, the perception of causal launching persisted. Another "paradoxical"
case

arose under conditions similar to those of the basic experiment above, except that both

and B begin

to

contact with B,

move

A

at the

same

time, though

stops and B continues, but

A

at a faster rate

more

it

"launching-in-flight").

increases, after being struck by A.

that of the basic

These reports seem contrary

experience of mechanical causation, however,

for B's

direct,

and

is

not

in

any way an

to

experiment above

common

speed decreases, rather than

Nonetheless, the impression of causation remained clear.

These "paradoxical" cases strengthen Michotte's conclusion
is

When A makes

slowly, eventually slowing to a stop.

Observers reported a perception of launching similar to
(Michotte called

than B.

A

artifact of the past
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that the perception of causation

experience of the observers.

5.7

Hume's Argument Again
Michotte's experiments demonstrate

perceived

in

the

same manner

Hume's

properties.

as

is

that,

under the correct conditions, causation

motion, three-dimensionality, and other

assertion that causation cannot

be observed

in single

is

common

instances

is

simply

wrong.

A few

caveats must be added, however, to our anti-Humean
conclusion.

range of causal perceptions confirmed by Michotte
interactions of simple objects. There

perceived

in

the

between

i.e.,

of interactions

qualities, but

He recounted

causation.

one

that

found

that, at

qualitative changes,

relationship, but

no reason

same way. Indeed, Michotte

qualitative interactions,

non-mechanical

is

is

and

is

restricted to that of the

First,

the

mechanical

to believe that other sorts of causation are

did extensive tests of the perception of

between changes

in

color, sound,

and other

most cases observers reported no perception of

that in

most, observers reported a "triggering" relationship
this in

less direct

only

some

cases.

than "launching."

In

"Triggering"

is

any case, the

a causal

results of the

experiments concerning qualitative causation were much more inconsistent

that those

concerning mechanical causation, and no positive conclusions concerning the perception
of "qualitative" causation could be drawn,

In

addition,

we

must be careful not

Michotte's opinion

in

to

Michotte's experiments that are unwarranted.
correct

Hume's

belief that causation cannot

answer Hume's problem concerning the
not, in other
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.

draw epistemological conclusions from
In particular,

be observed

in

Michotte experimental

single instances, but they

justification of causal

words, provided philosophy with a

new

results

knowledge. Michotte has

foundation for causal knowledge, but

only with some interesting evidence of the causal content of human perception. This

apparent

if

one only considers Michotte's experimental

the perception of causation

is

apparatus:

in

every case

in

is

which

generated by the stimulus conditions provided by the
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do not

apparatus, there

does not prove

is

in fact

no causal

knowledge

that

interaction

between the events presented. Michotte

of singular causation can be

founded on observation. He

has demonstrated, nonetheless, an important
point: that there

is

no

significant difference in

character between the perception of causation
and the perception of motion, form, spacedimensionality, and other "global" properties.

Even

if

Michotte's experiments do not provide an
epistemological foundation for

causal knowledge, however, they

do suggest

that there

is

no important epistemological

difference between our beliefs about causation and
those about motion, space-

dimensionality, and form.

then knowledge

To sum
have seen

that

in

up,

For

if

the

mechanisms

each case probably

rests

where do we stand with

Hume's argument

cannot be observed

in

relies

of perception are similar in each case,

on a similar foundation.
respect to

on two major

Hume's

skeptical

argument?

assertions: the claim that causation

the single instance, and the denial of ampliative inference.

shown, with Michotte's

help, that

Hume

causation can indeed be observed.

In

is

wrong about

addition,

I

We

We

have

the observation of causation:

have argued

that

Hume's skepticism about

ampliative inference should not concern us greatly, for the justification of ampliative
inference

is

presumes

to

a

problem not

just for causal

knowledge, but

for

all

empirical

We thus arrive at the

go beyond immediate experience.

knowledge

conclusion that

that

if

our

theory of scientific explanation requires causal knowledge, Hume's criticism places no
insuperable obstacle

answer charges

in

our course. For

it

is

of general skepticism, and,

no

we

criticism of causal theories that they

cannot

have seen, there are no charges specific

causal claims that cannot be justly dismissed.
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to

5.8

with so

even

if

More

Epistemological Worries

Some

readers will feel uneasy

lightly,

we

and

in

at this point.

Should Hume's criticism be dispensed

the face of such narrow experimental
evidence?

More

important,

accept Michotte's conclusions, what relevance
do they have to the domain of

our inquiry, namely, the domain of science?
Michotte's experiments yield evidence
causation can, contra

Hume, be

and the causal claims

of science remains obscure.

perceived, but the connection between such
perception
Indeed, the perception of mechanical

causation investigated by Michotte can, on the face of
scientific inquiry.

Furthermore,

that

it

it,

play no

more than a small

role in

has already been conceded that the direct perception
of

mechanical causation, even where

it

is

relevant,

cannot by

itself

provide a foundation for

causal knowledge.

In short,

but have

made

I

have offered reasons not

little

to

be troubled by Hume's skeptical conclusions,

advance toward the solution

to

Hume's

problem of the

original

foundation of causal knowledge, especially within the realm of science.
epistemic situation seems worse than
positivist successors

it

did from

In fact,

Hume's viewpoint. Hume and

our

his

envisioned the foundation of scientific knowledge to consist of

observation and deductive inference:

all

valid empirical claims

were

to

be

justified

by direct

observation or deductive inference therefrom. The same experimental evidence that affirms

our view that causation can be observed, however, also destroys the main
positivist

epistemic foundation. The modern psychological evidence

depends upon complex mental processes

of extraction, supplementation,

the perception of space, form, time, and causation

evidence

entails that there

is

tells

all

rely

pillar of

the

us that perception

and organization;

on these processes. But

this

same

no simple correspondence between perception and sensory

stimulus. As a result, the contents of perception cannot be

information about the world. Observation

assumed

to

provide accurate

— that bedrock of positivism — can
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no longer be

accepted as epistemically self-evident™
Hume's skeptical conclusions can be
repudiated
(or their

acceptance discouraged,

assurance than with which

5.9

we

at least), but

leave

Hume's argument with

less

began.

Epistemology and Science
This presents no difficulties for those

of the positivists.

to

we

adhere

who

have given up the foundational program

The foundational program was abandoned,

to positivist criteria of epistemic justification
led, ultimately

repudiation of

much

of accepted scientific knowledge.

philosophy provide an epistemological foundation
philosophical quarters, by the desire to explain

acquired

in part,

in

The

science.

shift in

normative enterprise (founded on
Yet this

has not been

shift

emphasis

is

for

how

As a

result,

because

and

the

all

attempts

inevitably, to a

demand

that

science has been replaced,

theoretical

in

some

and causal knowledge

is

subtle, perhaps, but nonetheless real: a

Humean

norms) has been replaced by a descriptive one.

made by

all.

A group

of neo-positivist philosophers

still

worries about the epistemological foundations of theoretical and causal claims. Witness
the

comments
entitled

of Philip Kitcher, a critic of causal theories of explanation, from a recent section

"Hume's Ghost":

The

desire to analyze causation stems from the apparent difficulty of

Some

justifying causal judgments.
justified.

But

educated

in

claim that

how does

we make
Once we have been

of the causal claims that

the justification work?

the causal lore of an ongoing field of science, then

we

simply observe causal relations. But there

is

very

it

is

are

easy to

little

when the observer is a
neophyte, say a child. Thus there arises the conviction that we come to
make justified causal judgments by observing that certain conditions obtain,
plausibility to the idea of observing causation,

and

causal claims from the premises that record

(initially, at least) inferring

our observations. Hence

we

arrive at the project of giving necessary

and

sufficient conditions for the obtaining of causal relations, formulating those

conditions

in

ways

that will dissolve the epistemological mysteries

surrounding causation by deploying only concepts whose

satisfaction

is

observationally ascertainable...
If

causal

knowledge

is

observational knowledge, then the apparently

implausible implications of that position should be addressed. But,
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if

causal

knowledge

is

131

mTTeO)
is

It

fair to say,

demands

The

u

’

7

satisfy the

critics of

if

causal

causal

causal

knowledge make no such

they do, they have no answers that

epistemological criteria they propose and account
for actual scientific

knowledge deserve

knowledge

is

skeptical conclusions, but

justified.

we

We

a

calls

it,

cannot be dispelled so

more complete answer

have provided grounds

must also say more about

how

concerns about

to their

for resisting

causal

easily.

Hume's

knowledge

acquired

is

science.

in

5.10

Testing (Bootstrapping) Causal Claims

So

how

understanding

is

causal

how

knowledge acquired and

the judgment that

A

knowledge and the
possession of
there

is

causes

8,

it

to

the following: scientists are never

Hume. The predicament,

rules of deductive logic.

much more

is

The key

as

Hume

sees

it,

is

how

to justify

assuming as evidence only non-causal observational
But scientists approach every investigation

than rules of logic and observations of the objects of inquiry

also a rich background of causal

investigation at hand. This rich

for

justified in science?

science acquires causal knowledge

the predicament described by

in

knowledge

that scientists

e.g.,

lists

all

statistics,

experiments,

decide between alternative prospective hypotheses.

claims by applying causal knowledge previously won.
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—

the difference,

of plausible alternative causal explanations

by doing

in

can bring to bear on the

background of causal knowledge makes

enables scientists to construct

assemble further information,
to

and other

Nonetheless, "Hume's ghost," as Kitcher

critics of

how

think, that Kitcher

of non-causal scientific knowledge, or,

would both
practice.

I

inferential knowledge, then we are
owed an account of the
C ° nditionS ° n which ca usal justifications
depend (Kitcher,

etc., that will

and

to

allow them

Scientists successfully test causal

At

(1)

least four general sorts of causal

claim are tested

in

Causal laws. Causal laws ascribe causal capacities

a certain structure).' 68

science:

to causal factors (entities with

Descriptions of causal interactions. These descriptions
inform us which factors,
virtue of their causal capacities, were operative
in a particular case (or typical
kind of case), and how they interacted causally to
bring about the phenomenon in
(2)

in

question.

(3)

Causal measurements. Scientists

test

the strength with which causes operate.

(4) Descriptions of causal mechanisms. In addition to
finding out which causes
there are, which are operative, and at what strength they
operate, scientists also seek
to describe the specific mechanisms by which causes
operate.

There are many different ways of

upon various

each kind of claim. The manner of testing depends

testing

factors, including the nature of the

background knowledge.

In

areas

phenomenon and

where the causal

structure of a

phenomenon

simple, well-understood, and controllable, controlled experiments
causal hypotheses.

understood,

On

the other hand,

phenomena

will

on

scientific inferences

would be long and

Nancy

statistical

1

and

2),

is

tedious.

which

number and

is,

in

science.

The example

is

variety of causal assumptions that participate in

astounding, and hence a complete description of an actual case
For a detailed discussion at an abstract level,

in part,

and

an extensive study of

Their

how

I

refer readers to

Measurement

scientists

causal conclusions from empirical evidence, including the evidence of

structural

to test

analyses rather than controlled experiments.

Cartwright's valuable book, Nature's Capacities

Chapters

may be done

relatively

which causal mechanisms are poorly

provide only one example of causal inference

necessarily simplified, for the

most

in

is

are extremely complex, and causal factors cannot be controlled or

isolated, scientists rely often

I

areas

in

the strength of relevant

make

(especially

inferences to

statistical

analyses,

models, randomized experiments, and single-instance controlled experiments.

For further examples of causal inferences

in

science, see Cartwright's discussion of the
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gravity-probe experiment (1989), and

experiments

in

the

understood, and

in

discussion of Anderson et

a/.'s

cloud chamber

chapter.

last

Our example

my

is

one

in

which the relevant causal mechanisms were

which the operative cause was suspected but

case Kettlewell's (1955,

1

untested.

956) famous study of industrial melanism

Kettlewell, melanic forms of at least

fifty

species of Lepidoptera

the mid-nineteenth century, and succeeded subsequently

in

first

in

fairly

I

well

my

take as

moths. According to

appeared

in Britain in

spreading throughout

Lepidoptera populations. Their evolutionary success coincided with
the industrialization of
England, and was restricted, moreover, to areas

in

close proximity to major industrialized

areas. At the time of Kettlewell's work, melanic forms

woods near Birmingham,

industrial areas; in the

for

dominated populations

example,

it

was estimated

in

some

that

90%

of

the species Bistort betularia consisted of melanic forms.

Ford (1937) proposed that the melanic forms had evolved as a result of natural
selection.

It

follows that melanism

is

either adaptive or linked to adaptive

cases, the contributions of an adaptive

many

different

trait to

mechanisms. To establish

that

overall fitness are

melanism

is

traits.

In

most

complex, and are made via

an adaptation,

it

must shown

that:

(i)

There was, during the evolution of melanism, variation

of Lepidoptera

(ii)

Melanic and other colorings are

(iii)

Melanism

(iv)

The proportion

is

adaptive

in

coloring

among

species

heritable;

the environment

in

which

it

evolved;
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of melanic forms of Lepidoptera increased, in part, because of

the adaptive character of melanism,
part, of their

in

;

i.e.,

the individuals were selected

in virtue, in

melanic coloring.

Ford advanced two hypotheses concerning the adaptive value of melanism: that melanism

is

linked to superior viability; and that melanism allows moths to avoid predation by birds
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by hiding on

tree trunks

the superior viability of

darkened by

industrial pollution.

some melanic

Later,

Ford (1940) demonstrated

forms.

Kettlewell (1955, 1956) set out to test
the second part of Ford's explanation:
that

melanism contributes
trunks.

moths' ability to avoid predation by hiding
on darkened tree

to

Kettlewell's concern

assumed

that

170

natural selection for

to establish that

Rather, his goal

is.

it

was not

was

it

is

to establish, in part, the

melanism took place.

was selected because

melanism

an adaptation; he simply

mechanism by which

he tested the claim

In particular,

permitted individuals to avoid predation

more

that

melanism

effectively than did

non-melanic coloring.
Kettlewell performed experiments using three species
of Lepidoptera B. betularia
:

(the typical form,

which

is

whitish grey with a sprinkling of black dots), B. betularia

carboneria (the industrial form, which
(another melanic form, which

is

is

almost completely black), and

B. betularia insularia

dark but with a sprinkling of white scales). Kettlewell’s

investigation consisted of four parts:

(1) a test

sitting

of the relative conspicuousness of melanic

on

and non-melanic forms when

trees in an industrial area of England;

(2)

observations of the behavior of birds feeding on insects

(3)

observations of the relative survival rates of the three species
in industrial England; and

in

an aviary;

in

a forest

environment
(4)

a repetition of

(1)

and

(3) in

a

wooded

area relatively untouched by industrial

pollution.

For our purposes,

we

will discuss

only

(3) in detail.

be summarized, however, as they are important

Human

The conclusions

of the other parts will

to Kettlewell's reasoning.

observers judged the conspicuousness of each of the three species as they

perched on oak and birch

trees in a forest near industrial

to note that air pollution has

two

darkens the tree bark; second,

it

significant effects

removes

lichen,
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Birmingham. Here

on the coloration of

which

is

it

is

important

tree surfaces:

generally light

in

first,

color (Jones,

it

1

952).

Kettlewell's observations

on birch

trees (black

on white

especially well concealed.

showed

bark),

On

that

three species

all

though the

and

typical

were

suitably

camouflaged

insularia individuals

were

the darkened oak trees, however, the
typicals appeared very

conspicuous, while the melanics (especially the darker
carboneria were well concealed.
)

an unpolluted area of England (Devon), where
lichen, the results

In

the trees and rocks are covered with

were opposite: carboneria were highly conspicuous
no matter where they

while typicals were well concealed

settled,

all

(insularia

were not released

while others were either

its

in this case).

the second set of experiments, individuals of the
three species were set loose

inside an aviary cage that contained a variety of tree
surfaces;

allowed

In

light birch or lightened

to find resting places,

resting place

was judged.

and then the

some

surfaces

were dark,

by the presence of lichen. The moths were

relative

conspicuousness of each individual on

Finally, birds (Great Tits)

were allowed

into the cage,

and

their

preferences for the moths were judged by observing their feeding behavior. The

observations supported two conclusions.

First,

the birds readily ate

including the melanics. Second, the birds took the moths roughly

all

in

three types of moths,

the order of

conspicuousness as judged by the human observers.
Kettlewell's third set of experiments will be the focus of our discussion.

The

goal of

these investigations was to assess the claim that melanism contributes to the chances of
survival,

and thus of reproductive success,

avoid predation. To do

this,

Kettlewell

of melanic

moths by improving

marked hundreds of male individuals of the three

species tested, released them over a period of ten days

populated by

Vapor
in

lights

birds,

and

and then recaptured

as

many

virgin females to attract the

proportions equal, roughly, to that

in

their ability to

in

of the

males to

an industrial-area forest heavily

moths as he could, using Mercury

traps.

The male moths were released

which they were found
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naturally in this forest,

i.e.,

85%

carboneria,

were 27.5%

Any

10%

typical,

carboneria

for

of a

number

,

and

13%

5%

insularia.

The recapture

and

for typical,

1

7.4%

for insularia.

of factors could have caused the
differential recapture rates

observed by Kettlewell. Accordingly, Kettlewell's

field

experiment was carefully designed

so that alternative possible causes of differential
survival rates

recapture

rates),

one

out. Thus,

(as

evidenced by

both intrinsic and extrinsic to the experimental
setup
specific factor in the melanics' evolutionary
success

predation by means of cryptic coloration

The

rates of the three species

- could

factors Kettlewell considered,

itself,

differential

could be ruled

— the avoidance of

be isolated and tested convincingly.

and the grounds on which they could be ruled

out as the causes of the differential recapture

rates, are:

(1) Differences in migratory behavior. For example, if
carboneria moths typically fly
greater distances during their nocturnal migrations, this would
account for a greater
percentage of them appearing in the traps.

Kettlewell placed the traps at a variety of distances from the release
points.
rates were independent of the distance of the trap from the
release

The recapture
points.

Differences

Differences

in

migratory behavior could thus be ruled out.

the scents of females baiting the traps. The males of one species
are perhaps not so strongly attracted to the scent of females of other species.
(2)

in

To eliminate

this possibility, the traps baited

with females included one

female from each of the three species.
Differences

Mercury Vapor lights, or to virgin females.
Mercury Vapor light traps and traps baited with
females. The recapture rates at both were similar, which indicates that differences
attractions to either kind of trap were insignificant.
(3)

in attraction to

Kettlewell used both

(4)

Differences

in

in

the life-spans of the species.

Kettlewell cites

two kinds

of evidence to rule out this possibility.

says, the life-spans of these species are not different in the laboratory.

First,

he

Second, he

released only males that appeared to be strong and healthy.

Having ruled out other possible causes
concluded

of the differential recapture rates, Kettlewell

that the differential recapture rates

were due

three species.
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to differences in survival rates of the

A

similar strategy

is

applied to the problem of deciding

among

possible causes of

the differential survival rates of melanic
and non-melanic forms. The general
explanandum,

remember,

the evolutionary success of melanic
forms

is

factors could

have contributed

obvious possibility

among

especially

general.

to this success.

differences

is

larval forms.

in

in industrial areas.

Ford cites differences

Numerous

in viability.

Another

resistance to the toxic effects of industrial
air pollution,

Kettlewell

is

not interested

in

ruling out

all

other factors,

in

Indeed, he believes that factors other than predator
avoidance are certainly

important.

But

if

he

is

to test the causal hypothesis that the cryptic
coloration of melanics

helps them to avoid predators, he must, for the purposes
of his study, rule out, or reduce the
influence

of,

these other factors, so that the effect of predation avoidance
can be measured.

The following

features of Kettlewell's test ensured that the differential survival
rates

could be attributed to the

(1)

The

hours.

effects of predation:

were for healthy males released for a period of only 24-48
potential causes of differential survival, e.g., the toxic effects of air
larvae, could thus be assumed to have no influence on the survival

survival rates

Many

pollution on
rates of the

moths.

(2) The moths were released
was sure to be heavy.

in

a forested bird sanctuary,

where aviary predation

(3) Kettlewell had the opportunity of observing two birds (a robin and a hedge
sparrow) hunting moths by inspecting tree trunks and boughs, and eating moths that
had previously been released by him. This further confirmed that predation was a

factor in the survival rates.

Kettlewell thus concluded that only differential predation could explain the differential

survival rates of the three species observed

To sum up
(1)

in

the industrial forest.

Kettlewell's results, having

observed that melanic moths

are, to the

human

eye, better camouflaged on the

soot-darkened and lichen-free tree surfaces of industrial forests than are nonmelanics,

observed that birds discover and eat moths roughly
conspicuousness as judged by human observers, and
(2)
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in

the order of

demonstrated that the

(3)

'

a

differential survival rates of three
species of Bfston
a " mdUS,rial f ° reS ' are the result of
differential rates of predation by

m

birds

Kettlewell concludes that the cryptic coloration of
melanics
part, of selective predation

by birds

in forests

in

contaminated by

general evolved as a result,

in

industrial air pollution.

Kettlewell later confirmed his conclusions by repeating
his experiments in an area relatively

uncontaminated by

industrial pollution (Kettlewell, 1956).

Kettlewell's conclusions are convincing because through
careful experimental

design he was able to rule out alternative possible causes
of differential survival

He was

three species of moths.

also able to provide strong evidence that predation

factor in the differential survival of the species,

improves moths

ability to

and

that the camouflage-effect of

body

Indeed,

of causal assumptions

we

to design

and

Kettlewell

show

in his

how

a

melanism

perform a

set of a

to speak, of the great

investigations.

that scientists are able to test successfully the causal

claims they make, although the design and execution of decisive
prior causal

to

have only scratched the surface, so

made by

Kettlewell's experiments

background of

is

the

avoid predation. Kettlewell was able to achieve these things only

by applying a vast background of causal knowledge
decisive experiments.

among

knowledge.

It

is

clear that

I

tests

always requires a

rich

have not provided any theory of

causal claims are to be tested experimentally, although Kettlewell's example suggests

some

possibilities.
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As

a result,

my

not constitute a complete answer to

justification,

inference,

which
believe

I

I

I

discussion of these examples of causal inference does

Hume,

for this

have not provided. Yet while

I

do not have

have provided convincing evidence

discouraged from appealing to causal concepts

shown

would require

in

Causal knowledge

is

indispensable

in
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a theory of causal

that philosophers

need not be

the philosophy of science.

that:

(1)

a theory of epistemic

science.

We

have

(2)

(3)

Causal claims are irreducible to laws
about regularities, counterfactuals,

Hume's argument provides no

does not also cast
knowledge.

that

(4)

into

special reason to doubt our knowledge
of causes
doubt more cherished (by philosophers,
at least) forms of

Causal claims are tested in science, and that the
in support of causal conclusions.

tests

evidence

I

conclude

etc.

that historical

sometimes yield convincing

and epistemological worries present no obstacle

to the causal

theory of scientific explanation.

5.11

Non-Causal Explanations

A number
it

is

of authors contend that even

causal explanation

if

important

is

almost certainly true that some explanations are non-causal. 172
At the core of

contention

is

often the belief that causation

constitutive relations that

make up

theory.

many

it

is

In

will

this

determinative or

Because explanation respects

argued, an adequate theory of explanation cannot

examine a representative sampling

most cases,

I

The explanatory value

proposed examples are

will

of

show

that the

examples pose

some examples

irrelevant to our

domain

of alleged non-causal

is

little

simply dubious.

of interest

threat to the causal

In

— science;

other cases, the

non-causal

explanations outside of science do not threaten the claim that scientific explanation
causal.

science,

connections alone.

Below we
explanations.

only one of

the structure of the world.

this diversity of constitutive relations,

refer to causal

is

in

Finally,

most alleged counterexamples are based on the recognition

— information that

that

explanations often contain

— or even

upon close

clear that these explanations require, either implicitly or

inspection,

it

is

explicitly, causal information to

fulfill

emphasize

their functions as explanations.
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is

is

non-causal.

But

5.11.1

Laws of Coexistence

A

large

number

of counterexamples to the causal theory
of explanation arise from a

mistaken belief about the nature of causation: that causes
cannot exist simultaneously with
their effects.
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In

accord with

this belief,

some

authors argue that explanations employing

so-called laws of coexistence cannot be causal, for these
laws describe relations

properties such that a change

Hempel's (1965) example
relation

pendulum

one property

entails

an instantaneous change

in

another.

the law of the pendulum, which describes the functional

is

between a pendulum

length of the

in

between

s

length and the period of

its

movement. A change

change, as well as explain, a change

will

in

in

the

the pendulum's period.

But since these changes can occur simultaneously, the connection cannot,

it

is

claimed, be

causal.

However, the

many
ball

belief that causes

effects

cannot occur simultaneously

is

dubious:

causal interactions occur simultaneously. Consider the simple example of a billiard

knocking a second

the second ball by the

second

(stationary) ball into motion.

first)

ball into motion).

simultaneously.

effect

and

In

case, the cause (the striking of

occurs simultaneously with the effect (the launching of the

There

general,

In this

I

is

nothing curious about the cause and effect occurring

submit, there

is

no good reason

to maintain that

cause and

cannot occur simultaneously. 174

5.11.2 Brody's Essential-Property Explanations

Baruch Brody (1972) begins with a proposed explanation of the
normally combines with chlorine

(I)

(1

)

(2)

in

fact that

sodium

a ratio of one-to-one:

Sodium normally combines with bromine

in a ratio of

Everything that normally combines with bromine

normally combines with chlorine

in

in

a ratio of one-to-one

a ratio of one-to-one.
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one-to-one.

(3)

Therefore, sodium normally combines with
chlorine

Brody's starting point
the one-to-one ratio

is

in

a ratio of one-to-one

the fact that this explanation (intuitively)
provides no explanation of

which sodium and chlorine normally combine
(although

in

it

satisfies

the requirements of the Covering-Law Model).

The

correct explanation of the ratio of combination,
says Brody, refers to the atomic

structures of the

two substances. This explanation, moreover,

structures of the substances are not the cause of their

is

non-causal, for the atomic

combining

in

a one-to-one ratio:

a given case of

sodium combining with chlorine is the same event as that
sodium combining with that chlorine in a one-to-one ratio, and, like all

other events, that event has only one cause. It is, perhaps, that event
which
brings it about that the sodium and chlorine are in proximity
to each other
under the right conditions. That is the cause of the event in question, and

not the atomic structure of the sodium and chlorine in question (which,
after
all, were present long before they combined). To be
sure, these atomic
structures help explain one aspect of the event in question, the ratio in
which they combine, but that does not make them the cause of the event.

(Note

6:

It

might, at

be maintained

least,

aspect of that event. But

this

is

just a

that they are

confusion

—

still

the cause of the

events, and not their

it is

aspects, that have causes.)

To say that the atomic structure of the atoms
cause of their combining in a one-to-one ratio is not
of that structure

combining.. .It

The

gist of

is

is

question

in

not the

not an essential part of any causal explanation of their

only to say that the atomic structure

Brody's argument

is

that

sometimes the

not the cause (193).

is

(essential) properties of things

can explain the properties of other things, but they cannot cause them:
their aspects [properties], that

Brody concludes

is

to say that a description

"It is

events, and not

have causes."

that not

Now,

explanations are causal.

all

the causal theorist to dispute the existence of essential properties,

it

for,

will to

do no good

for

despite Brody's

assertions to the contrary, his criticism of the causal theory does not rest on the acceptance

of essential properties. Consider the following example,

respects but not

in others:

Why

was

accident? About the explanation of

which

the car totaled (damaged

this incident,
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we would

is

similar to Brody's in

beyond

repair) in the

expect Brody to say the

some

The

following:

collision

is

be explained by descriptions of the

to

vehicles up to the point of collision (which
severity of the collision (and subsequent

but an aspect of an event, and

by reference

(causes), but

which the car

is

to the

the car’s

frailty,

a description of

damage

to the car),

two or more

events).

on the other hand,

is

two
The

no event,

thus to be explained not by reference to
other events

weight and velocity

collided, as well as

momentum and

is

travel paths of the

by the

(the

momentum)

structural frailty of the car

of the truck with

itself.

The

truck's

however, are not essential properties. Brody's claims

that

there are non-causal explanations thus need not rely
on the existence or importance of
essential properties.

How,
causal?

It

then,

information

demand

shows

however,

that explanations contain only causal information.

(e.g., structural properties,

play important roles

if it

respond to Brody's claim that some explanations are non-

to

should be noted that few causal theories of explanation, including the one

presented here,

only

one

is

that

in

explanation.

global laws, mathematical formulae, etc.) can also

Brody's argument hurts the causal theory, therefore,

some explanations

that Brody's

examples can

Other kinds of

contain no essential causal information.

satisfy this

in

doubt,

requirement. Atomic structure helps to

explain the ratio of combination of sodium and chlorine, for example, only
interaction resulting

I

combination has taken place. To put

it

if

the causal

another way: atomic

structure explains only in virtue of the structural properties being associated with certain

causal capacities that operate

capacities of

one chooses not

One way
(II)

(1)

some

sodium and chlorine,

combine, are thus necessary
if

in

to

particular instance of combination.

The causal

as well as the operation of these capacities

when

they

to the explanation of the one-to-one ratio of combination,

emphasize

this information.

to see this point

is

to consider the following type of explanation:

Sodium normally has atomic

structure X.
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even

(2)

Anything with atomic structure X normally combines
with bromine

one
(3)

Anything that combines with bromine

combines with chlorine
(3)

(II)

offers a

a one-to-

in

ratio.

in a one-to-one ratio also normally
a one-to-one ratio.

in

Therefore, sodium normally combines with chlorine

in

a one-to

one

ratio.

Covering-Law explanation of the one-to-one combination of
sodium and

chlorine that includes a premise describing the atomic
structure of sodium. Yet the

explanation

is

no

better than the

one

initially criticized

by Brody.

Why? Because no

connection between the atomic structures of sodium and chlorine and

combination

is

their

one-to-one

established. This suggests that the appeal to essential properties

unsuccessful as an explanation unless

is

it

causal

is

associated with appropriate causal claims.

5.11.3 Kim's Non-Causal Connections

Jaegwon Kim (1974) argues

dependency
dependency,

that the

in

which a change

Xantippes became a

was determined by

widow when

thing's properties

Socrates died

I

will

if

or she

such relation

depends upon

prison; Xantippes’

relation,

it

make only one

is

a

"Cambridge"

change

is

not,

point:

becoming

a

dependency

any competent speaker

knows immediately

even

if

is:

a

widow

Cambridge dependency

it

be explained by

it.

the husband's dying, unlike causal connections,

relation that

is

"built-in" to the language, in the sense

of English learns that Xantippes has

that her

in

however, causal. 175

not be caused by Socrates' death, but neither would

it

is

of

has no relevance for scientific explanation. Xantippes'

The connection between widowhood and
not contingent:

in

Socrates' dying; the determination

accepted as a non-causal

widowhood may

one

in

One

number

two properties are not causally connected. Kim's example

About Kim's argument

that

constituted by a

is

relations that are not of a causal nature.

another's, though the

is

world

been widowed, then he

husband has died. An explanation
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of Xantippes'

is

widowhood would
meaning

widow,

of the

word "widow";

how

i.e.,

thus be required only

if

word "widow."

In

in

cases:

someone would

her husband died.

explanation of Socrates' death;
of the

or

two

in

In

the

if

someone

like to

latter case,

know how

the explanation

the former case, the explanation

would the explanation be

neither case

fails to

Cambridge dependency thus poses no counterexample

understand the

Xantippes'

became

a

would be a causal

would be

meaning

of the

of Xantippes'

widowhood.

to the causal theory of scientific

explanation.

Kim discusses a second non-causal dependency
between

An example

"action-pairs."

extending

my

left

of an action-pair

arm. Here two actions, "signaling a

is

relation as well: the relation

my

left

signaling a

turn"

turn

by

and "extending

my

related, the

first

depending upon the second. Kim argues, moreover,

not causal:

My

extending

the

arm being extended

causality.

is

my

left

arm brings about

connected

Hence, extending

to signaling only

my arm and

Kim's example plays on a very
of social sciences: the relationship

psychological and social. With

following terms.

Some

that the

arm" are

dependence

is

arm being extended. But

by rules of

social convention, not

signaling are not causally connected, argues Kim.

difficult

and general problem area

in

the philosophy

between the physical world and the worlds of the

this in

mind, Kim's problem can be understood

in

the

"actions" are events of physical behavior that have social

significance or meaning.

at

(causes) the

left

Many meanings

at

the social level

something) can be associated with a single physical event

(e.g.,

signaling a turn, pointing

(e.g.,

extending

my

arm).

Furthermore, these meanings are connected to the physical event only by social

convention, not by relations of causality. The connection between the physical event

extending

my

arm) and the "socially significant event"

non-causal.
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(e.g.,

signaling a

left

turn)

is

(e.g.,

therefore

have no intention of

I

initiating a discussion

We

psychological, and social worlds.
that are non-causal,

and ask what

this

about the relation between the physical,

simply accept that these worlds contain
relations

will

means

for the causal theory of explanation.

The causal theory here presented does not claim
causal, but only that

all

scientific

explanations contain

capacities and interactions of things. This

Kim's action-pairs.

What would

There are a number of
is

an explanation

in

each specific

possibilities,

terms of

my

arm, switch on the car's turn signal,

aspects to the explanation: to explain

causes of

my

I

I

to

be confirmed even

example,

me

my

to signal

an explanation of

etc.).

why

how

behavior; to explain

is

explanations are

left,

how

100%

the causal

in

the case of

signaling for a left-turn?

an explanation context.

intentions (what led

achieve by signaling?). Another possibility

my

to

all

some information about

would seem

suffice to explain, for

that

I

or

One

possibility

what did

hope

I

signaled (did

I

to

extend

both possibilities, there are clearly causal

In

signaled

signaled

would be

would be

to describe the intentional

to describe the

sequence of

causal interactions that led up to the signaling.

Another kind of explanation
signaling for a

left

turn

is

(e.g., to

is

possible

in this

case: the explanation of

answer the question of one

who

is

what

not familiar with this

custom). This kind of explanation would contain descriptions of social goals and rules,

what

the social purpose of signaling,

is

would

when

is

it

beneficial or required to signal, etc.

also contain descriptions of the conventional causal

signals.

e.g.,

But

it

mechanisms by which one

Indeed, the conventional causal mechanisms are an important aspect of the socially

informed concept of signaling.
Kim's examples thus

They demonstrate only

fail

to

show

that explanations

that non-causal explanations

must be recognized.

sometimes contain non-causal information, a

that the causal theory already appreciates.
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fact

5.11.4 Other Non-Causal Laws

Some commentators
explain

argue that

phenomena. Examples

scientists occasionally use non-causal

of such laws are the law of inertia,
conservation laws,

equilibrium laws. Typically, such laws

system

in

(e.g.,

initial

ratios, tell us

properties or actual causal forces acting

Some

of these laws,

Consider the law of
forces act

the law of inertia)

what happens

us

tell

upon

it,

to

inertia,

move

I

what happens

in

to a

to a

system regardless

76

a system .'

submit, are mistakenly held to be non-causal laws

which
at a

tells

moving body

us that a

constant velocity

causation sketched above, this law looks

177
.

continue, so long as no

will

According to the theory of

in straight line.

like the description of a causal capacity: inertia

the causal capacity of objects with mass to maintain a constant velocity and direction

absence of forces acting upon them

a population

would appear

characterized by

if

to

be

in

is

the

178
.

Fisher's equilibrium explanation of the

in

and

the absence of external causal intervention. Others,
such as R.A. Fisher's

equilibrium explanation of observed sex
of the

laws to

1

:

1

sex ratio of reproductive age organisms

The main idea

different.

of the explanation

is

Sober as follows:

Elliot

a population ever departs from equal numbers of males and females, there

will

be reproductive advantage favoring parental

pairs that

overreproduce

A 1:1 ratio will be the resulting equilibrium point. The
female progeny has an impact on a parent's fitness in virtue

the minority sex.
ratio of

of the

male

to

number

of grandchildren that are produced.

majority, an individual

who

produces

all

If

males are

female offspring

have more grandchildren than one that produces
179
sons and daughters (Sober, 1983, 20 1-2).

all

initial

conditions or selective pressures occur

in

in

the

on average

males or a mixture of

Fisher's account, says Sober, demonstrates that the sex ratio will

actual

will

now

be

1

:

1

no matter what

a given population.

Fisher's

thus cannot be considered causal:

whatever the actual initial sex ratio had been the selection pressures that
would have resulted would have moved the population to its equilibrium
state. Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was
,
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account

in fact produced, equilibrium
explanation shows how the event would have
occurred regardless of which of a variety of causal

scenarios actually

transpired (202).

Even

if

any given

of

scenarios,

Fisher's explanation of sex ratios

1:1

than females, or

if

ratio,

which the

in

population

sex

no single causal path

possibilities

A

is

population has either

more females than males, and

(3)

is

cause

historical

does provide an exhaustive disjunction of three causal

initial

each case.

in

it

does not pick out a single

Isn't this to

a sex ratio of 1:1,

(1)

(2)

more males

a description of the causal path of the

provide a causal explanation of the

1:1

sex

ratio,

even

picked out? To explain by reference to a disjunction of causal

a causal explanation.

To

this,

Sober

replies:

disjunction of causal scenarios clearly provides

'

information about the
cause was one of the several mentioned); but
disjunctions of causal scenarios will sometimes fail to say what the cause is.
An ice cube melts in a warm room. We might say that the cube's being
made of water caused it to melt. Suppose that there were another
1

cause (namely,

substance,

that the actual

it X, that has the same melting point; if the cube
had been
would have melted just the same. In what sense is it true that
the cube's being made of water or of X caused
to melt? Only in the sense
that its being made of water caused
to melt, or its being made of X caused
it to melt.
The disjunction of possible causes fails to say what the cause

made

of X,

call
it

it

it

it

(205).

Sober concedes

one sex

ratio.

nothing

in

the

that the disjunction provides information

His further point

common between

two possible causes

something

in

common

point; melting point

initial

to,

is

is

not easy to discern, but

being

made

of water

selection

argument

seems

be

to

that, there

that

is

causally relevant: both water and

a causal capacity.

Fisher's

argument

at,

a one-to-one sex ratio.

is

X have

similar:

will force the

Hence, a
path

is

common

taken

in

the

But there

is

same melting

no matter what the
population to

causal factor

move

—

natural

concrete cases. Fisher's

a causal one, but at an abstract level: natural selection
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being

X, the disjunction of

says nothing about the cause of the substance melting.

— plays a role no matter which causal
is

it

and being made of

population structure, he argues, natural selection

or to remain steady

about the causes of the one-to-

is

an abstract cause, the

actual operation of

less causal

which may take

a

number

of concrete forms.

But abstract causes are no

than are concrete causes.

5.11.5 Identity Explanations

A number

of authors have argued that information about
identity relations can be

explanatory, though causes obviously play no role

cause

Identity explanations can take

itself).

David-H

i

I

(i)

Ruben (1990, 218-219)

lei

explaining

Q, which a

why some

many

such explanation

in

Two

forms.

(for

a thing cannot

general forms cited by

are:

particular a has property

P by identifying P with a property

also has;

(ii) explaining why a is a P by identifying
a with the sum of its parts, b & c & d,
and identifying P with some property of the sum, Q, or with a property
Q had
individually by each member of the sum.

Most

interesting identity explanations in science, says

Ruben,

rely

on

identities that

etc.,

reduce

macro-properties to micro-properties (1990, 220).

The nature

of identity explanations

Two examples

examples are

stated.

temperature

can be explained by the

t

fact that

explaining what something

e.g.,

result,

fact that

it

is

it

has

mean

H 0. 180 The
2

what temperature

the mention of a particular gas sample

and water. As a

often obscured,

I

by the form

think,

in

which

noted by Ruben are typical: that a gas sample has

water can be explained by the

is,

is

at

temperature

is,

t,

kinetic energy k;

emphasis,
or

what

in

ice

and

each case,

is.

This

is

that ice

is

obscured by

and by the comparison between

why

was applied

energy of the gas molecules to increase

to the gas, causing the kinetic

is

this

gas

at

temperature

t'?;

because heat
until the

gas reached a temperature of t\ This explanation makes use of the equivalence between
kinetic energy

ice

the explananda are easily confused with similar explananda that

receive a causal explanation: for example,

mean

is

and temperature, but

it

also provides causal information.

such as these provide no counterexample to the causal theory of explanation.
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Examples

Once
are

left

"what

the explananda are stripped of features that

with an explanandum of the form, "what
ice?"

is

Commonly,

is

demand

X?", e.g.,

"what

the explanation to this sort of question

we

causal explanation,

is

is

temperature?", and
a description of the

structural properties of X.

Structural explanation (explaining

inquiry,

and

it

The two kinds
many,
First,

if

not

would be obtuse not

what something

is) is

certainly a part of scientific

to distinguish structural explanations

from causal ones.

of explanation are complementary, however, and closely
related.

all,

structural explanations provide causal information.

the structure of an

atom may be described

First,

Here are two examples:

as consisting of a nucleus,

which contains

neutrons and positively charged protons, and a cloud of negatively charged electrons,

which are bound
forces"

is

to the nucleus

a causal description.

be complete without a

by

electrostatic forces.

"Being bound by electrostatic

To take another example, no explanation

citation of

its

pumping

of the heart

would

function. Anatomical descriptions of

biological organisms often contain information about the functions of described structures,

but functions are operative causal capacities.

So

structural explanations often contain causal information.

for structural explanations

aim

in

is

closely

bound

One

organs, for example,

is

addition, the search

to the search for causal explanations.

trying to understand the structural properties of things

causal capacities.

In

is

For one

to better understand their

goal of the dissection and careful description of the structure of

to

improve understanding of

their biological functions.

Structural

properties are of interest partly because they are associated with causal capacities: there

permanent, though
capacities,

brute-fact,

in

a

connection between structural properties and causal

and a major goal of science

while room

is

is

to discover these connections.

the causal theory of explanation must be

made

I

conclude

that

for structural explanations,

the addition of structural explanation to the theory complements causal explanation nicely.
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CHAPTER

6

EXPLANATORY CONTROVERSIES AND THEIR RESOLUTION

6.1

Explanatory Controversy
Positivist

in static

this traditional

Science

philosophy of science has traditionally viewed

narrow scope: only the theories
appraised

in

in

historical

science through a

science were examined with care, and these were

form, stripped of historical context. Recent work has begun
to correct

preference for theory and

static, ahistorical

Thomas Kuhn's The

contexts.

Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) initiated vigorous discussions
of theoretical

change

in

dynamic

historical contexts.

More

recently, the

work

of Ian

Hacking (1983) and

others has forced philosophers to reexamine the intricacies of experimental science, as well
as the

complex

relationship

With respect

between experiment and theory.

to explanation,

however, attention

to

dynamic

historical contexts

is

unusual, and the role of experimentation and other actual methods of resolving explanatory

puzzles

is still

ignored. These weaknesses

come

to the forefront

when one examines

particular episodes from the great history of explanatory controversies in science,

to

understand

how

18

unresolved.

'

It

is

these controversies arise, are pursued, and finally settled or

no

surprise, given philosophy's traditional focus

discussions of explanatory controversy are also rare.

This

is

unfortunate, for controversies

scientists' thinking.

completely

in

to the surface,

Controversy compels

in

of

tries

left

static theories, that

182

science are rich sources of information about

scientists to

defend

their

views forcefully and

public forums. Sharp disagreements thus bring more of scientists' reasoning

where

it

may be observed by

philosophers and historians of science. During

a period of controversy, moreover, the statuses of

champions

on

and

all

sides of the conflict are visible,
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competing theories are

in flux,

which helps the philosopher or

and the
historian to

resist

the natural tendency to discount or
overappreciate the value of hypotheses

accord

in

with the ultimate outcome of the controversy.

Below we
have

to say

consider what recent neo and paleo-positivist
theories of explanation

about explanatory controversy. With respect

what reasons does

ask: (1)

in

will

the forms that

it

does?

to

each theory of explanation,

provide to expect explanatory controversy to

it

(2)

Can

it

exist,

and

we

to exist

provide an account of the ways that explanatory

controversies are pursued and resolved? Historical examples
will be presented which

demonstrate

that positivist theories of explanation provide
inadequate

guidance

understanding the genesis of controversies, the methods by which
resolution

and the speed and decisiveness by which they are
be shown

to result

from a

false

resolved.'

conception of explanation.

by introducing detailed descriptions of two

83

In

We

published during

radiation,

which

1

science can help to

can

will preface this discussion

historical controversies: the dispute

in

between

a series of

its

partial resolution in

1

937.

chapter requires an important assumption: that the history of

in this

settle

failures

969-1 970), and the controversy concerning the nature of cosmic

ran from the mid-1 920s to

The argument

pursued,

each case, the

Jensen and Lewontin over the genetic determination of IQ (which occurred
articles

is

in

disputes between philosophical theories of explanation.

Fifty

years ago, this assumption would have received immediate rebukes from a majority of

philosophers of science, for philosophy was viewed as a normative project best pursued

an objective distance from the details of actual

contemporary philosophers
science.

of science

scientific practice.

have acquired serious

at

Times have changed, and

interests in the history of

Nonetheless, questions about the proper relation between history and philosophy

of science remain unsettled. As a result, although the appeal to history should generate less

heat

now

than

it

would have

in

the

1

940s,

it

must
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still

be defended.

We will

approach the topic by considering two

common

arguments against using

the history of science to settle disputes between
philosophical theories of science (including

When

scientific explanation).

one

is

considering these arguments, one must keep

evaluating the use of history of science not

philosophy of science, as a basis

come

in

in isolation,

in

mind

that

but vis-a-vis normative

for adjudicating philosophical questions.

The complaints

two general forms:

(1) Historical cases can be cited in which the methods
used by scientists are
no longer accepted as good scientific practice, though they were
approved,
and even championed, by the methods' practitioners and their

contemporaries.

would seem, therefore, that history provides unreliable
decide between philosophical theories of science. In
addition, scientific methods and knowledge have clearly made
progress
throughout history. Yet any appeal to history to settle philosophical
disputes seems to deny that the methods, inferences, and conclusions of the
chosen historical episode can be improved upon by subsequent science, or
by philosophy. Noretta Koertge, who makes this argument in a discussion
of Lakatos' work on historical reconstruction, asks rhetorically, "[w]here
would logicians be if they had rejected any theory of inference which did
It

grounds on which

to

not reconstruct

all of the arguments of the great Euclid as valid? Or what if
medical theory had restricted itself to the articulation of the methods used
by the best surgeons alive in 1850?"' 84

How

is

grounds

is

the history of scientific practice to be filtered and assessed for the
purpose of gathering examples for philosophical argumentation? On what
(2)

one

to

judge which

explanatory practice?

An

historical

initial

episodes contain examples of good

required, and it would seem
on which the evaluation can rely: (a)

evaluation

that there are three possible sources

is

intuition; (b) the consensus of scientists; (c) a normative philosophical
framework. Any reliance on intuition or consensus, however, is
unacceptable to many philosophers of science. Prior philosophical

frameworks are therefore required. This conclusion

is

summed up by

Lakatos' paraphrase of Kant: "history of science without philosophy of

science

is blind" (Lakatos, 1971/1978, 102).
Historical analysis therefore
presupposes normative philosophy of science, and cannot be used to

adjudicate between competing philosophical theories of science.

While
is

(1

)

raises

some important questions about

unconvincing as an argument against the use of

philosophy of science). The doubts

it

raises

the use of the history of science,

history (and in favor of normative

about the

reliability of history as a basis to

adjudicate philosophical disputes can be raised with respect to normative philosophy of
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it

science as well. Models of good scientific
practice reconstructed from history are
certainly
but so are models constructed from any
philosophical basis. Moreover, scientific

fallible,

practice can be improved, as

throughout

history,

is

demonstrated by the progress of

and any evaluative use of

history

a history of normative philosophy of science, and

philosophies of science

(e.g., Aristotle's final

scientific practices

must respect

But there

this fact.

many examples can be

and

fallible,

also

given of earlier

causes) that are no longer accepted by

philosophers. That historical reconstructions are

is

modern

that scientific practices

have

progressed throughout history, therefore provide no good reason to prefer
normative

philosophy to history as a basis
In

the case of

consensus

is

(2),

I

for adjudicating disputes.

wish to mention two points.

underrated by

many

First,

philosophers of science. Consensus regarding the

importance of theoretical or experimental developments
institutional process of dissemination, critical review,

the

"mob psychology"

that

the value of scientific

some philosophers make

focus discussion on a second point: even

if

we

is

and

it

achieved only

selection.

It

is

at

the end of an

much more

out to be. Having said

that,

I

than

wish

to

accept that the assessment of history requires

a normative philosophical framework, the construction, interpretation, and evaluation of

philosophical theories of science generally require,

philosophy
dialectic

in

actual scientific practice.

between

On

this

in turn,

the application of the

view, philosophical progress

actual practice (including historical study)

interpretation, analysis,

demands

a

and philosophical

and assessment.' 85

Philosophical theories of science

do not appear out

of thin

air,

but through

examination of the history of science. Theories can be interpreted, moreover, only

in light

of actual cases of scientific practice: the philosophy of science without the history of science

is,

again

in

Lakatos' words, empty.

be evaluated only

in

Most important, philosophical theories

terms of the fruitfulness of their application
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in

of science can

actual scientific practice,

either historically or in the present.

mere

Until a theory has

intellectual curiosity; at best,

application

some

in

is

of interest because

is

it

into practice,

that

(1

965)

because

between the theories and
that ideal

first

made

the argument,

their theories are only ideal

actual scientific practice can

models of explanation must

the ideal model are satisfied by

be explanatory. Here

I

the

is

would add another

has

it

become common

in scientific practice),

Naturally,

it

is

scientific practice.' 86

models, criticism founded on conflict

be dismissed.

In

Chapter

3,

following criterion: wherever the

explanation, the proposal

in

model must aspire

criterion: the

science, either historic or future.

in

for

If

a

argued

I

criteria of

question must
to satisfy

model

some

of

not satisfied by any historical examples of good explanatory practice, then

model acquires a burden

applied

satisfy the

some proposed

cases of good explanatory practice

explanation

remains a

seen as having potential

philosophers of science to portray their theories as "ideal"
models of

They suggest

it

area.

Hempel

Since

it

been put

easier to

show

of proof:

it

must be shown

that

if

the

model were

satisfied

(i.e.,

then the resulting scientific practice would be successful.
that a theory of explanation

scientific practices in the past than

it

is

to

show

can account

that the theory

for successful

would be

successful

if

applied to future cases.
This,

that

said,

is

sufficient,

I

hope, to indicate

philosophy of science not only benefits from, but requires, the study of actual

practice.

6.2

combined with what has already been

We now turn

to

our two

historical

examples.

Case Study: Controversies over the Explanation of
Performance
First

The genetic
of controversy.

187

basis of

human

Our immediate

intelligence

topic

is

scientific

is

a

Differential IQ-Test

huge subject with an extensive

history

a single dispute within this history: the exchange

between Arthur Jensen and Richard Lewontin concerning the
181

heritability of

IQ as evidence

for a genetic explanation of the racial
differential in

debate on the genetic basis of intelligence with

and Scholastic Achievement?", published
article set off a

in

IQ

test

"How Much Can We

his article,

Harvard Educational Review

dramatic controversy that extended beyond

The general controversy over the genetic
scientists participating in this controversy

performance. Jensen reopened

his

in

Boost IQ

1969. Jensen's

exchange with Lewontin. 188

basis of intelligence has not subsided 189

,

and

remain polarized. The smaller dispute between

Lewontin and Jensen remains equally unresolved: neither Lewontin nor
Jensen has budged
from

his original point of view.

The dispute
First,

is

of interest to our discussion of scientific explanation for

the dispute clearly concerns the causal role of a factor

role of genetic factors

in

IQ-test performance).

In

addition,

regularity (statistical data) about both genetic relationships

resolve the dispute:

knowledge

of these laws has

been

in

a

phenomenon

knowledge

two reasons.
(namely, the

of plenty of laws of

and IQ relationships has

failed to

insufficient to clarify the respective

roles of hypothesized causal factors.

Jensen's argument

First,

from two

starts

compensatory education has

neither of

facts,

which

is

disputed by Lewontin:

failed to eliminate the differences in scholastic

performance between certain groups of students, especially between black and white
students.

190

Second, black students score 15 points lower on IQ

white students;

this differential

"gross socioeconomic" factors.

forth

is

reduced to

19

that

he believes are

in

points, claims Jensen,

1

The purpose

'

and defend a causal explanation

measures

1

tests,

on average, than do
if

one controls

of Jensen's original article

for these facts;

and

to suggest

is

for

twofold: to put

education policy

accord with the proposed causal explanation. The main

outlines of Jensen's argument can be sketched as follows:

(1)

IQ

(2)

IQ has a strong genetic

is

highly heritable

(in

white American and northern European populations).
'’

basis, as (1)

and other evidence show.
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1

2

(3)

The IQ

differential

between black and white students therefore has

genetic basis.

(4)

Compensatory education

concept and the

a strong
6

on two assumptions: the "average children

rests

"social deprivation hypothesis." 194

challenge the assumptions of compensatory education.
They suggest
further that the IQ (and, hence, the scholastic
performance, as well as socio(5) (1 )-(3)

economic achievement) differential between blacks and whites
cannot be
eliminated by compensatory educational programs. Finally,
these groups
different educational needs that require different
educational methods.
Although Lewontin believes available studies overestimate the
(1

)

for the

heritability of IQ,

sake of argument. His criticism centers on Jensen's claim that

reasonably inferred from

(2)-(5)

may have

he accepts

can be

(and any additional evidence). Lewontin and Jensen thus

(1)

disagree on two major questions: does the high heritability of IQ and other evidence
that

IQ

(or intelligence)

has a strong genetic basis?; and what can one reasonably infer about

education policy on the assumption that IQ
has a strong genetic basis?

6.2.1

to

Our case study

Jensen's

Argument

Jensen

very careful

know what

capabilities:

is

in

is

measurements are

whether or not intelligence

by

focuses on the

whatever

is

it

is

his

first

question.

argument.

He disavows any

a single capability or a family of related

measured by IQ

tests,

so long as these

we

definition,

is

success.'

95

He

is

also quick to agree that arguments about

"fixed" are irrelevant:

observe or measure of the organism

is

not "fixed."

The phenotype

is

is

a phenotype, and

this,

the result of the organism's

mechanisms established at conception and all the physical
and social influences that impinge on the organism throughout the course of
96
so the
Intelligence is a phenotype, not a genotype'
its development.
argument about whether or not intelligence is "fixed" is seen to be spurious
internal genetic

,

(

claim

positively correlated with other factors of interest such as scholastic

achievement and occupational

[WJhatever

highly heritable or, further, that intelligence

or whether

is,

satisfied to study

is

development of

the

intelligence really

he

show

17 ).
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It

is

misleading to describe intelligence as "fixed,"
says Jensen, because intelligence

phenotypic characteristic

that

is

a

develops through the interaction between the
person's

genetic constitution and his or her environment.
While Jensen discards the question of the
"fixedness" of intelligence, however, he intends
to

show

that

strong genetic basis, and that relative intelligence
(such as
stable throughout the lifetime of individuals.

intelligence

is

much

intelligence has a

measured by IQ

is

Moreover, he

human

criticizes the

tests)

is

very

claim that relative

affected by environmental manipulation (e.g.,
educational

intervention).

In

support of the conclusion that

human

intelligence has a strong genetic basis,

Jensen cites the following evidence:

(1)

Mental

abilities, e.g.,

(2)

Known

genetic defects have recognized consequences on
Turner's syndrome.

maze-running

skills in rats,

can be selectively bred.

human mental

abilities, e.g.,

(3)

The

(4)

IQ (i.e., the proportion of variance
genotype) has been measured to be .81.

heritability of

variance

in

The measured

correlation

in

IQ attributable

to

between socioeconomic factors and IQ is weak, e.g.,
variance in IQ due to variance in environmental

some measures of the portion of
factors show
to be about .20.
it

(5) Large upward shifts in IQ seem to occur only
environmental deprivation is remedied.

In his

in

cases

in

which severe

discussion of the IQ differential between black and white students, he mentions these

additional factors:

(6)

No amount

of environmental manipulation (educational intervention, for

example) has been shown to eradicate the IQ differential; cited programs for
disadvantaged children show only 5-10 points gain in IQ, and these results have
been difficult to replicate on a broad scale.

(7)

Various evidence shows that the IQ

differential

is

steady across socioeconomic

classes.

Since

(1)

and

(2)

show,

almost no one disputes

at

most, that genetic factors play a role

— they can be ignored.
184

in

intelligence

The remaining evidence

— a claim that

falls into

two

categories:

positive evidence for the strong role of
genetic factors

(i)

(primarily the high heritability of IQ);

environmental factors

(e.g.,

and

determining IQ

in

negative evidence for the role of

(ii)

socioeconomic conditions, or educational intervention)

determining IQ. Although the negative evidence

for the role of

in

environmental factors

important to Jensen's argument 197 the focal point of
Lewontin's criticism
,

is

is

Jensen's appeal

to the high heritability of IQ.

6.2.2

Heritability

As

we

have noted, Jensen says he

is

concerned not with the

"fixity" of intelligence,

but the genetic basis of intelligence:

When we look behind the rather misleading term, "fixed
we find are principally two real and separate issues. ..The

intelligence,"
first

what

issue concerns

the genetic basis of individual differences

concerns the
lifetime ...

in intelligence; the second
constancy of the IQ throughout the individual's

stability or

198

Geneticists have avoided confusion and polemics about the issue of
whether or not a given trait is "fixed" by asking the right question in the first

how much

place:
trait

of the variation

or characteristic that

given population can
factors
(

In this

we

we

(i.e.,

individual differences)

observe or measure

account

for in

(i.e.,

in

a particular

the phenotype)

in

a

terms of variation

in the genetic
the genotype affecting the development of the characteristic?

(i.e.,

)

16 - 17 ).

way, Jensen

raises the question of the heritability of IQ, for "heritability"

of the proportion of phenotypic variance that

Heritability

is

importance to

is

assignable to genotypic variance.

only one of the "lines of evidence" cited by Jensen, but
his

argument because

a measure

is

it

is

of utmost

the primary positive evidence he offers

in

favor of

it

is

is

a special application of the analysis of variance,

the genetic hypothesis.

The estimation
which

is

a general statistical technique for

contributing causes

total

of heritability

191
.

Heritability (h 2 )

is

measuring the

relative influence of possible

defined as the ratio of genotypic variance {Vc to
)

phenotypic variance (VQ:

185

h 2 - Vc/Vp

The

total

phenotypic variance (Vp

)

is itself

.

a function of

genotypic variance and other

sources of variance:

vP = vc + VE +

V,

covCE

+

+ ve

.

Here "non-genetic" sources of variance are represented by V
E (environmental

variance), V,

(variance resulting from genetic-environmental interactions),

due

covariance between genotype and environment), and V
e
Obviously, genetic factors are operative

in V,

(error in

COVCEl

and

COVCf

(variance

to

measurement ). 200

as well as in

Vc Genotypic
.

variance (Vc ) also has a number of components that can be distinguished,
including additive
genetic variance, variance due to dominance deviations, and variance due to
genetic
interactions (epistasis).

There are a number of techniques
genetic relationship

is

known

(e.g.,

for estimating heritability.

parent-offspring,

example, one can calculate the genetic variance

measurements

of the phenotypic variance of

heritability of the

(dominance and
relationships

201

traits

concludes

.

However, because

epistasis),

it

is

traits

monozygotic twins,

siblings, etc.), for

these groups, and then use

within the group to

make

estimates of the

of the complexity of gene-interactions

and the existence of background correlations between genetic

and environmental properties

environments),

human

trait.

in

Using subjects whose

difficult to arrive at a

(e.g.,

good estimate

Lewontin notes some of the

that the heritability of

IQ

is

siblings tend to

in

of the heritability of

similar

IQ and other

difficulties of estimating heritability,

overestimated

Lewontin accepts Jensen's estimate of the

develop

in

heritability of

most
IQ

studies.

for the

and

Nevertheless,

sake of argument, and

will thus ignore the general issue of estimating heritability, restricting ourselves to related

points as they arise

in

our discussion.

186

we

number

Citing a

of studies of IQ

in

white north European and American

populations, Jensen estimates the heritability of IQ
to be .81

80%

of the variation

in

IQ can be explained by genetic

He

.

variation.

from

infers

this that

This figure,

about

combined

with the perceived failure of social scientists to find
any strong correlation between

environmental factors and IQ, leads Jensen
important

6.2.3

in

to

conclude

that genetic factors are

most

explaining the IQ differential between white and black students.

Lewontin's Criticism
Lewontin's criticism of Jensen's genetic hypothesis focuses on two points:
(1) Jensen's argument confuses the heritability of a trait within a population
with the heritability of the difference between two populations: the "genetic
basis of the difference between two populations," argues Lewontin, "bears

no

logical or empirical relation to the heritability within populations,"

the high heritability of IQ within

and

some

studied populations thus provides no
evidence of the genetic basis of the difference between populations (89).

Jensen's argument assumes that the major environmental variables have been
identified by social scientists, and that the genetic variables have thus been

(2)

successfully isolated

in their

analyses. This assumption, suggests Lewontin,

is

biologically naive.

To bring home
take

his

two handfuls

arguments, Lewontin presents two simple examples.

First,

suppose

of seed from a bag of open-pollinated corn (which contains a lot of

genetic variation):

we

will

grow the seed

nutrient,

in

vermiculite watered with a carefully

Knop's solution, used by plant physiologists

experiments.

One

made up

for controlled

solution, but the other will have the concentration of nitrates cut
in

addition,

we

growth

batch of seed will be grown on complete Knop's

will leave out the

minute trace of zinc

salt that

is

in half

and,

part of the

weeks we will
measure the plants. ..[W]e will find variation within seed lots which is
entirely genetical since no environmental variation within lots was allowed.
Thus [within-group] heritability will be 1 .0. However, there will be a radical
difference between seed lots which is ascribable entirely to the difference in
nutrient levels. Thus, we have a case where heritability within populations
is complete, yet the difference between populations is entirely
necessary trace elements (30 parts per

billion).

environmental!
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After several

we

But

let

know about

us carry our experiment to the end.
Suppose
in the nutrient solutions
because

we do

the difference

not

was

really the
carelessness of our assistant that was involved.
call in a friend who is a
very careful chemist and ask him to look
into the matter for us. He analyzes
the nutrient solutions and discovers the
obvious
only half as much
nitrates in the case of the stunted plants.
So we add the missing nitrates and
do the experiment again. This time, our second batch
of plants will grow a
little larger but not much,
and we will conclude that the difference between
the lots is genetic since equalizing the large
difference in nitrate level had so
little effect.
But, of course, we would be wrong, for it is
the missing trace of
zinc that is the real culprit. Finally, it should be
pointed out that it took
many years before the importance of minute trace elements in
plant
it

We

—

physiology was worked out because ordinary laboratory
glassware will
leach out enough of many trace elements to let
plants grow normally (90-

This example shows that even where the within-group
heritability
factors can

be decisive

second example

in

which two groups

in

is

1

.0,

environmental

producing between-group differences. Lewontin presents a

which the

relationship

is

reversed: he describes a plausible scenario

in

of corn plants exhibit within-group heritabilities of
0.0, yet have

between-group average differences

in

height that are entirely

due

to genetic differences

between the two groups.
It

important to understand that Lewontin's claim

is

from within-group
risky.

heritability to explain

Lewontin's point

Is it

is

is

not just that Jensen's inference

between-group differences

is

epistemologically

stronger:

not then likely that the [IQ] difference

nor unlikely. There

is

is

genetic? No.

It

neither likely

is

no evidence. ..Indeed, between two populations, the

concept of heritability of their differences is meaningless. This is because a
variance based upon two measurements has only one degree of freedom
and so cannot be partitioned into genetic and environmental components
(89).

Lewontin's argument contains two primary

based

in part

The two

on a

lines of

later article

lines of reasoning,

it

is

my

interpretation

by Lewontin on the analysis of variance (Lewontin,

Lewontin's argument are:

(1)

where the operation

independent, the analysis of variance (including
as

though

by Jensen, as an analysis of

heritability)

is

188

of causal factors

misleading

relative causal contributions;

1

and

(2)

when

is

974).

is

not

interpreted,

the analysis of

heritability

is

always

local to a population

and a particular environment

-

it

does

not, in

other words, reveal the general functional
relationship between genotype and
environment,

except under very special conditions (which,
believe are met

One

(1)

should be added, there

it

is

no reason

to

the case of IQ).

in

must keep

mind

in

that "heritability" has a definite technical

refers to the ratio of genetic variance to

phenotypic variance

a population.

in

meaning:

it

Above we

represented heritability by this formula:
b2 =

Vc/Vp

.

The degree

of heritability of a

variation

the population. So described, heritability appears to isolate the
respective

in

contribution

(i.e.,

This appearance

thus a function of the genotypic and phenotypic

trait is

causal contribution) that genetic variance

is

Remember

mistaken.

environment, as well as of

that

their interactions

VP

is itself

l

for the causal analysis

is

to

phenotypic variance.

a function of genotype and

and covariance:

vp = vc + vE + v +
The problem

makes

covCE

+ ve

that the factors listed

.

on the

right side of the linear

equation are not independent of one another: environmental variance

genotype and genotypic variance
indicated by

range of

V,.

a function of environment

The phenotypic expression

this variation

is

it

is

— this

of a genotype varies with

called the genotype's

have different norms of reaction;
genotypes

is

"norm

common

of reaction"),

for the

function of

is

is

the relationship

environment

and

different

factors, heritability

does not

tell

whether

if

this

environmental variance

is

Because

depends on both environmental and genetic

truly isolate the causal contributions of either

genetic factors. For instance,

impossible to

heritability)

genotypes

phenotypic expression of two

to vary not only in degree, but in direction across environments.

phenotypic variance (and thus

(the

because there

is little

189

is

small (and h 2

is

actual variation in

environmental or

large),

it

is

environment or

because the particular genotype
heritable"

sense.

in

is

therefore not the

is

insensitive to environmental differences.

same

as being "strongly genetic,"

Lewontin's corn examples show

determining a plant's height, even

no genetic

variation

heritability

is

in

the population).

or to differences

in

this

is

meant

the causal role of the genotype

this:

the heritability of height

Even

similar to that within the group,

between-group differences are due

(2)

if

if

Being "highly

if

we assume

we

is

0.0

(e.g.,

in

a causal

may be

strong

because there

is

therefore that the between-group

have no way of knowing whether the

to differences in

genotype (including norms of reaction)

environment.

A measure

of heritability

particular environment.

is

always relative to a particular population

in

a

Because the phenotypic expression of a genotype varies across

environments, and because different genotypes have different norms of reaction, a measure
of heritability does not, under most conditions, describe a general functional relationship

between environment and genotype
population. The only case

and environmental

in

that

can be applied outside of the measured

which such generalizations can be made

effects are additive so that differences in

perfectly proportional differences in phenotype.

number

when genotypic

genotype or environment yield

1974

article,

Lewontin discusses a

of reasons that might be introduced to support the assumption of additivity

analyzing variance, and argues that none of them

6.2.4

In his

is

is

justified

when

(1974, 189-191).

Jensen's Reply

In his

reply to Lewontin's article, Jensen responds as follows:

The main

man

thrust of Lewontin's argument, as

he sees

it,

actually attacks only a

up by himself: the notion that heritability of a trait within a
population does not prove that genetic factors are involved in the mean
agree. But
difference between two populations on the same trait.
nowhere in my Harvard Educational Review discussion of race differences
do propose this line of reasoning, nor have done so in any other writings.
do, however, discuss many other lines of evidence which believe are
straw

set

I

I

I

I

I

more

consistent with the hypothesis that genetic factors are involved

190

in

the

average Negro-white IQ differences than with purely
environmental theories
(1970, 103).

Given

that Jensen devotes over

heritability of IQ, and, as

positive evidence

in

in

we

25 pages of

his original article to a discussion of the

noted above, that the

heritability of

IQ constitutes the only

favor of Jensen's hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly
implicated

the IQ differential between races, this rejoinder seems disingenuous.
Not surprisingly,

Jensen continues

a

in

manner

that reveals

he does indeed believe that the inference from

the high heritability of IQ to the genetic hypothesis

is

valid.

We will

quote

his

argument

length:

But

let

us further consider Lewontin's statement that heritability. ..within

populations

is

irrelevant to the question of genetic differences

populations. Theoretically, this

is

true:

It

is

between

possible to have genetic

differences within populations and no genetic differences between

populations which differ phenotypical ly; conversely, it is possible to have
zero heritability within populations and complete genetic determination of
the

mean

difference between populations. Therefore, heritability

coefficients obtained within populations,

no matter how

high, cannot prove

the existence of a genetic difference between populations. ..But

it

is

necessary to distinguish between the possible and the probable, and
between proof in the sense of mathematical tautology and the probabilistic
statements that result from hypothesis testing

question

in

empirical science. The real

not whether a heritability estimate, by

its mathematical logic,
can prove the existence of a genetic difference between two groups, but
is

whether there is any probabilistic connection between the magnitude of the
heritability and the magnitude of group differences. Given two populations
(A and B) whose means on a particular characteristic differ by x amount, and
given the heritability h A 2 and h B 2 of the characteristic in each of the two
populations, the probability that the two populations differ from one another
(

)

genotypically as well as phenotypically

is

function of the magnitudes of h A 2 and h B 2

some monotonically
(1

970,

1

increasing

03-1 04).

Jensen then offers an example:

would be no difference
where h 2 for the trait in
in the probability that two groups
2
question is 0.9 in each group as against the case where h is 0. ? Pygmies
average under five feet in height; the Watusis average over six feet. The fact

Would Lewontin

maintain, for example, that there

differ genetically

1

that the heritability of physical stature

is

close to 0.9 does not prove that

more

all

is not caused by environmental factors, but
probable that genetic factors may be involved in the difference than would
be the probability in the case of a group difference in the amount of

the difference

scarification

it

(body markings) which very

191

is

likely has a heritability close to

at

zero. Since pygmies and Watusis live

should

we

in very different environments, why
not bet on the proposition that their difference in mean
height is

attributable to environment?

the high heritability of height suggests
then look for other lines of evidence to

In short,

We would

a reasonable hypothesis.

the hypothesis. ..We can proceed similarly in studying group
differences
behavioral characteristics. Within-group heritability estimates thus
can
give us probabilistic clues as to which characteristics are most
likely

test
in

to

genetic differences between groups when investigated through
available lines of evidence (1970, 104-105).

Jensen believes that the heritability of a

which between-group

differences

trait

the

in

trait

show

the other

provides prims, fscie evidence of the degree to
are genetically based.

Lewontin, he suggests,

either fails to recognize the probabilistic nature of this evidence or

demands,

explaining IQ differences, a degree of proof required nowhere else

6.2.5

all

in natural

the case of

in

science.

Lewontin Again
In his

response to Jensen's reply, Lewontin reemphasizes the point that

irrelevant (both deterministically

and

heritability

probabilistically) to Jensen's genetic hypothesis.

addition, he expands his original argument to consider other grounds relevant to the

probability of the genetic hypothesis:

If

two populations have high

heritabilities for a character

average difference between them,
possibility

is

is

and there

is

that difference mostly genetical?

an

One

because of a previous

that the populations differ genetically

history of differential selection of a type that causes genetic variation to be
stabilized.

Another

because of

historical accidents of genetic

possibility

differential selection.

genetically
in

some

much

A

is

third possibility

alike but live in

critical limiting factor.

can be

priori likelihoods

that the populations

fairly

first

is

differ genetically
drift)

without

that the populations are

environments

All of these

that differ

occur

in

from each other

nature,

and again no a

assigned to them.

For the race problem, however,

other information. The

may

sampling (genetic

possibility

we

is

can say something because of

quite unlikely because the result of

would be the elimination of additive genetic variance, leaving
only dominance and interaction variance. But Burt's data, quoted by
selection

Jensen,

show

that

variance. This

is

48 percent

of the variance in

a high figure for a quantitative

absurdly high for any

trait

that

IQ

is

additive genetic

trait in

general,

has long been under selection.

and

202
It

appears

IQ has been selectively neutral, at least over much of our species
history. The second and third possibilities are more or less equally likely

that

192

In

is

explanations of the situation in man, and would
not care to bet the
educational future of any children on one or the other
(1 970b, 1 10).
I

Does the high

heritability of

IQ support Jensen's genetic explanation of IQ

differences or not? Jensen and Lewontin

on the

statistical relations

do not come

6.3

however,

agreement, although they do agree

regarding genetic variance and variance

heritability measures), at least for the sake of

relations,

to

fails to settle their

in

IQ

(i.e.,

argument. This knowledge of

on the

statistical

explanatory disagreement.

Second Case Study: Controversies over the Nature of Cosmic Radiation

The

story of the study of

experiments to
electroscopes

scientists

try to

cosmic rays begins

understand a

phenomenon

1912,

in

when

Victor Hess performed

— the spontaneous discharge of

— that had puzzled scientists for more than a century.

understood enough about the physical world

to

know

203

Hess and other

that the discharge

was due

to charge-neutralizing ions present in the gas surrounding the leaves of electroscopes, but

they were unsure of the source of these ions.

What was causing

of the gas? Scientists

knew

gases, such as X-rays

and radium. They also knew

in

electroscopes,

some

of

it

the continuous ionization

of various radioactive substances that

came from

that

were capable of ionizing

whatever was causing the ionization

outside the electroscopes, and

was able

Most

result, that

thick layers of shielding lead or water.

scientists

presumed, as a

to penetrate

the source

of ionizing radiation must be the earth's crust.

To
and

test this

opinion, Hess ascended to

rate of discharge of a set of electroscopes

of discharge decreased at

first

increased thereafter. Indeed,

earth's surface.

6,000

at

amount

1

6,000
that

ft.,

ft.

in

a balloon, measuring the altitude

he had on board.

(up to about 2,000

Hess concluded

radiation, a significant

1

ft.),

He

discovered that the rate

but then, surprisingly, steadily

the rate of discharge

was four times

that at the

while the earth's crust does contain sources of ionizing

of radiation has

its
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source

in

the heavens above earth.

Hess's discovery launched forty years of inquiry into
the nature of cosmic rays, and
this inquiry

rays

played a major role

was driven by an evolving

the history of particle physics. 204

in

set of

explanatory problems. At

The study
one

least

- the spontaneous discharge of electroscopes - had already dogged
hundred

Most

years.

of the puzzles,

of

cosmic

of these

problems

physicists for over

one

however, developed with the introduction of two new

instruments, the Rutherford (and especially the later Geiger-Muller)
electric counting

devices, and the Wilson cloud chamber. These instruments

made

it

possible, for the

time, to study the behavior of individual micro-particles, and the data from

them generated

explanatory problems that received intense attention from physicists beginning
1

920s. The explanatory problems included:

How

is

one

to explain the

first

in

the mid-

spontaneous

discharge of shielded electroscopes and the simultaneous discharges of electric counters
separated by heavy barriers?
tracks that appear in cloud

What

debate:

is

How

is

one

to explain the

showers and long single ionization

chamber photographs? More general questions

the nature of cosmic radiation?

Is

is

the process by

engendered

cosmic radiation photonic or particulate?

Are there primary and secondary components of cosmic radiation?
respective natures, and what

also

which secondary

If

so,

radiation

what are
is

their

produced from

primary?

These questions generated vigorous,
physicists

during

will

1

1

9 3 7.

936-1 937. 206 Although

look

the main

between 1929 and

in detail at

205

this story

of sea-level

times acrimonious, controversy

This controversy

only a small part of

component

at

cosmic

includes

it:

was nonetheless resolved

many

the discovery

radiation.
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207

among
rapidly

explanatory ups and downs,

in

1937

of the

we

mu-meson, which

is

Cosmic Radiation: Photons or

6.3.1

will

It

1920

two sources

s,

Compton

known
that

be useful to summarize

Effect,

of ionization had

Particles?

first

the main events preceding

After

936.
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By the mid-

been recognized: corpuscular radiation and the

which was discovered by Compton

to ionize gases.

1

in

the early

1

Compton's discovery, most cosmic

920s. Cosmic rays were
ray researchers

assumed

cosmic rays were made up of high-energy photons.
Robert Millikan emerged as the major defender of the photon view. Beginning

the mid-1 920s, he and G.H.

Cameron sought

to shed light

in

on the nature of cosmic rays by

constructing an absorption curve for rays by measuring their ionization rate as a function of

depth

in

the atmosphere and

in

lake water.

They chose

curves, and then calculated the energies of photons that

to resolve their data into three

They argued

that the calculated energies are exactly

one assumed the cosmic
into helium, nitrogen,

that

rays to

oxygen, and

silicon.

In

principle,

that the

if

hydrogen

atoms being formed

in

outer space.

209

was soon challenged by experimental work performed

by W. Bothe and W. Kolhorster (1929).
arranged two Geiger-Muller tubes

result of the fusion of

to be,

This quantitative agreement convinced Millikan

"birth cries" of

Millikan's photon-hypothesis

each absorption curve.

yield

what one should expect them

be photons released as a

cosmic rays are photons, the

They discovered

would

In their

in parallel,

experiments, Bothe and Kolhorster

them by a

separating

two tubes discharged simultaneously with

thick gold block.

210

a significant frequency.

photons could produce a double discharge by colliding with an atom and

kicking out a high-energy recoil electron (the

argued that a calculation of the energies of

Compton

if

But Bothe and Kolhorster

recoil electrons (using a reasonable absorption

curve and the best available theory of the Compton
reveals that very few,

Effect).

Effect

any, recoil electrons at sea-level

— the Klein-Nishina theory)

would have energy

sufficient to

penetrate the gold barrier. Bothe and Kolhorster concluded that the penetrating particles

195

were not

recoil electrons,

and speculated

that the

cosmic rays themselves must consist of

high-energy charged particles rather than photons.

Between

1

better understand

Bruno

correct.

929 and
cosmic

Rossi, for

934, two groups of scientists pursued experiments to

1

radiation.

One

group suspected

that

example, continued experiments

in

try to

Bothe and Kolhorster were

Bothe and Kolhorster's lab

using an improved Geiger-Muller counter (Rossi, 1930a, 1930b, 1933). Others,
like Arthur

Compton, sought new kinds

of evidence for the charged-particle hypothesis, such as the

existence of geomagnetic effects on cosmic rays (the famous Millikan-Compton dispute

concerned the existence

of

pursued confirmation of

his

geomagnetic

effects).

Millikan's group, on the other hand,

photon hypothesis. Hoping

to gain better

measurements

of the

energies of cosmic rays, Millikan encouraged his student, Carl Anderson, to build a cloud

chamber with which

to

observe the behavior of the secondary particles he presumed were

produced by photons, with the goal of acquiring more precise measurements
photons' energy.

of the
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Millikan chose Anderson because he already had significant expertise with cloud

chambers, which he had used since

chamber

his

undergraduate days. Anderson

inside of a powerful electromagnet,

energy of the particles captured
with Millikan

in

1

932

(Millikan

in his

which helped him

photographs.

and Anderson,

1

He

932).

to

cloud

judge the charge and

published his

They found

built his

first

results jointly

significant

numbers

of

both negatively and positively charged particles, and he and Millikan interpreted the
particles to

be the electrons and protons of disintegrated nuclei. Nine-tenths of the

photographed

particles

had energies, they argued, consistent with the photon hypothesis.

Their interpretation of the data postulated a

which photons

new

process of absorption and ionization,

collide with atoms, thereby ejecting protons and electrons (which

captured by Anderson

in his

cloud chamber photographs).
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were

in

Later,

Anderson enhanced the

and improving illumination

in

quality of his photographs by reducing
turbulence

the chamber. As a result, he could better assess
the particles'

energies by measuring their curvature and ionization
densities.
the ionization of the positive particles

had a mass comparable

particles

was

less

to that of electrons,

Having

the plate.

be greater on
direction

the

1

were not

lost

lighter than protons.

He

of positive particles traveling

To resolve

this difficulty,

he

cloud chamber, hoping to catch a particle losing energy through

energy going through the

their exit sides than

on

plate, the curvature of the particles

would

their entrance sides, thus settling the question of their

and charge. Anderson's subsequent

end of

and certainly

of negative electrons traveling upwards.

installed a lead plate in the

to suspect that

than he had believed, suggesting that the

also considered the possibility that his photographs

downwards, but

He began

tests,

the results of

932, revealed that the small-mass particles

which were published

— dubbed

positrons

at

— were indeed

positive in charge.

P.M.S. Blackett and G.P.S. Occhialini soon confirmed Anderson's

results,

though

they explained positrons to be the result not of nuclear disintegrations, but of Dirac

production processes,
the

vacuum

after

it

(Blackett

in

which high-energy photons create an electron and positron out

and Occhialini,

1

Anderson accepted

933).

appeared, though he continued to believe

in

results as further confirmation of the

Meanwhile, Rossi published
that

its

inconsistent with his photon theory of cosmic rays.

accepted Anderson's

some

particles

were able

results of his

to penetrate over

Millikan and their colleagues responded

appearing

in

1934 (Anderson,

in

Millikan, et

an

al.,

their explanation

Millikan's photon hypothesis.

on the other hand, rejected Dirac pair-production, though

was not

pair-

soon
Millikan,

use by Blackett and Occhialini
Nevertheless, he willingly

photon theory.

counter experiments, which suggested

one meter

of lead (Rossi,

article written at the

1934).
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of

end

1

of

933). Anderson,

1

933, and

Rossi had noticed secondary showers

of particles appearing with the passage of single,
penetrating particles. Anderson and

Millikan had also noticed these showers, and their
observations had revealed that the

number
article,

of

shower

particles increased

up

to

one and one-half centimeters

of lead.

In their

they argued that the release of showers by a passing photon
better explained the

simultaneous discharges of Rossi's counters than did

his

proposal of a single particle passing

through both counters and a meter of lead. They returned to the claim,
therefore, that any

secondary radiation was due

to the interactions of

conclusion, they declared that their

this

production theory,

for

secondary particles

data

were inconsistent with the Dirac

they revealed more negative particles than positives

— not equal

were being produced

latest

photons and atomic nuclei. To bolster

in

pairs

Despite Millikan's

numbers

as

one would expect

on cosmic radiation

efforts,

however, the penetrating

Neddermeyer had begun

particles

observed

in their

and east-west

(the latitude

cosmic radiation consists of charged
S.H.

the

the secondary particles

by photons.

Bothe, and Kolhorster would not go away. For one,
effect

if

among

pair-

particles.

212

particles

emphasized by

new evidence on
effects)

More

Rossi,

the geomagnetic

favored the conclusion that

importantly, perhaps, Anderson and

to suspect that the radiative losses of

many

of the high-energy

cloud chambers were lower than was to be expected, which

is

to

say that these particles had great penetrating power. At the London and Cambridge

conference on nuclear physics

was

in late

1934, they presented their data, and argued that

it

inconsistent with the best current theory of radiation. Their presentation, which

precipitated a theoretical

Heitler) described only

was understood

in

crisis, raised difficult

two sub-atomic

problems:

213

the then-current theory (Bethe-

particles, the electron

and the proton, each of which

terms of two properties, namely, mass and charge. Neither

particle, so

described, could account for the absorption data presented by Anderson and Neddermeyer.

On

the

one hand, the

radiative losses of the observed particles
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were much lower than those

predicted for electrons by the Bethe-Heitler theory, the
best quantum electrodynamic theory
of radiative losses.

On

protons confronted

its

the other hand, the hypothesis that the penetrating
particles were

own

problems:

electrons (the result of ionization)
rays

were protons. Second,

sea-level

some protons with

if

the measured energy distribution of secondary

First,

was incompatible with

the hypothesis that the primary

the primary rays were protons,

relatively

one would expect

to find at

low energy, the ionization tracks of which are

easily

distinguishable from those of high-energy electrons. Yet no such low-energy
protons had

been found.

6.3.2

Cosmic Radiation:
By the end

of

1

Crisis

934, the study of cosmic radiation had no doubt advanced. Most

physicists (besides Millikan)

photons. But

in

and Resolution of the Explanatory Controversy

were now sure

cosmic rays were charged

that

make up cosmic

explaining the particles that apparently

especially the light-ionizing, penetrating tracks observed

cloud chamber

— scientists were faced with an

quantum theory was
incorrect

and the

correct and the particles

particles

were high-energy

quantum electrodynamics was

false.

—

unpalatable explanatory dilemma. Either

were protons,

quantum theory was

or

But there was good evidence that

electrons.

Not

radiation

and not

Anderson's and Neddermeyer's

in

the particles were not protons, and to accept that they were electrons

that

particles

would be

to

surprisingly, theorists such as Bethe

concede
tended to

believe that the penetrating particles were protons, which would salvage quantum theory,

while the experimentalists such as Anderson believed

were electrons

that did not

This explanatory

1

behave

crisis

in

it

was more

likely that the particles

accord with quantum theory.’

did not

936-1 937. The resolution took place

last

in

long,

two

however,

steps:

First,

for

the

it

14

was resolved

phenomenon

rapidly during

of particle

showers was successfully modeled by Carlson and Oppenheimer using the Bethe-Heitler
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quantum

theory: particle showers

were shown

to

be cascades

by high-energy

initiated

electrons and photons (Carlson and Oppenheimer,
1936). Their model

employed the

important distinction between the particle showers and the
penetrating particles.

boosted physicists confidence

Second, two groups of
Stevenson

in

1

scientists

— Anderson and

Neddermeyer, and

Street

and

— gathered decisive cloud chamber evidence for the conclusion that the
new

particle: the

and Stevenson, 1937a and 1937b, and Neddermeyer and Anderson,

(Street

Mu-mesons

937).

success

quantum electrodynamics.

penetrating particles were neither protons nor electrons, but an entirely

mu-meson

Its

make up

turn out to

the bulk of sea-level cosmic radiation, and to be the

penetrating particles that explain not only the cloud chamber phenomena, but also the

simultaneous discharges of shielded Geiger-Muller counters, and the spontaneous discharge
of shielded electroscopes, the

hundred

years.

explanatory

We

will

last

of

which had been an explanatory puzzle

crisis.

Anderson was already persuaded

of the likely existence of a

at

new

the end of 1936,

To

particle.

conclusion, however, as well as to acquire better data on the nature of the

and Neddermeyer performed a comparative study of the energy

and penetrating
the

particles at the

same energy. By considering

same energy, they would be able

particles

energy

over a

be concerned only with the second step of the resolution of the

By the time Carlson and Oppenheimer's paper appeared

at

for

losses of

particles

clinch the

new

particle,

shower

particles

from the two groups

to rule out the possibility that the penetrating

were simply high-energy electrons

that radiated less than did electrons at low-

levels.

Neddermeyer and Anderson
measurements of

chamber was

calculated the energy levels of particles from

their path-curvatures in the electromagnetic field in

located.

Having obtained groups

200

of particles at

he

which

their

cloud

comparable energies, they

then measured the energy-losses of these particles
as they penetrated a

1

cm

plate of

platinum. The absorbing plate was thick enough that the
likelihood that an electron could
pass through

it

without great radiative losses was negligible.

and Anderson reached these conclusions
(1

)

The

particles

fell

(Rossi,

1964,

Upon

103ff.):

two sharply distinguished groups: the

into

Nedermeyer

analysis,

particles of

group suffered large energy-losses, while those of the second group
energy penetrating the barrier.

one

very

lost

little

The absorbable particles often appeared in clusters, and they frequently
produced showers, confirming the view that they are electrons (as analyzed by
Carlson and Oppenheimer). The penetrating particles, however, usually generated
single tracks in the cloud chamber photographs.
(2)

(3)

The energy-losses

of the absorbable group, moreover,

of electrons according to

quantum

were consistent with those

Because the particles of the two groups
had comparable initial energies, there was no reason to believe that the two groups
were simply electrons behaving differently at different energy-levels. The
penetrating particles,

in

theory.

other words, were not electrons.

Some of the penetrating particles had an energy-level at which they would have
had, had they been protons, an ionization density three times that which was

(4)

recorded (the ionization density recorded
electron).

As a

result,

must be smaller than
did not radiate as

it

for these particles was roughly that of an
could be inferred that the mass of the penetrating particles

that of a proton.

much

as

do

In

addition, because the penetrating particles

electrons, their

mass must be greater than

that of an

electron.

Neddermeyer and Anderson's

precise measurements of the energy-loss and ionization

density of the penetrating particles

that the particles

in their

cloud chamber forced the conclusion, therefore,

were neither electrons nor protons, but were charged

particles with a

mass

intermediate between the two.

Street

First,

and Stevenson's research took a

experiments performed by a student of

Carlson-Oppenheimer analysis

shower

particles

analysis, Street

were electrons

slightly different track (Galison,

theirs, L. Fussell,

of particle showers

as

modeled

was

confirmed

correct.

successfully by the

and Stevenson could focus on the penetrating

cloud chamber, the upper chamber of which was
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fitted
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for

1

987,

them

1 1

9ff.).

that the

Confident that the

Carlson-Oppenheimer

particles.

They

built a

double

with an electromagnet, allowing

Street

and Stevenson

to

momentum

measure the

The lower chamber was

of particles.

fitted

with a series of lead plates, which allowed the two
physicists to determine which particles

produced showers and which did
Street

not.

and Stevenson's photographs yielded two groups

produced showers, and one of which did
thousand times more

likely to penetrate

that the penetrating particles

also

were not

measured the ionization density

measurements

be protons.
penetrating

Handbuch.

over 6

of

which

of lead.

Street

and Stevenson concluded

Neddermeyer and Anderson,

of the penetrating particles,

and concluded from

be protons,

their

for their ionization rate

that of protons.

their

power than
In

cm

electrons. They, like

and Stevenson had other reasons

First,

one

Moreover, the non-shower particles were ten

that the penetrating particles could not

was much lower than
Street

not.

of particles,

to believe the penetrating particles

low and medium-energy penetrating
that of protons of

particles

Bethe said they should.

It

had much greater

comparable energies, as calculated by Bethe

addition, Street and Stevenson found particles

densities indicated clearly that they

whose energies and

were protons, but which penetrated no

was evident

could not

that Street

in his

ionization

further than

and Stevenson's penetrating

particles

were

neither protons nor electrons.

Street

and Stevenson soon acquired an additional, powerful piece

the existence of the

their

new

particle.

cloud chamber, they

particle entering the

second.

In

the

fall

fitted

Hoping

one with counters

chamber through one counter

of 1937, their apparatus

track of a penetrating particle

coming

density of the thick track, as well as

electromagnetic

to catch a penetrating particle

field

and the

particle's

coming

expansion only

failed to exit the

magnetic

when

a

slightly

curved

chamber. By measuring the ionization

rigidity (a function of the force of the

momentum)
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to a stop in

chamber through the

produced a picture of a dense,

to rest in the

its

that triggered

of evidence for

Street

and Stevenson were able

to

estimate the mass of the particle to be about 200 times the
mass of an electron. This
picture,

more than anything

particle with intermediate

6.4

A Comparison
Our two case

over IQ and race

is

else,

convinced most physicists of the existence of the charged

mass (Galison, 1987, 122).

of the

Two Case

studies differ

in

a

Studies

number

of important respects.

the controversy

a dispute about explanatory scope: Are genetic, developmental, social,

or other factors

—

all

most important

in

determining IQ

of

which are recognized
test

to

be operative

cosmic radiation photonic or
electrons or protons?

In

in

determining intelligence

—

performance? The controversy over the nature of

cosmic radiation could also have been understood,

addition to theory

First,

particulate?

If

at times, as a

particulate,

composed

is it

the end, however, the controversy

controversy of scope:

Is

primarily of

was resolved by

a novel

— the postulation of a new charged particle of intermediate mass — and

thus ultimately cannot be viewed as a controversy of explanatory scope. Second, the

controversy over IQ and race remains unresolved, though
years.

The dispute concerning

it

has raged for over seventy

the nature of penetrating cosmic radiation, on the other

hand, was resolved quickly and decisively by the cloud chamber experiments of Anderson
et al.

We now turn

to theories of explanation,

explanatory controversies, and,

6.5

in particular,

and

ask:

how

useful are they in elucidating

the features of the controversies

The Covering-Law Model and Explanatory Controversy

What can
phenomenon

is

the Covering-Law model

tell

the History of Science

us about explanatory controversies?

explained, on the Covering-Law model,

phenomenon can be deduced from

in

named above?

a set of true laws

203

if

A

a statement describing the

(some of which are empirical)

in

conjunction with auxiliary statements of
foci of

fact.

This model suggests the following as potential

explanatory controversy:
the truth of the general laws and singular statements
appearing
explanatory deduction;
(1

)

(2)

the empirical content of

(3)

the lawlikeness of the proposed laws;

(4)

the validity of the rules of deductive logic used; and

(5)

the appropriateness of the

some laws used

in

the suitability of the

controversies.

On

proposed

the deduction;

explanandum chosen.

Disagreements about the empirical content of laws or the
the history of science.

in a

validity of rules of logic are rare in

the other hand, the truth and lawlikeness of general laws 2

explanandum 217 sometimes serve
,

'

6
,

and

as objects of dispute in explanatory

But for other types of explanatory controversies and their resolution,

including the controversies over IQ and cosmic radiation, the Covering-Law model offers no
plausible explanation:

(1

)

From the standpoint

(regularities),

explanandum

and auxiliary

of the

Covering-Law model, once an explanandum, laws

facts sufficient to construct a

Covering-Law derivation of the

are settled, explanatory controversy should end; further explanatory pursuits

should be pointless. Yet the history of science

is

filled

with controversies that have

flourished long after a covering-law derivation has been obtained. The acrimonious

controversy over the relation between race and IQ-test performance
(Lawlike) correlations

between average

test

is

a

good example.

scores and race, social class, and other features

are accepted by most parties to the debate. These laws suffice, moreover, to construct

covering-law explanations of

differential test scores.
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Yet

in spite

of this, the controversy

performance has continued unabated.

about the explanation of

IQ-test

that the controversy rests

on deep disagreements about the nature

204

It

seems obvious

of the causal

mechanisms

connecting race and IQ-test performance, but the nature
of these disagreements cannot be
captured by the Covering-Law Model.

Under the Covering-Law model, one would expect

(2)

explanatory controversy

in

scientists to resolve

the following way: Look for relevant regularities that
can be

formulated into true laws. Then confirm the necessary auxiliary
hypotheses, and construct

covering-law derivations of the
In

phenomena

question.

in

actual science, however, the search for regularities sometimes plays

scientists try to

cases of them

understand the factors responsible for a

in isolation

under the

artificial

If

phenomenon by observing

et a/, present

aspects of their experiments are important for our argument.

drew inferences from no more than

role at

a handful, or

even

single,

examples of
First,

single

this strategy.

they sometimes

photographs of particle

confirming a regularity was the goal, the inductive basis was weak, to say the

to

go through chambers of

plates as their behavior

gas,

powerful magnetic

was photographed.

If

regularities

fields,

trails.

least.

Second, the behavior they observed was obtained under unnatural conditions: the

were made

all:

conditions of the experimental setup. The

cloud chamber experiments performed by Anderson

Two

no

particles

and a variety of metal

were established

in

these

experiments, they are bound to such highly specialized conditions that the laws would be
inapplicable outside of the lab.

was not

the goal of the experiments.

This

is

not to deny, of course, that the experiments of Anderson et

repeatable, or that repeatability

some

Both of these features indicate that establishing regularities

was

seems

to entail regularities.

it

would be

was

to establish regularities, for

The experimental data were acquired under such

highly specialized conditions, however, that

indicative of a regularity,

were

a goal of the experiments. This fact might mislead

into believing that the goal of the experiments

repeatability

a/,

if

we assume

scientists

understood them to be

a regularity useless outside of the investigators'

205

specially designed cloud

the case of Anderson et

and charge z

is

a/.,

depth

y,

What would such

one law might have

this law,

field of strength g,

which

is

specialized cloud chambers,

z,

1

able to penetrate more than
y

perpendicular magnetic

Obviously,

chambers .'

and force

g.

of

is

little

Whenever

this form:

cm

then

perhaps true

a law of regularity look like?

of lead,

it

will

and

if it

is

move along

In

a particle of energy

p

subjected to a

a path of curvature

r.

for particles inside of the experimentalists'

when

use

conditions are other than energy p, charge

Yet lawlike regularities of

this

type are

all

that

could be inferred

from the experimentalists' specialized setup.

Anderson

et a/, did infer, nevertheless, that the properties of the

cloud chamber were
inference

is

like

mu-mesons

in their

those of mu-mesons outside of their experimental setup. But

this

not an inference from one regularity (under experimental conditions) to another

(under natural conditions). Rather, they inferred from the experimental observations that a
particle with great penetrating

mass intermediate between

assumed
in

that other

power and

that of an electron

mu-mesons

which they are found.

light-ionization capacity exists,

and

that of a proton.

also have these capacities,

and

that

it

has a

Furthermore, they

no matter what the circumstances

Finally, the physicists also inferred that the penetrating

and

ionizing behavior of cosmic radiation outside the lab was due to the mu-meson. This

inference

was grounded on

the experimentally confirmed

this capacity, as well as the belief that

no other

knowledge

that

particle has capacities that

mu-mesons have
could explain

this

behavior.

The goal (and subsequent method)

of

Anderson

et a/.'s

experiments was not the

establishment of any regularity, nor were the important conclusions drawn by them about
lawlike regularities.

approach

The Covering-Law model thus cannot account

to solving the explanatory difficulties of

cosmic

for

Anderson

radiation, nor

why

et a/.'s

their

experimental results resolved the explanatory controversy so decisively. The Covering-Law

206

model's

inability to

do

so,

moreover,

lawlike regularities as the central

6.6

is

clearly a result of

component

reliance on description of

its

of explanation.

Pragmatic Theories of Explanation and Explanatory Controversy

in

the History of

Science

Van

Fraassen's pragmatic theory of explanation rests on a theory of
why-questions,

according to which explanatory answers must respect the why-question's topic,
contrast
class,

and relevance

relation, all of

which are a function of the questioner's

intentions. This

theory would seem to sanction disagreements regarding only the intentions of questioners
(everything else

controversy

in

is

taken for granted), which has nothing to do with actual explanatory

the history of science.

Van

Fraassen's theory thus adds nothing to the

understanding of explanatory controversy and

What about
suggestions might

it

make concerning explanatory
is

community. The search

community,

to treat a

shared by

all

fixed

by

sets of

domain

commitments

of

is

to

be

would seem

explanatory scopes of theories could occur
scientific

motivated by unrealized theoretical

little

room

for

explanatory controversy, for

that

advance and

no more than minor skirmishes over the

221
.

communities, on the other hand, Sintonen's theory suggests

deep explanatory disputes may occur,

for different

communities may be bound

conflicting sets of theoretical commitments. Scientific controversies

different theoretical

of a scientific

that delineate explanatory relevance are given in

it

What

controversy? Sintonen argues that

phenomena. Within the boundaries

would seem

members. Thus,

Between

220
.

explanatory exemplars shared by a scientific

for explanation

therefore, there

the theoretical

resolution

Sintonen's structuralist extension of the pragmatic approach?

explanatory relevance

commitments

its

commitments

certainly occur.

In

to

between groups with

early nineteenth-century Europe, for

example, there arose an extended explanatory dispute
207

that

in

biological morphology, the most

celebrated event of which was the famous series of
debates between Geoffroy and Cuvier
Paris (1830-1 832). 22

'

As

is

true of

in

most great disputes, the significance of the Cuvier-

Geoffroy debate was multifaceted, and subsequent students
have interpreted

it

in

various

ways. But perhaps the most important point of controversy
was a disagreement about the
correct approach to explaining biological form: Cuvier argued
that biological form must be

explained by reference to the organism's functional requirements and,
hence, to
"conditions of existence" (environment). Geoffroy asserted,

could be explained by reference

to sets of

fundamental

in turn, that

its

biological form

structural plans (Bauplane)

and laws

of morphological change.

Though Sintonen's theory recognizes grounds on which explanatory controversy
between

groups can

scientific

Explanatory relevance

is

arise,

settled,

it

remains a mystery

how

such disputes can be

on Sintonen's view, by the theoretical commitments

(paradigms) accepted by a given community. Hence, where there

paradigms, there

no

is

no

basis

on which

there

over another. But
scientists,

one way

is

this requires

though there may be

to settle

a short period of time.

That

is

between

to say, there

is

social or political bases.

in

the theoretical outlook of the capitulating

and such changes can occur only slowly, given the power

the history of science, however,

a conflict

such disputes: by the victory of one paradigm

broad changes

commitments by Sintonen (and by
in

is

to settle explanatory disputes.

scientific basis for conflict resolution,

In truth,

settled.

attributed to theoretical

the progenitor of his theory, Kuhn). There are episodes

in

which explanatory

The explanation

conflict

of the penetrating

is

settled decisively within

component

cosmic radiation

of

provides a good example: disputes about the nature of cosmic radiation that had persisted

for

decades were resolved quickly by the experimental work of Anderson

The dispute was

settled,

et at. in 1937.

moreover, on the basis of a relatively small amount of experimental

208

evidence concerning the nature of the penetrating
account

for the

radiation.

quickness and decisiveness with which

Sintonen

s

theory has other

this

difficulties, as well.
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Sintonen's theory cannot

controversy was resolved.

Sometimes explanatory controversy

can be resolved by the introduction of a new theory, or the
theoretical expansion of existing
theory.

But explanation by the introduction of

understood as

fulfilling pre-existing theoretical

new

entities

and

commitments,

their properties

as

cannot be

conceived by Sintonen.

Again, the discovery and acceptance of the mu-meson as the explanation
of the penetrating

component

of cosmic radiation presents an illustration.

On

Sintonen's account, the

acceptance of the mu-meson as an explanation of cosmic radiation phenomena
unintelligible, for there

This

is

was no theory

not to say that

when

as having explanatory force, that

was no doubt comforting
radiation, for

existing

it

a

of the

new

mu-meson

theory

does not

in

or criteria are satisfied

prior to 1937.

introduced and immediately recognized

some way meet

to physicists to learn that the

example, was indeed a charged

commitments

is

pre-existing expectations.

It

main component of cosmic

particle, as

in this

is

many had

suspected. But

if

pre-

and similar cases, they are much more

general and diffuse that the commitments associated with any well-defined theory.

6.7

Kitcher's Unification Theory

and Explanatory Controversy

in

the History of

Science

If

Kitcher's theory of scientific explanation

of explanatory controversy, and

The answers

to these questions

how would

were

scientists

depend upon whether

correct,

proceed

what would be the nature

to settle their

disagreements?

or not the controversy involves the

potential for theoretical change.

Controversy can occur without the threat of significant theoretical change: a variety
of factors

may be known

unsure which factor

is

to

produce the phenomenon

responsible

in a set

in

question, though scientists remain

of particular cases.
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Debates about the nature of a

poorly understood disease,

for

genes, viruses, bacteria, inorganic toxins,

champion

— with each potential factor having

etc.

the debate. Such controversies

in

—

example, might focus on a number of well-known
factors

may be

its

own

concern the explanatory scope

said to

of accepted theories.

The

historical

episodes detailed above include examples of

explanatory problem of cosmic radiation might have been posed
radiation

due

to

photonic or particulate rays?

If

particulate,

this type.

this

do the

way:

Is

In

1

930, the

cosmic

rays consist primarily of

electrons or protons? All sides were vigorously defended, and lively controversies
resulted,
the best

known

of

which was perhaps the Millikan-Compton

engendered by Gould and Lewontin's (1984)

one

all

The controversy

programme

is

also

which evolutionary

are to be explained by natural selection, genetic

other mechanisms of evolutionary change,
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critique of the adaptationist

of explanatory scope: the debate concerns the extent to

phenomena

dispute.

drift,

pleiotropy, allometry, or

of are already recognized as occurring in

nature.

In

controversies concerning explanatory scope, significant theoretical change

at issue: the

opposing explanations

all

accepted members of the explanatory

As a

result,

the unifying

power

is

not

instantiate explanatory patterns that are already

store, to put the point in the

terms of Kitcher's theory.

of the explanatory store remains the

same no matter which

hypothesis turns out to be the correct explanation. Controversies concerning explanatory

scope therefore cannot be

said to

be founded on disagreements about the unifying power of

alternative hypotheses, nor can they be resolved by considerations of unifying power.

What about

the other class of cases,

explanatory hypotheses
Kitcher's theory

is

of a novel type,

seems more

at

home

where one

or

more

of the

in

’

competing

and thereby threatens theoretical change?

here than

22
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controversies of explanatory scope, and

brings a ready answer to the question: explanatory controversy arises over the respective

210

it

unifying powers of the alternative explanatory
stores associated with each explanatory
hypothesis. Controversy

moreover,

settled,

is

when

a (global) comparison of the stores of

patterns associated with each competitor hypothesis
reveals a decisive difference

and stringency of patterns or wealth of consequences. Thus,
we might expect
pursue controversy by streamlining
assumptions, and by seeking out

consequence

their theories into structures with

new

sources of data that

one theory (explanatory

of

This proposal, though plausible

which many controversies
(a)

account

A

in

some

fewer basic

may be shown

accounts

cases,

manner

in

for Kitcher's theory, already

for the swift resolution of

scientists to

be a

to

pattern) but not of the other.

are pursued, nor the

major problem

paucity

in

for neither the

way

in

which they are resolved:

touched on above,

is

that

it

cannot

explanatory controversies via the introduction of novel

explanatory hypotheses. Novel theories are sometimes unifying, but more often they are
diversifying.

They introduce new

patterns of explanation.

entities

So long as there

completely replaced by the

new

one, the

and/or

is

unifying

power

If

number

of

of the store

Kitcher's theory

is

properties,

and with these come new

no previously accepted pattern

number

inevitably increase with the acceptance of the

increases the total

new

that

is

of patterns in the explanatory store will

new

theory. Thus, even

phenomenon covered by

if

the

new

pattern

the explanatory store, the total

not improved.

were

correct, scientists should

be ambivalent about resolving

explanatory controversies through the acceptance of novel (diversifying) explanatory
hypotheses. Yet

many

cases

in

the history of science exhibit the decisive resolution of

controversy through the acceptance of a novel theory
associated with the theory

case

in

point.

Of

was ambiguous,

this period,

at best.

Brown and Hoddeson

— even though the unifying power

The

early history of particle physics

write:

Although the positron discovery of August 1932 was a validation of Dirac's
theory, that particle (and the neutron, neutrino, and meson) totally

211

is

a

destroyed the synthesis that appeared to be at hand
in 1 930. As Millikan
said: "Prior to the night of 2 August, 1
932, the fundamental building-stones
of the physical world had been universally
supposed to be simply protons
and negative-electrons." Progress in the 1930s, and the
next few decades,
would lie not in unification of forces and a reduction in the
number
of

—

elements but rather in diversification
in the discovery of new particles,
the enlargement of the particle concept, and in the
recognition of

in

new

nuclear forces, both strong and weak. 227

The discovery

of the

mu-meson

is

an exemplary case

in

which explanatory

controversy was resolved via the (non-unifying) diversification of theory,
namely, the

expansion of quantum electrodynamics

between

that of a proton

penetrating

component

Kitcher

It

was

while

new

a

its

of

cosmic radiation was, moreover, quick and decisive.

theory cannot sanction the acceptance of the mu-meson as an explanation.

s

particle with a previously

phenomena

unknown

of

decisions are

One
theory,

store.

mu-meson

made on grounds

many

is

Moreover,

and proton hypotheses) promised

the penetrating

component

of

new

cosmic

radiation.

thus inconsistent with Kitcher's view that explanatory

of unifying power.

basic explanatory patterns

were added

really diversify

to the explanatory

places, Kitcher suggests that the basic explanatory patterns of the

explanatory store are extremely general,

"origin-and-development" pattern.
suggests a

(the electron

could argue that the introduction of the mu-meson did not

the sense that

in

In

of the

constellation of properties.

cosmic radiation with hosts of other well-known phenomena,

mu-meson hypothesis explained only

The acceptance

charged particle of mass intermediate

and of an electron. The acceptance of the mu-meson as the

competitor explanatory hypotheses

to unify the

the

to include a

means

228

e.g., a

Kitcher's frequent

of handling the case of the

meson brought with

it

no patterns

general pattern, one which

we

"mechanical corpuscular" pattern, or an

move

to

extremely generic patterns

mu-meson. Kitcher could argue

of explanation that could not be

might

call

fit

that the

mu-

into a pre-existing

the "physical particulate" pattern of explanation,
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according to which phenomena are explained

in

terms of the properties

(e.g.,

mass and

charge) of micro-particles.

In

1

937, the mu-meson explanation of penetrating cosmic radiation no
doubt

general pattern

in

which physical phenomena were explained

charge of micro-particles
Kitcher

s

— but this "general
A

theory of explanation.

pattern"

logical ordering of premises.

a

et a/.'s discoveries.

it

those premises,

of

— but there could be no such claim before

of the penetrating

instantiated a "particulate pattern" of explanation,

it

specific:

229

mu-meson explanation

meson brought with

much more

to contain the claim that there

Putting this criticism aside, a further problem presents
that the

is

To cover the mu-meson explanations, the kind

charged particle of intermediate mass

Anderson

terms of the mass and

filling instructions for

schematic pattern envisaged by Kitcher's theory would have
is

a

not the kind of pattern described by

pattern," in Kitcher's theory,

contains a set of schematic premises, a set of explicit

and a

is

in

fit

component
and thus

itself.

of

If

Kitcher

were

to

argue

cosmic radiation

mu-

that the discovery of the

no explanatory novelty, then the controversy resolved by the

discovery of the mu-meson

is

transformed into a controversy of explanatory scope,

controversy between proponents of accepted photonic and particulate patterns.

i.e.,

We

as a

have

already seen, however, that Kitcher's theory has nothing to say about controversies of

explanatory scope: the theory provides no reason to expect controversies of explanatory

scope

to occur,

and no grounds on which they can be resolved. Even

us the schematic pattern that the

therefore, this

nature of

its

(b)

If

move does

mu-meson explanation could be

if

Kitcher can

show

said to instantiate,

nothing to explain both the existence of controversy and the

resolution.

the preceding conclusion

explanatory hypotheses that are not

is

correct, then there

among

must be grounds

for accepting

Kitcher's criteria of unifying power. This
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is

evident,

is

often

suggest,

I

weighed

in

the weighing of evidence

locally, not globally,

Kitcher's theory

If

were

and not

correct,

all

in

all

favor of explanatory hypotheses: evidence

evidence

is

accorded equal weight.

experimental evidence

of explanatory patterns) should be weighted equally, for unifying

of the

numbers (and not

(i.e., all

power

the consequences

is

a function only

type) of confirmed experimental consequences. Yet

minuscule amount of evidence of the

right

kind (minuscule,

at least,

sometimes a

when measured

against

the general wealth of empirical data) suffices for a swift and decisive resolution of

controversy.

Consider the case of the mu-meson. Prior

to

1

937, there was a great deal of

empirical evidence that was consistent with both the electron and proton explanations of
the penetrating particles.

2J0

Yet a small series of experiments performed

Neddermeyer and Anderson, and
a stopping particle

community
radiation.

that a

in

Street

new

Decisive for

Street

1937 by

— especially a single photograph of

and Stevenson's cloud chamber

particle, the

this

and Stevenson

in

— convinced the scientific

mu-meson, was the penetrating component

the experiments' ability to distinguish electrons, protons, and a

was

decisive.

To take one example

Neddermeyer, and others had long argued
particles

cosmic

conviction was not the wealth of undifferentiated, confirmed,

empirical consequences, but the special nature of the experimental evidence.

possibilities

of

new

In particular,

particle as explanatory

of the scientists' reasoning, Anderson,

that the radiative losses of the penetrating

observed were inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory

But the penetrating particles also had energies

much

for electrons.

higher than anything previously seen.

Thus, there remained the possibility that the penetrating particles were high-energy
electrons,

and

that high-energy electrons simply radiate differently than

energy. Neddermeyer and Anderson's experiments

in

do those with low-

1937 were designed

explicitly to rule

out this possibility. They measured the energy losses of two groups of particles, shower
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particles

and penetrating

same energy. The energy

particles, at the

were consistent with those described by theory
group were

not.

Hence, they concluded

for electrons,

group

while those of the second

Street

only one example of the

is

many ways

and Stevenson, carefully designed

experiments to yield decisive data. The resulting evidence showed
hypothesis could explain their data

first

— as did the majority of physicists' — that the

penetrating particles could not be electrons. This

which Neddermeyer and Anderson, and

losses of the

in

their

one plausible

that only

— that postulating the existence of a charged particle of

intermediate mass.

If

a

few

Kitcher's theory

sets of

were

correct, the small

amounts of empirical data

photographs taken under highly specialized conditions

would not have weighed heavily

in

— no more than

cloud chambers

against the wealth of prior experimental data.

The weight

of the

new evidence

favors

— the existence of a new particle — competed with hypotheses that promised to

of

1937 diminishes

unify the penetrating particle

electrons or protons.

If

further

phenomenon

Kitcher's theory

when one

considers that the hypothesis

with hosts of other

were

—

it

phenomenon caused by

true, therefore, the

evidence of

1

937 could

not have resolved decisively the dispute concerning the nature of the penetrating

component

of

— and certainly not

cosmic radiation

decisive resolution

was indeed

in

favor of a

new

particle.

But a

the outcome.

Kitcher's theory also misreads the path taken from experimental evidence to the

conclusion that the mu-meson
existence explains a variety of

experimental data

tell

made

is

the penetrating

phenomena both

scientists

apparatus employed. This
inferences

is

what

is

component
inside

happening

in

of

cosmic

and outside the

radiation,

lab.

and

that

Good

the specialized experimental

the primary significance of experimental evidence.

to the global level, e.g., about the unifying

power

Any

of general explanatory

hypotheses, are secondary. For example, Street and Stevenson's photographs provide
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its

evidence,

first

and foremost,

of

what happened

cloud chamber

in their

electrons, protons, or other particles explain
cosmic radiation

were

certain that the ion

trail in

chamber was caused by

their

in

a

- not of whether

general.

new

Only

they

after

particle of intermediate

mass, could they consider the broader implications of
the evidence for the explanation of

cosmic

radiation.

Local explanation

— and the experimental

evidence thereof

—

is

often

prior to global considerations.

If

Kitcher's theory

were

correct, the line of reasoning

to accept the explanatory force of the

that the

complete explanatory

mu-meson

store of science

hypothesis were accepted. Only then could
explains what happened

in

There are cases

in

fails to

fit

which

power, yet has been considered by
that

hypothesis,

would be

we know

it

would have

better unified

if

to

the

that the existence of a

reverse:

be judged

mu-meson

new

particle

the cloud chambers of Anderson, Neddermeyer, Street, and

Stevenson. This description

(c)

would be exactly the

a

the facts.

new and promising

scientists to

have impressive unifying power on an

Newton's theory of universal

gravitation,

be unexplanatory.

intuitive level,

by Kitcher as examples of powerfully unifying

theory has had great unifying

theories.

231

I

will cite

only theories

and which have been accepted

The two cases

and Darwin's theory

I

have

in

mind

are

of natural selection.

Finocchiaro (1980) and Mischel (1966) argue convincingly that Newton's

hypothesis of gravitation was widely viewed to be unintelligible because action-at-adistance could not be understood

scientists of

Newton's time

in

then-current mechanical terms.

— and perhaps even

Newton

himself

232

As a

result,

many

— considered the theory to

provide an accurate, precise statement of a multitude of empirical

regularities, but to

fail

as

an explanation of the phenomena (Mischel, 40-1). Newton apparently wavered between

two

alternative views of his theory:

sometimes he viewed

his

theory as an incomplete

explanation; other times he denied that the theory was an explanation
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at all (239ff.).

Finocchiaro argues further that gravity was accepted
as intelligible only
intelligibility

was won

as a result of a long historical process in

mathematical theory was gradually embraced as

requirement that
critics of

laws.

it

be articulated or explained

Newton's theory such

These

scientific

as

Huygens

in

which

intelligible in itself,

much

and

later,

that

abstract,

without the

mechanical terms. 233 Yet no one

- even

- denied the great unifying power of Newton's

judgments are inconsistent with

Kitcher's

account of explanation.

Kitcher has also cited Darwin's theory of natural selection as an
example of a theory

whose

potential unifying

power was widely recognized

worried, remarks Kitcher, that

complained

that

studies have

emphasized the

its

(Kitcher, 1981).

explanatory scope was too great:

any conclusion could be adapted

to

its

premises.

1

920s and

1

930s.

234

Indeed,

turn of the century declared natural selection to be

6.8

But recent historical

phenomena:

generally agreed that natural selection was not widely accepted

initially failed as

scientists

great reluctance of scientists to accept Darwin's theory of

natural selection as an explanation of adaptations or of other

evolutionary synthesis of the

some

Indeed, scientists

an explanation, despite

its

dead

it

is

now

until the so-called

some commentators around

as a theory.

the

Darwin's theory thus

great unifying power.

Explanatory Controversy and the Causal Theory of Explanation
Positivist theories of explanation thus

explanatory controversy.

Once

fail

to

account

the laws, explanatory paradigms or patterns, or intentions of

questioners are settled, positivist theories cannot say

continue, though

it

often does.

for a variety of aspects of

From the other

why

explanatory controversy should

side, positivist theories

cannot say

why

explanatory controversies should be resolved through the introduction of small amounts of
empirical evidence acquired under the highly specialized conditions of an experimental

setup, especially

when

the evidence supports belief
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in

the existence of novel entities,

properties, or processes. These problems,

and

others,

came

out clearly

in

our discussion of

the controversies over IQ and cosmic radiation.
In

comparison

to positivist theories, the causal theory of explanation
illuminates the

historical cases with ease.

accept the validity of the

They
test

In

the controversy over race and IQ, both Jensen and
Lewontin

statistical

correlations

between race and IQ

test

performance.

strongly disagree, however, about the nature of the causal process
that determines IQ

performance, as well as the connection between IQ and race.

genetic, social, or environmental?

factors are

all

in

parties agree that genetic, social,

relative causal

on the programmatic conclusions

knowledge

the

mechanism
and environmental

the intellectual development and resulting IQ-test performance of

They disagree about the

individuals.

as well as

operative

The

Is

of the causal mechanisms.

should have continued, although the

importance of these

that should

factors,

however,

be drawn from our limited

The causal theory thus explains why the controversy

statistical

correlations are

assumed

to

be

incontrovertible.

The causal theory can

also account for the quick

and decisive resolution of the

controversy about penetrating cosmic radiation. The controversy was resolved, remember,

by the postulation of

a

new

particle, the

mu-meson, which was supported by

cloud chamber experiments performed by Anderson
causal theory, Anderson et

a/.'s

in

The

From the perspective

of the

experiments were successful because they were carefully

designed so that specific causal capacities of the
operation

et a/.

a series of

new

particles

could be observed

in

the cloud chamber.

fact that the

controversy was resolved neither through the establishment of a

regularity, nor a discovery that

fit

pre-established explanatory patterns or paradigms, does

not trouble the causal theory. Scientists go looking for causal explanations by analyzing
causal processes into components, isolating these components
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in

the controlled conditions

of an experiment,

and observing the

explanation, causal capacities

in

resulting behavior.

According

operation can be observed directly

to the causal theory of

in

single cases, without

the assumption of prior explanatory laws, patterns, or
paradigms that describe the causes.

Once

the operation of a cause can be convincingly isolated and
observed

scientist

assume

can confidently attribute the associated causal capacity
that the capacity will

what Anderson
their

be carried

et a/, did in their

in

the lab, the

to the entity observed,

to other situations outside the lab as well.

cloud chamber experiments. They were able to

and

This

is

isolate, in

cloud chambers, a particle exhibiting great penetrating and light-ionizing behavior,

and were able
proton.

to infer

from

their data that the particle

Furthermore, they were able to measure the

precision,

and

attribute this

was responsible

for the

mass

to the

new

particle.

could be neither an electron nor

new

particle's

Finally,

mass with some

they inferred that

behavior of some cosmic radiation outside the

lab,

this particle

again because

they were able to rule out alternative potential causes. The causal theory thus explains
quite nicely the resolution engendered by Anderson et
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a/.'s

experiments.

NOTES

The

focus of this paper is the understanding and explanation of natural
phenomena. It is
clear that other kinds of understanding are important to science.
Some examples include:
understanding a theory, an experimental technique, or a theoretical deduction.
It is equally
obvious that these types of understanding are associated with respective kinds of
1

.

explanation (e.g., explaining a technique, a theory, etc.). In this paper, am
not concerned
with these other kinds of understanding and explanation, nor do think there is reason
to
believe that a theory of scientific explanation must include them within its scope.
I

I

2. All

biconditionals and equations, for example, are logically symmetrical.

3. The ongoing debate about the origins of intelligence is such a controversy. A good
example of the latter is the theory of inheritance: debates about the nature and mechanism
of inheritance, which had endured for centuries, were resolved in decisive stages between
885 and the 950s.
1

1

4.

See

5.

This

Hume
is

739) and

(1

748).

not to say that the terrain

What we have

centuries.
details of

(1

which

will

seen,

in

philosophy of science has not changed over two

in fact,

is

a very gradual turning

away from Hume,

the

be rehearsed below.

6. Other requirements, of course, may have to be met; for example, neo-positivists often
add conditions designed to capture explanatory asymmetries.
Neo-positivist accounts of explanation include Hempel's Covering-Law model,
Salmon's S-R model, and Friedman's and Kitcher's unificationist theories.

Cartwright (1989) and (1992). Cartwright views her ideas about causal knowledge to be

7.

a development,

My

in

some

respects, of the Aristotelian conception of science

(1

992).

and others has a further consequence that wish to
Although the causal theory defend was inspired by Aristotle's
theory of explanation, the theory is not Aristotelian, for it relies on modern developments in
the theory of science, including Cartwright's account of causal knowledge. The differences
8.

intellectual debts to Cartwright

emphasize

I

at this point.

I

between the causal theory

I

defend and

Aristotle's

views are discussed

in detail in

section

4.2.4.

9.

The

to

be of

historical
interest,

survey to follow should not be presumed to be complete. Though think
what follows is, at this point, only the bare beginnings of a plausible

historical story for

1

0.

This

is

1

1

2.

.

which

I

have gathered some evidence.

an altered version of

positivism (1983,

1

I

Ian

Hacking's description of the

41ff.).

See Wolff (1960) on Hume's theory of mental propensities.

Some evidence

for this will

be presented

in
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Chapter V.

six

key ideas underlying

it

Mach (1883/1976,

13.

Cf.

14.

See Mach (1883/1976,

457ff.).

458ff.).

These are not the only pragmatic virtues of theories. Mach argues, for
example, that
theories are tailored to the interests of scientists, i.e., theories are always
an abstraction of
those aspects of the facts of interest to us, and an abstraction from those
that are not.
1

5.

1

6.

These two philosophers deserve

the six doctrines of

Humean

to

Humean

be called

positivism listed above;

in

because they accepted

positivists

addition, they hold a conception of

theories similar to that just described.

Duhem

1

7.

See

1

8.

This proposal

(1914/1954), especially chapter

— that one goal

of explanation

1

is

to achieve a stable, unified conception

of nature — has been pursued at length by Friedman

(1974) and Kitcher (1976, 1981, and

1989).
19.

Here

I

follow Ayer's remarks

in

the introduction to Ayer (1959,

20. See, for example, Schlick (1930/31), reprinted

introduction to the

21

.

My discussion

in

1

0ff.).

Ayer (1959), pp. 53-59, and Ayer's

same volume.
of the logical positivist criterion of significance follows those of

Ayer

Hempel

959, 108ff.)and Scheffler (1 961 133ff.)
should be noted that use the term, "proposition," loosely and interchangeably

(1950), reprinted
It

in

(1

,

I

with "statement," "sentence,"

etc.

"Proposition" thus implies nothing about the significance

of the statement.

Hempel

22. See

(1950), reprinted

in

Ayer (1959).

My citations

are from the reprint

in

Ayer

(1959).

23.

The same

24.

Hempel and Oppenheim

Hospers

(1

criticism applies to a requirement of

946), and

also cite Mill, Jevons

complete
(1

falsifiability.

924), Ducasse (1925), Hull (1943),

Feigl (1945) as important predecessors to the

view of explanation they

develop.
Karl

Popper was perhaps the first neo-positivist to pursue a theory of explanation as
Not surprisingly, he also promoted the view that the significance of

theoretical treatment.

theories transcends that of observation.

Popper,

Humean

like

many

philosophers

who were

to follow him, refused to

prohibition against causes and causal explanation

in

science.

accept the

Unlike

many

subsequent philosophers of science, however, he did not believe that causation could be
reduced to laws of regular association, nor did he believe that causal explanation in science
could be reduced to theoretical treatment (Popper, 1934/1959, 61). Nonetheless, he
accounts

for explanation in

To give

terms of theoretical treatment:

deduce a statement which
the deduction one or more universal laws,

a causal explanation of an event

means

to

it, using as premises of
certain singular statements, the initial conditions. For
with
together
example, we can say that we have given a causal explanation of the
breaking of a certain piece of thread if we have found that the thread has a

describes
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tensile strength of

analyze
the

and

lb.

1

this causal

that a

explanation

one hand there

is

weight of 2

we

was put on

lbs.

it.

If

we

shall find several constituent parts.

the hypothesis:

'Whenever

a thread

On

loaded with a

is

weight exceeding that which characterizes the tensile strength
of the thread,
it will break'; a statement
which has the character of a universal law of
nature. On the other hand we have singular statements
(in this case two)
which apply only to the specific event in question: 'The weight
then

characteristic for this thread

2

is

1

and

lb.'

The weight put on

this

thread

was

lbs.'.

We

have thus two different kinds of statements, both of which are
necessary ingredients of a complete causal explanation. They are
(1)
universal statements i.e., hypotheses of the character of natural laws,
and
,

(2)

singular statements, which apply to the specific event

which

I

shall call

conjunction with

initial

conditions'.

It

conditions that

initial

This thread will break'.

We call

is

in

question and

from universal statements

we deduce

in

the singular statement,

statement a specific or singular

this

prediction (1934/1959, 59-60).
It is this view of explanation that Hempel later
developed and clarified, and although
Popper was perhaps first to characterize explanation as deduction from general laws

combined with antecedent

particular facts, it is Hempel's formulation of this view that has
dominated subsequent discussions of explanation. For this reason, Hempel's account — the
Covering-Law Model of explanation — is the focus of our discussion.

25.

Hempel and Oppenheim 1948,

p.136.

Hempel and Oppenheim 948. The authors formulate these conditions in the logically
more rigorous terms of a model formal language, but we will stick to the their informal

26.

1

account.
27.

Hempel and Oppenheim concede

that the concept of a "purely qualitative" predicate
mention as a constraint on the formulation of laws serves merely as a reminder
problems developed by Goodman (1983, especially pp.72ff.) must be dealt with to

vague.
that

achieve a satisfactory account. Roughly, Hempel and Oppenheim wish
of predicates, e.g., "grue" (the
t),

that

is

Its

do not pick out

meaning

of

which

is "is

to rule out the use

green before time

t

and

is

blue

after

natural kinds.

Hempel

28. See "Aspects of scientific explanation"

in

model" as an umbrella term covering

Hempel's models, including

all

of

(1

965).

I

use the

name "covering-law
the D-N and l-S

models.
29. Criticism of the

D-N and

l-S

models

of explanation can

be found

in

many

places;

some

more important sources are Scriven (1 958, 962, 975); Eberle, Kaplan, and
Montague (1961); Scheffler (1961); Bromberger (1966); Salmon (1971); and Cartwright
(1983). What follows makes use of these sources and others.

of the

30.

The problem they consider

1

is

that raised

by
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1

Goodman

1

954/1983.

Or one may
from a

see the problem of relevance as being a problem of selecting the
relevant law

set of lawlike suitors.

32. This criticism has been pursued by Scriven (1962, 1975) and Cartwright
(1980, 1981).

33. This
If

is true of causal laws,
will argue below, only if causal laws are read as regularities.
causal laws are read as capacity ascriptions, on the other hand, they can be
accepted as
I

true.

example

34. This
35.

I

is

taken from Cartwright (1992).

use the term "narrative explanations"

which the fact-to-be-explained

is

in a broad sense: it refers to any explanation in
not inferred from the explanatory information provided.

36. Later will argue that laws like (P) are best understood as capacity ascriptions, as which
they can be taken to be true. Capacity ascriptions do not provide premises, however, from
I

which one can deduce the occurrences

of actual events, as the

Covering-Law Model

requires.

Thus, although reading laws as capacity ascriptions

will

scientific

laws as being true,

the deductive requirement of

Model

the Covering-Law
37.

be of no help

will

it

in satisfying

allow one to certify

of explanation.

Examples have been discussed by Scriven,

Jeffrey (1969),

van Fraassen (1980), and

Salmon (1984).
38.

Hempel develops

explanations
39. See

in

Hempel

his distinction

between D-N explanations and

"Aspects of scientific explanation"

(1

965), 41

be distinguished from

2ff.

Hempel

i.e., in

statistical (l-S)

(1965).

of explanation treated as being incomplete are to

inductive-statistical explanations,

which, while also being non-

on statistical premises describing events of an
which no amount of added information will allow one

deductive, are so because they

indeterminate nature,

The kinds

in

rest

to

deduce the explanandum.

Kim (1 963) argues that the difficulties presented by Eberle et a/, can be avoided by
placing restrictions on the accessory conditions (C) allowed as premises in the deduction of

40.

the

explanandum from

41

Troublesome counterexamples can be generated without end. Consider the following

.

laws.

three testable, true laws:
(1)

the Pythagorean Theorem;

(2) all

men who

(3) all

emeralds are green.

take birth control

These laws can be employed

pills fail to

to derive (to "explain,"

get pregnant;

according to the Covering-Law Model)

the following claims:
(1

')

(2')
(3')

The distance between

the earth and the sun

is

93 million miles.

Jim failed to get pregnant.
This emerald is green.

obvious that the deductive arguments imagined here cannot be accepted as
Model.
explanatory, although they would satisfy the requirements of the Covering-Law
It

is

42.

The example

is

taken from Barnes (1992).
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The example discussed by Hempel
period (Hempel, 1965, 352).

43.
its

44.

In

that of the derivation of a

pendulum's length from

am suspicious of those who wish to draw a sharp distinction between
and everyday understanding: the contrast between the two domains of

addition,

scientific

is

I

understanding

lies

sophistication,

and most importantly, the mathematical and technological

not

in

explanatory approach,

I

submit, but

differences in precision,

in

tools brought to

bear on the problems.
45. Darwin (1962), p.476, quoted
46.

In

In

role,

it

Thagard (1978).

general, an inference to the best explanation refers to an inference from the

explanatory power of the theory to
47.

in

its

truth.

considering historical examples

in which considerations of unification seem to play a
important to distinguish three sorts of appeals to unifying power:

is

(1)

potential unification as an impetus of theory construction: the promise of

power can lead scientists to construct theories of a certain type; e.g., the
success of Newtonian mechanics led scientists in many fields to pursue mechanicalcorpuscular theories of all kinds of phenomena;
(2) unifying power as criterion of theory acceptance; this is one sort of appeal made
unifying

by Darwin
(3)
(3) is

48.

in

unifying

the passage above; and

power

as criterion of the explanatory

our only genuine concern

Van

Fraassen's theory

discussed

in

is

in this

discussed

power

of a theory.

paper.

in

the next section of this paper, and will not be

connection with Kitcher's account.

49. See Kitcher (1976).

The "essence

of scientific explanation," according Friedman,

science increases our understanding of the world by reducing the

number
given.

is

that

total

phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or
world with fewer independent phenomena is, other things equal,

of independent

A

more comprehensible than one with more (1974, 5).
As an example of a unifying theory, Friedman offers the kinetic theory of gases:
Where we once had three independent brute facts-that gases approximately
obey the Boyle-Charles law, that they obey Graham's law, and that they
1

have the specific-heat capacities they do-we now have only one-that
molecules obey the laws of mechanics. Furthermore, the kinetic theory of
gases allows us to integrate the behavior of gases with other phenomena,
such as the motions of the planets and of falling bodies near the
earth. ..because the laws of

that planets

mechanics also permit us

obey Kepler's laws and the

to derive

fact that falling

both the

fact

bodies obey Galileo's

laws (14-1 5).

At the center of Friedman's account is the idea that explanatory laws "reduce the number of
independent phenomena." Friedman conceives this reduction as the logical reduction of a
set of lawlike

sentences by another, smaller

set of laws.

50. Kitcher's emphasis on seeing familiar patterns

in

reminiscent of the view of Ernst Mach, cited above.
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previously unfamiliar

phenomena

is

5

Kitcher

989, 434). Kitcher cites two other properties required for the best
First, the derivation patterns of E(K) must
be acceptable relative to K: every
premise of every derivation must be a member of K, and each
derivation must be
deductively valid. Second, E(K) must be complete with respect to
K: every derivation that is
acceptable relative to K and which instantiates a pattern in E(K), must
be contained in the
set D of derivations produced by E(K). The importance
of this condition, says Kitcher,
is to debar explanatory deviants who
use patterns selectively. If someone claims
that an argument instantiating a particular pattern explains why
Mars
1

.

(1

systematization.

,

follows the

trajectory

it

does, admits that there

pattern that will yield as

its

an acceptable derivation instantiating the same
conclusion a description of the trajectory of Venus, but
is

refuses to allow the latter derivation as explanatory, then. ..that person has
incoherent vies about explanation" (Kitcher, 1989, 434).

The

feasibility of this condition

On

Kitcher's rules, see below.

depends, of course, on the rules

for instantiating patterns.

Kitcher concluded from this that no fewer laws appear in Newtonian explanantia than
explananda. Hence, explanantia do not reduce the number of laws appearing in
explananda, contra Friedman.
52.
in

53.

Kuhn

(1 970), pp. 43-51
187-191. Where Kuhn discusses the schematic character of
laws such as Newton's second law, and the process by which young scientists
to understand the scientific theories they are taught, his fundamental thrust belies the
,

scientific

come

conception of
variables.

achievement

and complete rules for replacing dummy
adequate understanding of some theoretical

filling instructions as explicit

Kuhn argues

that acquiring an

do with learning any set of rules. Rather, students are
forced to struggle to solve a series of related problems. Through such exercises, a student,
with our without the help of an instructor, comes to see a variety of situations as being
in

science has

similar in certain respects.

little

to

Once he

or she has grasped the similarities, he or she

is

then

able to relate, as do scientists

in his or her field, the symbols of the scientific theory to
and thus apply the theory to solve problems. This kind of learning, argues Kuhn, is
not achievable by verbal means, e.g., by learning rules. Moreover, the knowledge acquired

nature,

through

this

process always remains partly

tacit;

it

cannot,

in

other words, be fully

articulated.

A

look above at the Darwinian explanatory scheme

illustrates this point.

the filling

instruction, "replace... E with a characterization of the environment

members

of

C*

lived."

Imagine

how one

in

Consider

which

might write a rule that dictates the content of

characterizations of the environment. Every environment exhibits an indefinite

number

of

properties, only a subset of which are relevant to any given organism; moreover, the subsets
of relevant environmental properties obviously differ for distinct populations of organisms.
Clearly, a set of rules for characterizing the environments of ancestral organisms cannot be
written. Just as obviously, biologists

do describe

the relevant properties of environments

How

do they acquire the
ability to do this? The manner of acquisition described by Kuhn seems feasible: through an
extended process of professional training, which includes learning about specific kinds of
habitats (which requires time in the field) and how to apply ecological theory to exemplary

when

constructing adaptation (natural selection) explanations.

the ecology of organisms (especially the ecology of those organisms of special
interest to the biologist), the biologist acquires an understanding of the aspects of
environments that are relevant to the development and reproductive success of various

problems

in

organisms. This understanding of environments is knowledge that is not fully articulated by
any set of rules: when one goes into the field to study the environment of some group of
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organisms, there is no complete and explicit set of rules that may
be applied to determine
which aspects of the environment are relevant. Kuhn's point is thus
not simply that no
young scientist, as a matter of fact, comes to understand a theory by learning

any

explicit rules for applying a theoretical

knowledge acquired by the student

that the

such

scheme

of explanation.

His conclusion

set of

deeper:
not constituted, nor fully described, by any

is

is

set of explicit rules.

Perhaps this is the reason for Kitcher's deductive chauvinism, i.e., he believes
that
counting can be done only if the patterns are deductively valid. But it seems to
54.

me

non-deductive classifications would allow one
55. Separately,

count consequences

one might ask whether complete and

formulated. See note
56.

to

that

just as easily.

explicit filling instructions

can ever be

9.

Kitcher offers the following formal criteria with which to judge the comparative
power of sets of explanatory patterns:

unifying

U' be

(C) Let U,

to K.

U

Then

conditions

is

sets of patterns,

and

has greater unifying

S, S'

their

complete instantiations with respect
if one (or both) of the following

power than U'

met:

(Cl) The consequence set of S', C(S') is a subset of the consequence set of S, C(S),
and there is a one-to-one mapping f from S to S' such that for each pattern p in S, p
is at least as stringent as f(p), and such that either f is an injection or f is a
surjection and there is at least one pattern p in S such that p is more stringent than
f(p).

(C2) C(S')

is

a proper subset of C(S) and there

(injection or surjection) such that for

each p

is

a one-one

in S,

p

is

map

f

from S to

S'

at least as stringent as f(p)

(p.478).

The consequence
that the

U

set of S

is

the set of conclusions of

has greater unifying

power than U'

if:

(i)

all

instantiations in S (434).

U s consequence
'

in

U

U';

and

(iii)

the explanatory patterns

in

U

are

(J';

and

(iii)

the explanatory patterns

in

U

are as stringent as those

set

is

(Cl) says

at least as large;

less than or equal to the number of patterns in
more stringent than those in U'. (C2) says that
U has greater unifying power than U' if (i) U's consequence set is larger than that of U'; (ii)
the number of explanatory patterns in U is less than or equal to the number of patterns in
(ii)

57.

the

number

of explanatory patterns

The formal version

is

in U'.

of the these conditions are as follows:

<s,/> be a pair whose first member is a schematic sentence and
whose second member is a complete filling instruction for that sentence,
and let <s',/'> be another such pair. Suppose that s and s' have a common
logical form. Let g be the mapping that takes each nonlogical expression (or
(T)

Let

schematic

letter) is s to

corresponding place

the nonlogical expression (or schematic

in s'.

For any schematic

tighter than <s',/’> with respect to

instances that

instances that

/

/'

allows for
allows for

t is

t

just in

letter

t

occurring

letter) in

in s,

case the set of substitution

a proper subset of the set of substitution

g(t);

<s,i>

is
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at least as tight as

<s

,/

>

the

<s,/>

with

is

respect to t just in case the set of substitution instances that
allows for t is a
subset of the set of substitution instances that /' allows for g(t).
<s,i> is
tighter than <s ,/ > just in case (i) for every schematic
letter occurring in s,
/

<s,i>
there

is

<s,i>
in s

at least as tight as

is

at least

occurring
satisfied,

<s

tighter than

is

such that

<s',/'> with respect to that schematic letter,
letter occurring in s with respect to which

(ii)

one schematic

g(e)

,/

>

or there

a schematic

is

in s, g(t) is

and

letter,

a schematic letter.

then <s,/>

is

a nonlogical expression e occurring

is

If

at least as tight as

(iii) for every schematic letter
only conditions (i) and (ii) are

t

<s’,/'>.

Let p, p'

be general arguments patterns sharing the same
classification. Let <p ,...,p„> and <p' ...,p' > be the sequence of
n
schematic sentences and filling instructions belonging to and p',
p
;/

)

respectively.

Then p is more stringent than p' if for each / (1 <_ j <_
p \ and there is a k such that p k is tighter than p\

n),

p

is
(

at least as tight as

(R) Let p, p' be general argument patterns such that the sequence of
schematic sentences and filling instructions of p is <p„...,p > and the
n

sequence of schematic sentences and filling instructions of p' is
<p„...,p q ,...,q v p r+ „....,p n >. Suppose that the classifications differ only in
that for p one or more of the p
is to be obtained from previous members of
r+i
the sequence by derivations involving some further principles of a general
r/

(

kind, C, while for p' that (or those)
earlier

members

p r+l

are to be obtained from the

of the sequence and from

same

some

of the q k by specified
further that in each case of difference the set

Suppose
of subderivations allowed by p' is a subset of the set of subderivations
allowed by p, and that in at least one case the relation is that of proper
inclusion. Then p' is more stringent than p (479-480).
inferential transitions.

58. These concerns are discussed
reprint of this article in

Pitt

1

in

Kitcher 1981, §8.

Page references are taken from the

988.

is analogous to that mentioned by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948,
and discussed by Friedman (1974, 16ff.).

59. This problem
n.28),

60.

For an important discussion of this tendency

Gould and Lewontin
61

.

among contemporary

1

59,

biologists, see

(1984).

Having viewed the basics of

Kitcher's account, those familiar with

Hempel's or

Kitcher's theory could not be equally well

Friedman's theories of explanation might ask if
constructed with reference to laws rather than to patterns of explanation. The explanatory
store could thus be said to consist of the basic scientific laws used in explanation, and
Kitcher's criteria for unifying power could be applied to judge the acceptability of laws for
use

in

would be based on the paucity and stringency
consequence sets. This approach would be much like

the explanatory store: acceptability

laws and the wealth of their
Friedman's (1974), but Friedman's

criteria of

of

reduction-that the unifying set of laws

contains fewer laws than the unified set-would be replaced by the criteria of paucity and
stringency of patterns and wealth of consequences. Since Kitcher defends deductive

chauvinism, it is not clear what patterns add to the picture anyway: beyond its classification
which appears to be redundant because all patterns are held by Kitcher to be deductive
schematic laws of
a pattern consists only of the schematic statements of the pattern, e.g.,

—
—
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and their filling instructions. So why bother with explanatory
patterns?
Kitcher believes simply that the explanatory patterns, and
not the laws,
associated with a scientific theory are the correct loci of the reduction
that constitutes the
unifying power of theories (1976, 212). In addition, Kitcher is
looking ahead to dealing
with some philosophical difficulties, among them the problem of
asymmetries of
explanation. The problem of asymmetries of explanation is a special form
of the problem of
explanatory relevance, and results from the symmetrical (e.g., biconditional) form
of many
laws. FHempel noted, for example, that according to the general theory of
relativity, galaxies
are receding from us if and only if their spectra exhibit a shift into the red part
of the

different kinds,
First,

spectrum.

such cases, each side of the symmetrical law may be derived from the other,
yet the explanatory relation goes, so to speak, only in one direction. Kitcher hopes his
In

conception of explanatory patterns will be able to account for such asymmetries: although
deductive logic allows, in the case of symmetrical laws, derivations in either direction,
Kitcher's explanatory patterns serve to limit the explanatory relation to

Explanatory patterns thus function to

example

62. This

many

discussed
63.

We

relations of explanatory

a version of the flagpole

is

example

cited

one direction only.
dependence.

by Bromberger

(1

966), and

times over by numerous philosophers.

must extrapolate from

which the

fix

(T*)

and

(R*)

because they hold only under conditions

compared patterns are
these conditions would hold in

classifications of

clear that either of

(R*) suggest that stringency

identical or nearly identical.

the present case.

a function of the size of the

is

number

It

is

in

not

Nonetheless, (T*) and

of substitution instances

of a pattern.

64.

I

am

which

here assuming the idealization that the tower stands perpendicular to the ground,

cotangent

0

may be applied, depending upon the information
employing the equation (if remember correctly)

Obviously, other patterns

is flat.

available, e.g., a trigonometric pattern

= O/A where
,

0

the tower at the ground at the

is

I

the angle of incidence of the rays of light from the top of

tip of

the shadow,

O

is

the height of the tower, and

A

is

the

length of the shadow.
67.
65. This point will be treated

in detail in

the chapter on explanatory controversy.

66. Such a dispositional predicate might look something like

this: "t is

the right triangle

were illuminated,
was
length
z from the top of
which
y,
measuring grid
on
microscopic
placed
a
cell
were
circular
or
if
any
the illuminated surface;
lengths y and z
lines
of
in such a way that its diameter of length x forms a right triangle with
on the grid; or if a mammalian intestine of length x were straightened and pinned adjacent
to two measuring sticks, forming a right triangle with sides of length y and z, etc."

formed:

if

any

solid straight linear surface (e.g., a tower) of length x

casting a perpendicular

shadow

of length

the tip of

Kitcher (1989, 412). Concerning the projectibility of predicates, Kitcher says, the
challenge is to distinguish laws from mere accidental generalizations, not

only by showing

how

to characterize the notion of a projectible predicate

(and thus answer the questions raised by Goodman's seminal 1 956) but also
by diagnosing the feature that renders pathological some statements

containing only predicates that are intuitively projectible
emerald has a mass greater than 1000 kg.").
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(for

example, "No

68. Kitcher recognizes this problem to
least,

includes
the

some extent. He recognizes similar problems, at
arise in cases of theoretical change. Theoretical
change, he concedes,

which

theories with greater explanatory power,

shifts to

community

989, 488).

may

force linguistic

which
change on

cases of potential theoretical change, therefore,
appeals to
(e.g., the projectibi ity of predicates) will be
unavailable when
competing candidates are compared for admission to the explanatory store.
Kitcher thus
worries that his theory will be unable to avoid problems of explanatory
relevance in these

accepted

cases.

(1

In

usage

linguistic

I

Regarding such cases, he says:
If we alter our language so as to change
judgments about projectability, then
we must respond to any existing arguments against the projectability of

new language

predicates that the

Consider the

gerrymandering a new "pattern" by disjoining
be disconnected predicates of L and suppose that L'
language] proposes to treat "/\x v Bx" as a projectable predicate.

predicates.

new

[the

Suppose

Let A, B,

that C,

D

are predicates such that "(x)(Ax

are generalizations accepted both
beliefs],

Now

and such

take

I

takes to be projectable...

trick of

it

in

K and

that C, D, like A, B, are

^

and ”(x)(Bx j Dx)"
and new sets of

Cx)"

K' [the old

disconnected predicates of L.
"Ax v fix" is not a

that part of the reason for thinking that

is that one could not confirm the generalization
(Cx v Dx))” by observing a sample consisting of instances of
that are also instances of C. To make the proposed transition from L to L\

projectable predicate
”(x)((Ax v Bx)

A

not sufficient simply to declare that "Ax v

is

it

One

projectable predicate.

will also

have

Any such answer

past inferential practice.

modifications of views about confirmation

widespread changes
in

in

(i)

If

in this

3 (Cx

K

believe, involve the

way

— K' will

as to yield

have

to differ
fall

from K

afoul of the

to K' (492-3).

fix"

is

projectible, then

Aa & Ca confirms

the generalization

v Dx));

Current confirmatory practice says that

(ii)

I

such a

paragraph seems to be as follows:

the predicate "Ax v

(x)(Ax v Bx)

in

to

— and some of the proposed changes will

systematic ways

argument

will,

the corpus of beliefs

proviso governing the modification of
Kitcher's

to

now

be counted as a
answer arguments based on
fix" is

Aa & Ca does

not confirm (x)(Ax v Bx)

=>

(Cx v Dx)).
(iii)

in

Therefore, asserting the projectibility of "Ax v

fix"

would

entail certain

changes

confirmatory practice.

These changes in confirmatory practice would entail widespread and
unacceptable changes in the corpus of beliefs.
confess that do not know what to make of this argument. For one, cannot conceive of
what grounds could be offered in support of (ii) that are independent of the presumed
(iv)

I

I

I

unprojectibility of

Ax

v

fix.

69. Barnes' presentation

is

not consistent with Kitcher's account. For example, he speaks of

power of the Predictive and Retrodictive Patterns. On Kitcher's view,
however, unifying power is a property of sets of patterns over K, not of individual patterns.

the identical unifying

Therefore,

my

presentation

is

slightly different than Barnes'.

Such derivations, however, were not always considered
Mischel (1966), Finocchiaro (1980), and below.
70.
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to

be explanatory. See

71

.

If

necessary, imagine

we

are speaking of the E(K) prior to the acceptance of the
theories

of relativity.

72.

Kitcher points out that making explanatory

dependency primary allows one to
notions of explanatory dependence in mathematics and formal sciences,
which he discusses at some length (422-425), as well as notions of causal dependence.
He
views this as an advantage v/s-a-v/s causal theories of explanation e theories in which

accommodate

(

i

.

.

relations of causal

dependence

unable to account

for

73.

Here

it

explanatory relations

should be noted that even

necessarily unidirectional

been accepted by most

if

mathematics and formal sciences.

in

one

is

inclined to reject the claim that causality

time, this argument

in

,

are primary) because causal theories of explanation are

physicists

who

unaffected.

is

is

For causal asymmetry has

have employed Newton's laws since the

1

7th

century.
74. Authors include Scriven (1962, 1975), Mischel (1966), Bromberger (1966), van
Fraassen (1980), Gardenfors (1980), Tuomela (1980), Achinstein (1983), Sintonen (1989).

This

list is

by no means complete.

75. See especially Scriven (1962) and (1975).
intend here only to survey some of the
ideas presented by Scriven, and not to claim that Scriven's views of 1962 are identical with
I

those of
76.

1

975.

Van Fraassen (1980,

1

2).

Further development appears

He develops
in

his account of explanation on pp. 97-1 57.
van Fraassen (1983), where he discusses explanation and

theory acceptability.
77. Because have not had access to Hannson's original paper, my discussion here
on the discussions of van Fraassen (1980, 27-8) and Stegmuller (1983, 950ff.).
I

relies

1

78.

The importance
Question:

and contrastive force can be seen

of focus

"Why do

in

the following old joke:

firemen wear red suspenders?"

Answer: "To hold up

their pants."

develop the theory of explanation independently from the
theory of why-questions, one faces an analogous problem: explanations must respect the
emphasis and contrastive force of explananda.
79. Again,

80.

if

Hannson

one wishes

to

calls these "reference classes," but

("contrast classes") to distinguish clearly

81.

In

why

use van Fraassen's terminology

will

between contrast

addition to a theory of why-questions,

explanation: an explanation shows

I

the

Hannson

member

classes

offers a

and relevance

relations.

complementary theory

of

of the contrast class that underlies the

explanandum) is to be favored over the alternative members of the
contrast class. "Favoring" is conceived by Hannson in probabilistic terms: the explanandum
probability is higher than the average
is favored if, given the answer (explanation), its
why-question

(the

probability of the

members

of the contrast class.

Van

Fraassen

(1

980,

1

28f.)

shows,

however, that this proposal runs into the same problems of relevance exhibited by
Hempel's models of explanation.
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82. Cf. Bromberger
83. This

melanism
84.

is

(1

966).

the contrast class suggested by Kettlewell's (1955,
1956) famous studies of

in

moths.

Van Fraassen (1980,

129).

85. Van Fraassen's theory can be cast directly as a theory of explanation
rather than as a
theory of why-questions. An explanation would thus be characterized as a
three-tuple

< P,C,R > where P
,

is

the explanandum,

need of explanation; C

is

the statement presumed to be true and

i.e.,

the contrast class {P,-iQ,-i5,...}; and R

is

in

the appropriate

relevance relation. For example, P, the explanandum, might be, "These moths have
melanic coloring," where the contrast class, C, is {These moths have melanic coloring,

These moths do not have pale coloring}, and the relevance relation, R, is "evolutionary."
mention this because it is doubtful that all explanations (or answers) are, or may be
construed as, answers to why-questions. For example, one can explain how the human
circulatory system works without answering any why-question. One might therefore infer
that van Fraassen's theory is of no use in elucidating explanations that are not answers to
why-questions.
believe this would be incorrect.
I

I

Van Fraassen (1980, 1 43). Van Fraassen's theory of why-questions is not all there is to
theory of explanation. He also provides criteria for selecting the best answer once the
topic, contrast class, and relevance relation of the why-question are settled. Given the
86.
his

and relevance

topic, contrast class,

also

tell us,

says van Fraassen,

relation of a why-question, a theory of explanation

how answers

must

are to be evaluated as telling, good, or better,

especially with respect to other potential answers to the

same question. Assuming

that

potential answers A, A', A",... bear the correct relevance relation to topic 6, van Fraassen

suggests three further types of evaluation.

First,

likelihood that each of the potential answers

we

rule out

Because

A

altogether

is

one must evaluate and compare the
true:

K [background knowledge] implies the
K bestows on A. Later we
which K bestows on the cores of other
if

denial of A; and otherwise ask what probability

compare

this

with the probability

possible answers.

This type of evaluation does not rule out explanatory propositions with low

Once

theoretical probability.

indicating that the event has occurred

bestow a high probability on A
Since a proposition that

is

initial

an unlikely event has already occurred, the evidence

may be overwhelming.

In

such a case, K would

(the proposition describing the initially unlikely event).

likely to

be

false

is

a

weak candidate

for

an explanation,

this

preference for propositions whose truth is best supported by the evidence is justified.
Second, one must judge the extent to which each of the potential answers favors the
Favoring is the idea underlying
criterion of statistical relevance: a
Salmon's
Hempel's criterion of grounds for believing and
good answer, A, shows that B was to be expected, and that the other members of the

topic B against the other

members

contrast class, <B,C,...,N>,
Third,

made

It

not.

which the each of the potential answers
by being screened-off by others.

one must evaluate the degree

irrelevant

None

were

of the contrast class.

by other answers,

of these

is

i.e.,

to

decisive, says van Fraassen.

should be clear that these (epistemic)

criteria

231

provide no help

in

solving our

is

remaining philosophical problems of explanation, e.g., the problems
of relevance. For
example, van Fraassen's own criticism of Hempel's models and of
Hannson's conception of
favoring-that they cannot handle problems of relevance and
asymmetries of explanationhold equally against

One problem

87.

his criteria of favoring.

that the theory handles, but

requests for explanation.
theory,

if

one or more

which

Requests for explanation

I

will not discuss,

may be

rejected,

of the presuppositions of the question

aspect of the theory because

is

endemic

is

false.

is

the rejection of

on van Fraassen's
I

will not discuss this

to the theory of questions in general,

and not just
not just why-questions, have presuppositions, the rejection
of which can lead to the rejection of the question. This part of van Fraassen's theory
is
therefore of little importance to scientific explanation.

to why-questions.

Van
relevance.

it

All questions,

how one might treat some cases of explanatory
own examples is the case of the unlucky mayor who has

Fraassen's theory also suggests

One

of van Fraassen's

contracted paresis, which

is supposed to appear only in a small percentage of persons with
Besides untreated syphilis, no other contributing factor is known.
Because only a small percentage of those who have untreated syphilis contract paresis, the

untreated syphilis.

fact that the

mayor has untreated

does not allow one to deduce, or to confer high
paresis. According to Hempel's D-N and
l-S models of explanation, therefore, the mayor's untreated syphilis cannot explain the
mayor's paresis.
syphilis

probability on, the conclusion that the

Yet

it

would seem

that

mayor has

such an explanation

is

not always implausible (Scriven),

though a certain tension is evident. Van Fraassen's theory of why-questions suggests how
one might account for this intuition. One must simply consider the contrast class of the
why-question.

If,

for

example, the question being asked

in

the particular context

is,

"Why

did the mayor, and not the other townspeople, contract paresis?", then the answer,

"Because he had untreated
if

the question

is,

"Why

syphilis," presents a satisfying explanation.

did the mayor, and not other syphilics

in

On

the other hand,

the state, contract

paresis?", then no explanation can be given. Van Fraassen's theory thus accounts for the
changing explanatory relevance of the mayor's untreated syphilis by pointing out that
different contrast classes make different demands on the answer.
Note that in these cases we are assuming that the relevance relation in each case
obvious. See the following discussion of relevance relations in van Fraassen's theory.

88.

Van Fraassen endorses

89. See

A

90.

this

consequence of

Salmon and Kitcher (1987,

his

theory (1980,

1

is

38).

319).

similar analysis, achieved independently of mine,

is

offered by Kitcher and

Salmon

(1987).
91

Or

.

of possible contrast classes.

interest for the

Relevance relations seem, however,

captured the basic features of explanation

is

The

to

be of greater

philosophy of science.

92. Moreover, the authors of these theories

93.

to

in

would probably be satisfied
modern science alone.

intentions of the investigator determine, nevertheless,

(1

977), and Stegmuller.
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their theories

which piece

be described by an explanation.

94. See Sneed (1976), Balzer and Sneed

if

of the causal net

95. Sintonen places what-questions together with

wh-questions).

would argue

I

that

many

who and

where-questions (he calls them
what-questions are as difficult to understand as are

Some what-questions are straightforward, e.g., "What color is the sky?"
Others, however, present difficulties analogous to those of
why-questions, e.g., "What made
the man ill?"
why-questions.

96.

In

further

Gardenfors formal presentation, the belief value of £, B(E), is derived
from two
measures of probability. His analysis can be summarized as follows.

The epistemic

state of a

given person

is

conceived of as a

set,

W,

of worlds u,

v,

w,

etc.,

allowed to be

possible by the person (Gardenfors talks about world-states rather than worlds,
but
our presentations are identical in other relevant respects). Gardenfors assumes,
for

I

believe

simplicity, that the set of individuals remains the

same across possible worlds.
probability measures are to be introduced. First, for each possible world, w,
a belief function, L(w), which is a measure of the probability that
is the actual

Two
there

is

world.

w

addition, for any subset (or class) of individuals, A, there is, for each possible
world, w, a measure of the probability that an individual belongs to A in w,
PJA). Given
In

these two probability measures,

it is possible to determine the expected
probability that an
the actual world by multiplying, for each possible world, w, the
probability that an individual is A in
by the probability that
is actual, and then adding

individual

is

A

in

w

w

the resulting values for each possible world. Thus, the expected probability that an
individual is actually A, RJA), is

RJA) =
The

PJA) * L(w), provided that L(w) is not 0.
explanandum E is derived from this second-order

Xwe

belief value of

\N

following way: the belief value,

probability in the

explanandum, E, in epistemic situation, K, is equal
to RJQ/C), where £ is the sentence, Qa, and C is the intersection of all classes C, such that
it is known in K that "C,a" is true and nothing else of relevance to Qa is known (i.e., where

C

is

the narrowest reference class).

97. Gardenfors leaves
is

B(E), of

required for

"Why

open the problem

of

what

initial

£?" to arise as a legitimate question

98. Gardenfors recognizes that his theory

is

degree of belief

when

in

explanandum

£

£ has occurred.

not sufficient (422), though not necessarily for

the reasons presented here.
99.

Some

philosophers,

e.g.,

Wesley Salmon,

believe, moreover, that explanatory

information can even decrease the expected probability of the explanandum.

The three varieties of the semantic view of theories are the set theoretical, the statespace, and the structuralist approaches. Beth, Suppe, van Fraassen defend a state-space
approach to a semantic view of theories; see Beth (1 948, 949, 1961), Suppe (1 967, 972a,
1

00.

1

1

1972b, 1974, 1976), and van Fraassen (1970, 1972, 1980). Suppes defends a settheoretical approach (Suppes, 1967). The structuralist view is developed and defended in
Sneed (1 976), Balzer and Sneed (1 977), Stegmuller (1 979), and Balzer, Moulines, and
Sneed (1986). My own presentation of the structuralist view follows that of Sintonen (1 989)

and Stegmuller (1983).
101. This example

1

02.

is

discussed by Stegmuller (1983, 1036ff.).

For the original discussion of paradigms and exemplars, see

the "Postscript."
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Kuhn

(1970), especially

103. Sintonen himself recognizes that distinct kinds of
applications are grouped together in
the set of intended applications, for he points out
that l "generates analogies, explanatory
p
ideals, and other cognitive values of the scientific
community" (1 989, 266).
104.

On what

grounds could one distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory
One possibility would be to distinguish explanatory from nonexplanatory applications on pragmatic grounds of the following sort.
Explanation consists
in demonstrating that some as-yet-unexplained
phenomenon is truly a model of the theory.
Other applications, it might be argued, are only re-applications of theory
performed after the
task of explanation has been fulfilled. The difference between
explanatory and nonapplications of theory?

explanatory applications of theory is then this: Explanation occurs only if the
phenomenon
has not yet been shown to be a model of the theory. Other applications,
however, can be
made only after the phenomenon has already been shown to be a model of the theory.
Unfortunately, this attempt fails, for whether or not a phenomenon is explained, or
predicted, or

values calculated,

etc. is not determined by whether or not the
be a model of a theory. Having shown that some heat
systems are models of theories of fluid dynamics, we can calculate some parameters of heat
dispersion. But we have not thereby explained the dispersion of heat in the systems, for it is
its

phenomenon

well

known

has been

that the

shown

to

mechanics of heat dispersion are quite

different than those of fluid

dynamics.
105.

In

her important paper, "Causal laws and effective strategies" (1979), Nancy Cartwright
between causal and non-causal laws cannot be captured by

also argued that the distinction
statistical

1

relevance relations.

06. Recently, Salmon has himself introduced a theory of causation that eschews the use of

counterfactuals (Salmon, 1994). Salmon's

107. See, for example, Salmon
108.

The

definition

is

(1

new

theory will be discussed below.

984), 121, 262, and 274.

from Webster's Third International Dictionary (Springfield,

Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 1993).

1

09. This

example,

is

not the only formulation that

Hume

gives

two additional

Hume

gives.

On

definitions of "cause,"

same page, for
which has the form

the very

one

of

of a

counterfactual conditional, the other of a psychological law.

1

1

0.

For a discussion of

111. This argument

1

1

2.

is

Hume's theory

of mental activity, see Wolff

(1

960).

adapted from Cartwright (1992), 48.

For detailed argumentation

Cartwright (1989, chapters

1

and

in

support of

this point,

see Salmon (1984,

1

74-1 75),

and

2).

This ignores the important distinction between an empirical correlation and a true
statistical correlation, and the validity of the inference from the former to the latter.
1

1

3.

symmetrical laws, which generate the problem of
asymmetries of explanation for accounts such as Hempel's, which view explanation as the
deduction of explananda from laws of regularity.
1

14.

A

special case of this

problem

is

234

1

1

5.

See Cartwright

(1

989, chapter

3).

1

1

6.

See Cartwright

(1

989, chapter

2) for a

1

1

7.

discussion of this point.

Meanwhile, independent evidence may support the conclusion

that

both paths are

operative.

The regularity view also can account for neither the way that
causal knowledge is
used to design experiments, nor the manner in which causal
inferences are made from them
(see Cartwright, 1 992). This will be discussed below.
18. They cannot be considered causal because they provide
no information about causal
capacities or causal interactions. All true laws, nonetheless, are
connected to causes in the
1

sense that they have a causal explanation.

An episode from

119.
will

1

be discussed

20.

in

the IQ controversy, and

greater detail

in

Chapter

its

significance for the theory of explanation,

6.

The necessary and sufficient condition view of causation, which holds that a cause
and sufficient condition of the occurrence of the effect, is a variation of the

is

a necessary

regularity view.

It suffers from the same inadequacies as
does the regularity view, and this
most sophisticated form, the INUS-condition proposed by Mackie. As a result,
this view will not be explicitly discussed here. An extensive critical discussion
of INUS
conditions can be found in Cartwright (1989), 25ff.

is

true of

121.

1

22.

its

The example

A

is

recent article

taken from Cartwright (1979).

Science (v.269:

in

1

64-1 69) discusses the problems of biases and

confounding factors in drawing causal inferences from
area of medicine
epidemiology.

statistical

—

analyses

in

one important

Reichenbach (1 956), Suppes (1 970, 1 984), Salmon (1971), and many others have
appealed to screening-off as a statistical condition of causation.
1

23.

1

24.

Adapted from Suppes (1984), 50. A

exhaustive events. ..[Wjhere
disjoint,

nonempty

sets

we

have an

whose union

is

partition

explicit

the

is

"a collection of incompatible

sample space,

it

is

whole space" (Suppes,

and

a collection of pairwise
1

984, 50).

25. (NSO') is adapted from Suppes (1984, 50). Salmon (1 984, 82) argues that causes
can be simultaneous with their effects. If this is so, it would seem advisable to change
(NSO 1 to require a look at partitions simultaneous to, as well as earlier than, the purported
causal event to which (NSO is applied. Unfortunately, if causes are allowed to be
simultaneous with their effects, then even if (NSO were amended accordingly, it would be
1

1

)

1

)

r

)

easy to find counterexamples
cause, C,
effect,

P.

relations

is

screened

We will

its

simultaneous

effect, E,

i.e.,

cases

in

which a

by a simultaneous and coincident

therefore simply note the problem that simultaneous cause-effect

would pose

for

simultaneous with their

1

from

off

similar to Salmon's billiards example,

(NSO

1
),

but ignore the issue of whether causes can be

effects.

26. Skyrms (1980), Cartwright (1989), and

many

averaging out.

235

other authors discuss the problems of

1

27.

128.

Assuming the moths face

significant predation.

For probabilistic alternatives to

and (NSO T ), see Salmon (1971) and (1984), Skyrms
(1980, 1 08ff.), Eells and Sober (1 983), Glymour et a/. (1 987), Humphreys
(1989), and many
others. For critical discussions of many of these, see Salmon
(1980) and (1 984) and
(S)

Cartwright (1989).

1

29. Specifying the notion of a "complete causal set"

doubts that

can be done.

it

possible and plausible; see,

1

30.

We

is

not easy. Suppes

984), for one,

(1

will ignore this

e.g.,

problem. Weaker versions of (SC) are also
Skyrms' pareto-dominance condition (1 980, 1 08).

For an extensive defense of this proposition, see Cartwright (1989).

131. Indeed, Goodman points out that any counterfactual, "If A had been, the B would
have been," can be rewritten as a logically equivalent factual. As a result, the
counterfactual account shares the problems of the regularity analysis of causation: it cannot
handle overdetermined causes or mixed capacities, and it underdetermines causal structure.
Similarly, believe the regularity view shares a problem typically noted only with
respect to counterfactual analyses: the problem of truth conditions. The problem, in
Goodman's words, is
I

to define the circumstances under

which a given counterfactual holds while

the opposing conditional with the contradictory consequent

And

this criterion of truth

must be

set

up

in

fails to

hold.

the face of the fact that a

counterfactual by

its nature can never be subjected to any direct empirical
by realizing its antecedent (Goodman, 1954, 4).
would argue that truth conditions are also a problem for laws of regularity, and this
problem is revealed by the fact that most causal laws, if read as laws of regularity, are true
only ceteris paribus. Thus, there is little, if any significant difference between the regularity
and counterfactual views of causation. cannot argue this point here, but Goodman would

test

I

I

apparently agree:

one sense the name "the problem of counterfactuals" is misleading,
because the problem is independent of the form in which a given statement
happens to be expressed. The problem of counterfactuals is equally a
problem of factual conditionals, for any counterfactual can be translated into
In

a conditional with a true antecedent and consequent; e.g., Since that butter

50 degrees F [Cf. the counterfactual: If the
150 degrees F., it would have melted]...
[T]he truth of statements of this kind depends not upon the truth or
of the components but upon whether the intended connection

did not melt,
butter

falsity

it

wasn't heated to

were heated

1

to

obtains. ..[I]t must be born in

mind

that a general solution

would explain the

kind of connection involved irrespective of any assumptions about the truth
or falsity of the

1

32.

Here

I

rely

components (Goodman,

on Aune's discussion

of Russell

1

954, 4-5).

(1

985,

48ff.).

33. This transformation of the problem has, in fact, nothing to do with the distinctive
underlying ontologies, for the problem of causation associated with the process-ontology
1

can easily be restated in the terms of the event-ontology, whereby the problem is to
distinguish causal from non-causal events. The role played by Salmon's change to a
process-ontology

is

thus heuristic.
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134. Again, Salmon's theory does not suffer on
this account as an epistemological
criterion
Knowledge of causal processes may be acquired, he could
argue by
ootstrapping from prior causal knowledge, which is
applied in experimental situations to
test the counterfactuals relevant to judging
whether a mark has been introduced into and
transmitted by, some particular process.
ot causal processes.

1

35.

Here Salmon

refers to the specified interval as "half-open" to

amount

that affect the

of the quantity that

allow for interactions

being transmitted.

is

136. See especially Cartwright (1989) and Cartwright (1992).
1

37.

By contingent

mean

I

that the

connection

not logically necessary.

is

138. Cf. William Alston (1971).

1

39.

Some

of

what follows

I

learned from

Hugh

Mellor's discussion of dispositions

in

Mellor (1974).
1

40.

The causal

Thus, there
141.

1

42.

e.g.,

view

interactions

nothing about

is

Fora discussion of
In

what

follows,

I

may be spontaneous,
this

claim that

this point,

is

discuss only the regularity view, thereby ignoring other possibilities,
INUS views of causation. do so not just because the regularity

more common than

I

the others, but because the counterfactual and

are, at their base, regularity accounts.

laws of regularity

in

quantum mechanics.

see Mellor (1974).

the counterfactual and
is

the spontaneous decay of a particle.

e.g.,

inconsistent with

INUS accounts

Counterfactual conditionals, for example, are merely

which the antecedent

is

false.

143. Cartwright discusses the need for causal laws

in

"Causal laws and effective strategies"

(Cartwright, 1979).

1

44. Even

if

there were,

it

is

Coulomb's Law

clear that the application of

is

not restricted to

particles with zero mass.

1

45. This point

is

argued

in detail

by Cartwright

(1

989,

1

992),

some

of

whose arguments

I

trace in the following paragraphs.

1

46. This failure

is

most evident

in

the case of single-instance experiments.

In single-

instance experiments, the circumstances of the experiment are so carefully and precisely

controlled (and difficult to repeat) that just a single instance of behavior
establish the

phenomenon.

It

is

dubious to

assert that

is

sufficient to

such experiments yield knowledge of

number of instances — or even
—
observed a regularity.
said
to
have
cannot
be
one
been
observed,
have
just one
regularities, for the inductive basis

is

too slim:

when

a small

Cartwright (1989) discusses the Stanford gravity-probe B experiment as an example of a
single-instance experiment.

1

47. This case will be discussed

in

greater detail

in

the chapter on explanatory controversy.

must be noted that descriptions of structural properties sometimes stand
alone as explanations. See discussion of this point below in section 5.1 .5.
1

48.

Though

it

1

237

49. "Mass" is a quantitative measure of a body's inertia.
Inertia
remaining at rest or of continuing to move in a straight line at
1

no force

acts

is

the property of

a constant velocity so long as

upon the body.

Interestingly, the

law of inertia is one of those laws, like Coulomb's,
which is never
and cannot, therefore, be understood (usefully) as a regularity.
This
mass is a capacity rather than a tendency or propensity.

instantiated in nature,

makes
1

clear that

50. Again, note the caveat discussed

151.

in

section 5.11.5.

important paper, Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) argue, for example,
that
predictive and explanatory grounds are identical in logical form, differing
only with respect
to the temporal relation between the statement of the explanandum
and the grounds for
believing the explanandum to be true.
1

In their

Here

52.

rely

I

on discussions by Hempel (1950) and Mellor (1974), especially Mellor's

defense of dispositions.
1

The manifestation

53.

of a disposition does not imply that

observable, but only that there
chloride
in

1

is

somehow

directly

is

water.

Though not

54.

real, dispositions are

Ryle clearly has events

55.

nonetheless useful, according to Ryle.

be viewed as

dispositions, like laws, should

1

it

evidence of it. For example, the solubility of sodium
not observable, though one can observe a sample of sodium chloride dissolving
is

in

mind,

for

On

view,

his

"inference-tickets."

he speaks of "incidents" and "goings on" (1949,

124-5).

1

Much

56.

157.

It

of the following criticism of Ryle

might be thought that

this criticism of Ryle's

nondispositional property that
is

was garnered from Mellor

is

any more than does molecular

is

above the

1

58. Here

first

object,

gratefully

I

me

pointed

in

and count

its

untrue.

structure: in

indicate indirectly the property of the thing, e.g.,
light

rests

on choosing a

"theoretical," e.g., molecular structure, rather than

non-theoretical, e.g., octagonal shape. This

directly,

view

(1974).

one

For "shape" does not display

that

itself

each case, events must be found that
one might turn on the

the case of shape,

in

angles.

acknowledge my debt

to

my

colleague and friend,

Andrew

Blais,

who

the direction of Michotte's work.

on the account offered by Michotte and Thines (1963/1991), which
emphasizes the importance of this assumption among early experimental psychologists.
159. Here

1

60.

72ff.,

Some

I

rely heavily

aspects of Kolers'

whose

discussion

I

(1

972) experimental results are discussed by

Goodman

(1978),

have made use of here.

161. Such examples can be multiplied without end. Motion is not the only phenomenon
for which the brain adds information in generating a perception. Other examples of

augmentation occur

in

the perception of changing shape (Kolers

(Kanizsa 1976).

238

1

972), and of contours

62. See, for example, Jeremy

M. Wolfe’s preface to The Mind's Eye, which is an
anthology of recent Scientific American (New York: W.H.
Freeman and Company, 1986)
articles on the psychology of perception. Wolfe
divides the process
1

of cognition into three

steps, reception, extraction,

and inference. "Inference" includes the processes
labeled supplementation and organization.

have

I

63. Michotte used two kinds of apparatuses to perform this experiment:
a rotating disc
behind a screen into which a slit had been cut, and a set of two projectors
behind a viewing
screen. He found the responses of observers to be similar in each
case.
1

64. Michotte reports that under different conditions, two kinds of causal
perceptions
could be distinguished: one of direct causation, e.g., "launching," and one of
indirect
1

causation, e.g., "triggering." Thus, observers consistently distinguished between
perceptions of launching, triggering, and non-causal events.

165. It should be noted that Michotte did believe, however, that other kinds of causation
could be perceived (or, if you will, that causation could be perceived in other ways).
Especially important

what he termed,

is

"tactile-kinesthetic" causation,

which was also

studied by Piaget.
1 66. Friedman (1992, 84-86) argues that many early positivists,
influenced by the
discoveries of Gestalt psychologists, conceded that observation was not simple and

immediate.

1

67. See Chapter

1

989).

are:

III

for a discussion of Kitcher's theory of explanation (Kitcher

should be noted that Kitcher

It

he accepts that one aim of science

is

is

not anti-cause

way

the

in

that

1

Humean

976, 1981,
positivists

to grasp the causal structure of the world.

But he

believes that inferences to causal knowledge are based, not on observation and experiment,

but on criteria of the systematic unification of our beliefs. Although he does not say
Kitcher's unificationist theory of explanation

may

viewed

therefore be

this,

as a theory of the

epistemology of causal knowledge.
1

68. Cartwright

(1

989)

is

the

first,

as far as

different aspects of causality that follow.

I

I

know,

to distinguish carefully

owe my

between the four

understanding of these distinctions to

her analysis.
169.

I

distinguish here

between adaptive

traits, fitness,

and adaptations.

"Fitness" refers to a

genotype's or group's) propensity to survive and reproduce. ("Fitness" is a
probabilistic measure of the likelihood that a phenotype's capacity to survive and reproduce

phenotype's
will

(or

be operative

some environment). A

in

positive contribution to the fitness of the

adaptation

1

if it

trait is

"adaptive"

phenotype

in

in

environment E

environment

A

E.

if it

trait is

makes

has evolved as a result of natural selection.

70. Until quite recently, biologists believed natural selection to be the driving force of

evolutionary change.

It

In

coloring

any case,

still

evidence

melanism

exists

that

it

is

is

is

if

Kettlewell simply

this to

an adaptation.

clear that condition

among

melanism

In this

assumed

all

be
grounds
provided
also
had
Ford
however,
(1940)
case,

would thus be unsurprising

true in the case of melanism.
to believe that

a

an

(i)

is

satisfied, for the

the species of Lepidoptera.

In

necessary variation

heritable (1955, 324), thereby satisfying

(ii).

experiments, moreover, verify that the third and fourth conditions are

239

in

addition, Kettlewell reports

His

own

satisfied, as well.

71

Kettlewell's reasoning often suggests a kind of eliminative
deduction: background
list of potential causal factors;
all but one of these factors
is then ruled out by decisive
evidence; the operation of the remaining factor is also
confirmed by additional evidence, where possible.
1

.

knowledge suggests an exhaustive

1

72. See

last

1

of

73.

Brody (1972), Kim (1974), Kitcher
which cites other authors as well.

A

second

belief

about causation

(1

985), Railton (1978), and

that causal processes

Ruben

(1

must be continuous

990), the

in

spacetime— also

gets the causal theory into trouble within the realm of quantum
mechanics,
especially Bell s inequalities, and what they purportedly reveal about
causation.
lack of
knowledge of quantum mechanics prohibits me from discussing Bell's inequalities in detail.

My

who

Readers

one

in

desire an extensive discussion of causation and

Cartwright (1989, 23

would point

quantum mechanics can

find

Iff.).

however, that the lessons of Bell's inequalities seem to be
can tell, Bell's inequalities show, at most, that some causal
processes are discontinuous in spacetime. This would certainly be a puzzling fact about the
I

out,

unclear, at best. As far as

I

world,

if verified beyond a doubt, but it would not militate
against the role of causation
quantum mechanics: it would mean only that causation in the quantum world has

unexpected and puzzling properties.
processes must be continuous.
1

74.

It

In short,

would, nonetheless, be troubling

I

in

see no strong reason to assert that causal

to maintain that

an effect could occur before

its

cause.
1 75. Socrates' dying and Xantippes' becoming a widow are events that occur
simultaneously, but at locations distant from one another. Causal influence, however,

propagated:

it

between the two events,
1

is

cannot, the argument goes, act simultaneously over a distance. The relation
therefore, cannot

76. See R.A. Fisher (1931), as well as

E.

be causal.

Sober's discussion

in

Sober (1983).

Mackie (1974, 1 54-9), or Ruben's discussion of Mackie's argument
in Ruben (1990, 214ff.). The view presented here is independent of Mackie's argument.
Ruben also cites Cummins (1976) as a source of counterargument to Mackie's view.
1

77. See, for example,

1

78. This reply

may be

tailored to

answer

why neon
explain why

Kitcher's claim that the explanation of

is inert is non-causal (Kitcher,
985). To explain this property of neon is to
neon does not chemically interact under most conditions. The explanation would refer to
the low capacity for chemical reaction (e.g., neon's low energy state), as well as the general
lack of conditions under which it would interact with other elements (e.g., inadequate
1

activation energies).

conditions

is

as

Explanation by reference to a lack of causal capacities or facilitating

much

one that refers to the presence of causal
example is thus no counterexample to the causal

a causal explanation as

capacities and their operation.

Kitcher's

theory of explanation.

As Sober points out, Fisher's argument contains
not concern us here. See Hamilton (1 968).
1

79.

180.

Ruben (1990,

218).

Ruben

credits the

identity explanation, to Achinstein

(1

significant presuppositions that will

example, as well as much of

983, 233-237).
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his discussion of

1 81
use "controversy" as a general term that includes the entire
spectrum from
constructive debate arising from disagreement to raging,
emotionally charged altercations.
.

1

82.

I

One

exception to

of explanatory force

in

this trend

is

who

Kitcher (1989),

takes up questions of the evaluation

contexts of theoretical change.

183. My argument is an elaboration and extension of an argument
made by Robert
Ackermann (Ackermann, 1985, 62ff.). Ackermann argues that neither Kuhn's theory
of
science, nor more traditional empiricist or rationalist philosophies of
science, provide any
cognitive reason for the existence of controversy
1

1

84.

Koertge (1976), p.366-7. Her argument

85. This

the view of Lakatos

is

scientific progress, the

(1

science.

in

targeted against Lakatos

is

(1

971/1 978).

971/1 978), though he adds a particular theory of
of Scientific Research Programmes.

Methodology

186. See, for example, Railton (1981) and Kitcher (1989).
87. A good beginning source of contributors to the controversy is N.J. Block and G.
Dworkin, The IQ Controversy Critical Readings (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976). See
also L.J. Cranach, "Five Decades of Public Controversy over Mental Testing," American
1

,

Psychologist 30, no. 1:1-14.
,

188. See Cranach

189.

1

E.g.,

(1

,

A

large bibliography

is

provided by Aby (1990).

975).

with the recent publication of The Bell Curve by

R.J.

Herrnstein and C. Murray.

"The chief goal of compensatory education

90. Jensen writes:

— to remedy the

educational lag of disadvantaged children and thereby narrow the achievement gap
between "minority" and "majority" pupils
has been utterly unrealized in any of

—

education programs that have been evaluated thus

the. ..compensatory

191.

In

(1966),

support of
all

of

this figure,

Jensen cites Dreger and Miller (1960,

which are reviews

of a large

amount

1

far" (3).

968) and Shuey

of literature.

192. Jensen writes:
'In

the actual race of

life,

which

somebody, the chief determining
Thorndike

him

in

1

not to get ahead, but to get ahead of

is

factor

is

So said Edward

heredity.'

L.

905. Since then, the preponderance of evidence has proved

right, certainly as

concerns those aspects of

life in

which intelligence

plays an important part (1969, 28).

193. Jensen concludes:
all

we

are

left

with are various lines of evidence, no one of which

definitive alone, but which, viewed together, make

it

hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated

is

a not unreasonable
in

the average Negro-

white intelligence difference. The preponderance of evidence is, in my
opinion, less consistent with a strictly environmental hypothesis than with a
genetic hypothesis, which, of course, does not exclude the influence of

environment on

One

its

interaction with genetic factors (82).

must agree with Lewontin's assessment of

this

241

passage:

Anyone

not familiar with the standard litany of academic
disclaimers.. .will,
taking this statement at face value, find nothing to disagree
with since it says
nothing. To contrast a "strictly environmental hypothesis"
with a "genetic
hypothesis which. ..does not exclude the influence of the environment"
is to
be guilty of the utmost triviality. If that is the only conclusion he
means
to

come

Jensen has just wasted a great deal of space in the Harvard
Educational Review. But of course, like all cant, the special language
to,

needs to be translated

saying

pretty clear, although not absolutely proved, that

"It is

is:

difference

1

common

social scientist

94. These

two

into

IQ between blacks and whites

in

is

English.

of the

What Jensen

is

most of the

genetical" (1970a, 88-89).

"basic assumptions" that underlie compensatory education are described

by Jensen as follows:

The "average children" concept

essentially the belief that

is

all

children,

except for a rare few born with severe neurological defects, are basically
very much alike in their mental development and capabilities, and that their

apparent differences
differences

in

these characteristics. ..are due to rather superficial

the child's upbringing at

home, their preschool and out-ofschool experiences, motivations and interests, and the educational
influences of their family background...

The

in

"social deprivation hypothesis"

is

the allied belief that those

who achieve
school do so mainly because they begin school lacking

children of ethnic minorities and the economically poor

"below average"

in

certain crucial experiences

which are prerequisites

perceptual, attentional, and verbal

and teacher-oriented

skills,

for school learning

—

as well as the self-confidence, self-

conducive to achievement in the
classroom. And they lack the parental help and encouragement needed to
promote academic achievement throughout their schooling (1969, 4).

direction,

attitudes

1 95.
Jensen gives the following reasons for focusing on IQ rather than on scholastic
achievement: it is more easily and "efficiently" measured; it can be measured early in a
child's life, when he or she has no scholastic achievement to speak of; and IQ is "known

to

predict scholastic performance better than any other single measureable attribute..." (4-5).

196.

A

"phenotype"

is

any

set of

morphological, physiological, biochemical, behavioral, or

other properties of an organism that develop through the interaction of genes and

environment.

A

"genotype"

Futuyma (1986, 43, 552,
1

97.

is

any

set of

genes possessed by an individual organism. See

554).

Indeed, the main rhetorical thrust of Jensen's article

is

negative argument:

compensatory programs where
Why has there been such uniform
they have been tried? What has gone wrong? In other fields, when bridges
do not stand, when aircraft do not fly, when machines do not work, when
treatments do not cure, despite all conscientious efforts on the part of many
failure of

persons to make them do so, one begins to question the basic assumptions,
principles, theories, and hypotheses that guide one's efforts. It is time to
follow

1

suit in

education?

98. Studies cited by Jensen

increasingly stable, and

is

(3)

show

that

IQ

is

highly variable early

very stable beyond 8 years old (1969,

242

1

in life,

8;

but

becomes

Jensen cites Bloom,

1 964).
Because the stability of IQ is consistent with both the genetic
hypothesis and
opponents, we will concentrate on Jensen's claim that the IQ

differential

its

between races has

a genetic basis.

may be defined as the mean value of the square of an observation's
deviation from the arithmetic mean of the population. My discussion
of heritability
1

99. Variance

on Futuyma (1986), 98ff. and Suzuki et a/.
was one of the co-authors of Suzuki et a/.
1

986), 51

(1

9ff.

It

relies

should be noted that Lewontin

200. This formula

is a simplified and slightly altered version of
that presented by Jensen
(1969, 34). Note that the names "genotypic" (or genetic) variance and "environmental"
variance are misleading, given that V, contains both environmental and genetic

factors.

is

also important to understand that heritability

measure of the proportion of a
population's variation that is assignable to genotypic variation: it does not tell us what
proportion of any individual's phenotype is due to genetics or to environment. If the
heritability of height for human beings were .80, for example, it would be nonsense
to
conclude that for a person whose height is 70 inches, 56 inches are due to genetics and 14
to environment (nutrition, etc.).
It

201

.

The

difficulties are so

insurmountable,
In

at least at

onerous

that

some

is

a

them

geneticists believe

the present. Suzuki et

a/.

to

be

(1986), for example, conclude that:

general, the presence of greater environmental correlation between close

relatives

makes

heritability estimates uninterpretable.

there are no legitimate estimates of heritability for

It

for this reason that

is

human

quantitative

traits

(520).

Again,

it

should be recognized that Lewontin

is

a co-author of Suzuki et

202. As suggested above, genetic variance can be analyzed into
additive variance,

dominance

a/.

at least three

components:

variance, and epistatic variance. Additive genetic refers to

the average effect of an allele on the value of a
refer to deviations

trait, while dominance and epistatic variance
from the sums of these averages due to dominance and epistatic relations

between genes.
To take a simple

case, there

is

additive genetic variance

average phenotypic value of two genotypes
if

the value of the heterozygote

lies

is

different.

in

a population

All the genetic

if

variance

the
is

additive

directly intermediate between those of the

homozygotes. Conversely, where there is no additive genetic variance, there is no
difference, on average, between the phenotypic values of the genotypes. Consequently,
where there is no additive genetic variance, there can be no natural selection. One
consequence of this line of argument, which originated with Fisher, is that natural selection
tends to remove additive genetic variation within a population. Similarly, Lewontin is
arguing that

if

the proportion of genetic variance

unlikely that IQ distribution has been

in

IQ that

is

additive

is

high, then

it

is

the result of a lengthy process of natural selection.

203. Electroscopes come in many forms; a simple gold-leaf electroscope consists of an
enclosed case containing two gold leaves suspended from a metal rod that is separated from
the case by an insulating sleeve. When the metal rod is touched by a charged material, the
leaves acquire the charge, which causes them to fly apart as the charges repel each other.

The leaves

will

remain apart

for a period of time, but, as scientists

had long noticed, the

leaves will always settle slowly back together as they lose their charge (even after the effects
This
of known sources of discharge, e.g., through the insulating sleeve, are reduced to nil).
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description of electroscopes and the problem of ionization

My

204.

understanding of

this

and Brown and Hoddeson

(1

period

983).

is

due

in

taken from Rossi (1964,

is

great part to Galison (1987), Rossi

Rather than cite these authors

rehearsal of the history of the period,

I

hereby acknowledge

my

(1

2ff.).

964),

every sentence of
debt to them.
at

my

205. The most acrimonious (and widely reported) of these disputes was perhaps
the one
between Millikan and Compton concerning the existence of the so-called latitude effect
(Kevles, 1977, 240ff.).
206. These problems were resolved via Carlson-Oppenheimer's theory of particle showers
and the discovery by Neddermeyer and Anderson, and Street and Stevenson, of the mu-

meson. Although

scientists quickly

phenomena, questions about

accepted that local cosmic radiation was due to these

their origins

were not answered

until

the late

1

940s.

207. Before considering these experiments, it will be useful to place the experiments in
context by summarizing the basics of physical knowledge in the mid-1 920s. Physicists

knew that atoms consist of a relatively heavy, positively charged nucleus surrounded by a
cloud of relatively light, negatively charged electrons. The approximate sizes of atomic
knew little of nucleic structure. It was known that
more fundamental particles-protons-that were identical
to hydrogen nuclei, and there was speculation that all nuclei were built out of protons (it
was known that the masses of some nuclei were nearly whole-number multiples of the mass
of a proton). There were suspicions, however, that there is more to atoms than protons and
nuclei had been measured, but physicists

some atomic

nuclei decayed into

electrons.

mechanics had been recognized to be inadequate as a theory of atomic
and a new theory, quantum mechanics, was being developed to describe the
behavior of electrons and other atomic phenomena. Radiation was generally divided into
two types, corpuscular and electromagnetic, though by the late 1920s it was widely
recognized that all radiation behaves in some respects as particles and in other respects as
waves. Corpuscular radiation included beta-rays (high-speed electrons emitted in
radioactive decay), alpha-rays (helium nuclei emitted in the decay of certain atoms), and
cathode rays (electrons discharged from a cathode). It had been known since the late
nineteenth century that corpuscular radiation was capable of ionizing gases. Known
electromagnetic radiation included visible light, infrared and ultraviolet rays, X-rays, and
Classical

constituents,

rays (another product of radioactive decay). In 923, Arthur Compton discovered
photons of electromagnetic radiation could also generate ionization indirectly through

gamma
that

1

the scattering of high-energy electrons (the

Compton

Effect).

were recognized:
By the mid-1 920s, therefore, two
corpuscular radiation and the Compton Effect. Cosmic rays were known to ionize
atmospheric gases. After Compton's discovery, most cosmic ray researchers assumed
cosmic rays were made up of high-energy photons (Rossi, 1964, 14ff.).
sources of ionization

208.

and

Once

again,

I

emphasize

that the following

that

accounts rely heavily on Galison (1987)

Rossi (1964).

209. See R.A. Millikan and G.H. Cameron (1926, 1928a, 1928b, and 1928c, 1928d).
210.

A

a metal cylinder with a thin wire running the length of its axis.
filled with a gas at very low pressure, and there is an electric potential

Geiger-Muller tube

The cylinder

is

is
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between the wire and the walls

of the tube. Under the right conditions
(e.g., a large enough
potential) the presence of a single ion pair in the cylinder
is sufficient to set off an
electric
discharge that is easily measured by an electroscope.

211. Early cloud chambers were basically glass boxes containing
a moveable wall attached
to a piston. The piston was used to expand the volume of
the chamber, which causes the
temperature in the chamber to drop. The chamber was filled with gas,
often a vapor
mixture of water and alcohol. When the chamber expands, dropping
the temperature, the
vapor condenses into a cloud. If the expansion is carefully controlled, producing
a smaller
temperature change, the vapor will condense only around ions in the chamber.
As a result,
an ionizing ray crossing the chamber shortly before expansion will leave a
condensation
trail along its path of travel. The density of the ion (and,
hence, condensation) trail is a
function of the ray's charge and velocity.
2

1

See Compton (1936)

2.

for a

summary

of the evidence.

213. This was not the only problem facing quantum electrodynamics (QED).

Oppenheimer

1934,

In

J.R.

wrote:

[T]heoretical physics

Copenhagen

— what with the haunting ghosts of neutrinos, the

conviction, against

all evidence, that cosmic rays are protons,
Born's absolutely unquantizable field theory, the divergence difficulties with
the positron, and the utter impossibility of making a rigorous calculation of

anything

—

way

Oppenheimer, published in
Smith and Weiner (1980, 181) and cited by Galison (1987, 107],
Because our interest is the discovery of the mu-meson, the other problems of QED have
at all

in a hell

is

of a

[letter to F.

been ignored.

Compton and Bethe

214.

The

(1934) mobilize the evidence

in

favor of the proton hypothesis.

Anderson (Neddermeyer and Anderson, 1937) took such great care
the electron hypothesis shows that he believed it to be the more promising.
fact that

to rule out

produced photographs taken in a cloud chamber fitted with a series of thin
plates, in which one could see both the production of pairs of electrons and the cascading
build-up of showers, just as one would expect from the Carlson-Oppenheimer analysis.
21

5. Fussell

21 6.

An example

of the latter

whether they are spurious
21

7.

Newton and

his

is

controversies about the validity of experimental data,

artifacts of the

contemporary

experimental setup or not.

scientists argued, for

example, about whether an

would be a legitimate scientific pursuit,
beyond the grasp of the scientific mind.

inquiry into the causes of gravitation
gravitation should forever lay

218. The covering-law explanation suggested here would, of course, be
2

1

9.

This argument

was

first

presented, so far as

I

or

whether

statistical in

know, by Nancy Cartwright

(1

form.

989).

physics refute the regularity

Cartwright argues that features of single-instance experiments
view of (causal) laws. She provides a nice example in her description of gravity probe
in

experiments

at Stanford.

another part of Van Fraassen's theory, which is an account of
criteria are
to evaluate competing answers that satisfy the pragmatic criteria. Here, two

220. As noted above, there

how

is

245

basic: the probable truth of each answer, and the
degree to which the answer "favors" the
exp anandum. "Favoring" is an epistemic notion: it is a
measure of the degree to which the
explanandum is to be expected, given the truth of the answer.

Van Fraassen's theory of answer-evaluation thus relies on
epistemic notions already
embodied in neo-positivist approaches, including the Covering-Law
versions (including Salmon's S-R model) and thus
apply to the Covering-Law model.

221

.

may be

criticized

model and its statistical
on the grounds that

This no doubt understates the potential for controversy within
scientific communities,

for the theoretical outlooks of scientists are

suggest.

For discussion of this point, see

more plastic and less stable than Kuhn seems
Ackermann (1985), 44ff.

222. See Appel (1987) for an enlightening description of

this

to

debate, as well as further

references.

223. This

not to say that theoretical commitments played no role in the acceptance of the
mu-meson's existence and role in cosmic radiation. It has been suggested above, for
is

example, that Oppenheimer and Carlson's successful modeling of the shower component of
cosmic radiation using the Bethe-Heitler theory played a role in convincing physicists that
the penetrating component could not be electrons. The effect of their work, however, was
to demonstrate the limits of the quantum theory.
224. See Kevles (1977,

240ff.).

225. Under Kitcher's theory, the scope of a pattern is determined by its schematic
sentences, rules for filling in variables, and order of premises. To attempt to explain or
settle a controversy over explanatory scope by reference to these properties seems useless,

however,
falls

each explanatory hypothesis already asserts that the phenomenon-in-question
within its explanatory domain; presumably, the rules for filling in variables, making
for

inferences, etc., would already reflect this claim. Kitcher's theory thus offers
where explanatory controversies arise over accepted patterns of explanation.

226. To his credit, Kitcher
evaluation of explanations

is

in

perhaps the only theorist to have explicitly discussed the
the context of theoretical change (Kitcher,

Kitcher discusses the comparative evaluation of explanations
contexts, he
that to

is

defend

guidance

little

in

989).

1

when

But

changing theoretical

most concerned about the problem of predicate projectibi ity. Remember
theory against spurious unifications by explanatory patterns with
I

his

gerrymandered predicates, Kitcher appeals to a criterion of predicate projectibi lity. His
discussion of theoretical change is spurned by the fear that the criterion of predicate
projectibility will break down in these contexts, thereby weakening his defense of the
unification theory.

At this point

in

predicates but with the question
settled,

where

there

is

227. L.M. Brown and

it

it

is

the potential for theoretical change.

L.

Hoddeson (1983,

should be noted, moreover, that
understand

we are not concerned with gerrymandered
of why explanatory controversy occurs, and how

our discussion,

when

21).

Millikan quote

is

from Hawking

(1

980).

It

Anderson discovered the positron, he did not

as a validation of the Dirac theory.

other places Kitcher appeals to examples of basic patterns that are more
900." For the
specific, e.g., "Darwinian simple selection, or a "Mendelian pattern, circa 1

228.

Of

course,

in

246

moment, we

will ignore this troubling ambiguity.

229. This criticism

is

perhaps more forceful

in later cases in which entirely new
particle
and not merely new constellations of properties (e.g.,
intermediate mass and charge), were added to explain phenomena.

properties

230.

It

is

(e.g.,

strangeness),

true that, at the

good evidence

London-Cambridge conference

ran against each of these alternatives.

of 1 934, Anderson argued that
But not all scientists were in

agreement. Later that year, for example, Bethe and Compton published a
defense of the
proton-hypothesis, arguing that both geomagnetic data (the latitude and east-west
effects)
and the cloud chamber photographs of penetrating particles were best explained
as the

effects of protons (Bethe

and Compton,

1

934).

23 1 Whether or not these theories can be shown, by application of Kitcher's criteria,
have been the best unifying systematizations of their times is another question, which,
.

to

as

I

suggested above, would not be easy to answer.
232.

Finocchiaro distinguishes two kinds of unintelligibility: explanatory and conceptual.
Explanatory unintelligibility exists when a theoretical component lacks explanation, i.e., is

not derivable from what

understood. Conceptual unintelligibility exists when the
the sense that it is not statable or expressible in terms that are
understood. Explanatory intelligibility implies conceptual intelligibility, says Finocchiaro,
but the converse does not hold; for example, inertia, says Finocchiaro, was conceptually

component

is

lacks clarity,

intelligible for

in

Newton, but not

explanatorily.

On

Finocchiaro's view, Newton's hypothesis

of gravitation suffered from both kinds of unintelligibility.

Most importantly,

it

was

conceptually unintelligible because gravitation could be described only as a kind of mutual
attraction, which could not be understood in mechanical terms.
233. Here Finocchiaro cites Hesse (1961) as the source of

this

view. This historical process

of the acceptance of gravitation as intelligible stretches, says Finocchiaro, from Leibniz to
Kant,

and was the

result of

arguments showing

that gravitation, attraction,

and

action-at-a-

distance are no less intelligible than collision, repulsion, or contact action,

all of which
were already accepted as intelligible (248). In other words, the concept of intelligibility
changed so that appeal to gravitation was made consistent with the methodological ideal

that

all

concepts used be reducible

to other

concepts that are already understood. This

be distinguished from the additional later change that was the
by Einstein's theory of general relativity (see above for
the distinction between explanatory and conceptual intelligibility).
Finocchiaro is wrong, think, to locate gravitation's change of status in the

change

in intelligibility

is

to

result of the explanation of gravity

I

acceptance of mathematical theory as being intelligible in itself, at least if intelligibility is
understood in the explanatory sense. Mathematical theory is never explanatory in itself.
234. See, for example, Bowler

(1

983) and (1988), and Mayr

247

(1

983,

540ff.).
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